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RANDOMNESS, UNCERTAINTY, AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR: 
THE LIFE OF MONEY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY FICTION 
 
My dissertation argues that fiction produced in England during the frequent 
financial crises and political volatility experienced between 1770 and 1820 both reflected 
and shaped the cultural anxiety occasioned by a seemingly random and increasingly 
uncertain world. The project begins within the historical framework of the multiple 
financial crises that occurred in the late eighteenth century: seven crises took place 
between 1760 and 1797 alone, appearing seemingly out of nowhere and creating a 
climate of financial meltdown. But how did the awareness of economic turbulence filter 
into the creative consciousness? Through an interdisciplinary focus on cultural studies 
and behavioral economics, the dissertation posits that in spite of their conventional, status 
quo affirming endings (opportunists are punished, lovers are married), novels and plays 
written between 1770 and 1820 contemplated models of behavior that were newly 
opportunistic, echoing the reluctant realization that irrationality had become the norm 
rather than a rare aberration. By analyzing concrete narrative strategies used by writers 
such as Frances Burney, Georgiana Cavendish, Hannah Cowley, and Thomas Holcroft, I 
demonstrate that late eighteenth-century fiction both articulates and elides the awareness 
of randomness and uncertainty in its depiction of plot, character, and narrative.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Eighteenth-century Fiction and Behavioral Economics 
 
A rich uncle puts his nephew’s “creditworthiness” to the test by brokering the 
purchase of a family painting. An heiress will marry only if her future husband takes her 
last name. And in what is, arguably, English literature’s most famous first sentence, we 
learn “it is a truth universally acknowledged, that a single man in possession of a good 
fortune, must be in want of a wife.”  
Eighteenth-century fiction abounds in astute depictions of economic behavior and 
its underlying psychology. But while there is a diverse body of economic criticism 
written by and addressed to literary scholars, its focus is on external influences: the 
culture of private credit, formal and informal lending networks, borrowing, and 
consumerism in social life. Much of this scholarship derives its theoretical impetus from 
neoclassical economics, drawing upon research from the same cohort of august 
economists: one need only consider the preponderance of research derivative of the 
writings of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, John Stuart 
Mill, and Friedrich Hayek. Alan Richardson, citing Linda and Michael Hutcheon, is 
correct in calling such writing “interdiscursive” as opposed to truly interdisciplinary, 
“selectively incorporating elements of another discipline’s vocabulary, without placing 
one’s home disciplinary perspective into sustained, mutually vulnerable, and potentially 
transformative dialogue with the rival perspectives of colleagues trained in significantly 
different areas.”1 
                                                
1 Alan Richardson, The Neural Sublime: Cognitive Theories and Romantic Texts 
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This dissertation studies late eighteenth-century fiction through insights from 
behavioral economics, an emerging discipline at the intersection of economics and 
psychology. It argues that fiction produced in England during the frequent financial crises 
and political volatility experienced between 1770 and 1820 both reflected and shaped the 
cultural anxiety occasioned by a seemingly random and increasingly unreliable world. 
The project begins within the historical framework of the multiple financial crises that 
occurred in the late eighteenth century: seven crises took place between 1760 and 1797 
alone, appearing seemingly out of nowhere and creating a climate of financial meltdown. 
But how did the awareness of economic turbulence filter into the creative consciousness? 
Through an interdisciplinary focus on cultural studies and behavioral economics, the 
dissertation posits that in spite of their conventional endings (opportunists are punished, 
lovers are married), novels and plays written between 1770 and 1820 contemplate models 
of newly opportunistic financial behavior that illustrate the reluctant realization that 
irrationality had become the norm rather than a rare aberration. By analyzing concrete 
narrative strategies used by writers such as Frances Burney, Georgiana Cavendish, 
Hannah Cowley, and Thomas Holcroft, I demonstrate that late eighteenth-century fiction 
both articulates and elides the awareness of randomness and uncertainty in its depiction 
of plot, character, and narrative.  
 In introducing2 behavioral economics to the scholarly attention of literary studies, 
the dissertation promises to contribute to two fields: cultural studies and the social 
sciences. The individual chapters that follow will use interpretive tools from behavioral 
                                                                                                                                            
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), x. 
2 Though see some related work-in-progress by Blakey Vermeule (“The New 
Unconscious”) and William Flesch (“Decision Theory”). 
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economics’ vast disciplinary constituents—cognitive and social psychology, 
microeconomic theory, neuroscience, experimental finance, and sociology—to test 
theories and hypotheses that arise when we assimilate behavioral economic theory into 
literary analysis. The dissertation begins from my conviction that both disciplines—
behavioral economics and cultural studies—need to draw closer, perhaps even share in 
the conversation, since, one might argue, authors and economists study the same thing: 
human behavior in all its complexity and richness.  
 
What is behavioral economics? 
In its eighteenth-century origins, economic theory was built on the simplifying, 
and often unrealistic, hypothesis that individuals make economic decisions that are 
consistently rational and self-interested. Neoclassical economists—and, for the purposes 
of this dissertation, literary scholars writing economic criticism—construe normative 
economic behavior in terms of self-control and predictability. Yet these are assumptions 
that human beings violate repeatedly in their daily lives, but especially in unstable 
environments characterized by extreme events and uncertainty. In our economic lives, we 
are what celebrated psychologist Daniel Kahneman calls “‘fully rational, except for …’ 
some particular deviation.”3 In the past four decades, behavioral economics has emerged 
as a discipline that challenges many of the standard assumptions of mainstream 
economics. By incorporating realistic models of human behavior, behavioral economics 
tries to explain and predict how and why we make the economic choices we do.  
                                                
3 Daniel Kahneman, “A Psychological Perspective on Economics,” American Economic 
Review, 93.2 (2003): 163. 
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The eighteenth-century concept of homo economicus or economic man (the 
gendering is both infelicitous and inaccurate, as chapter 4, “Negotiating Money in The 
Wanderer” will illustrate) is always self-serving, consistently rational, and would never 
consider doing an act of charity. In other words, homo economicus is unlike anyone we 
have ever met. In contrast, behavioral economists aver human beings have “bounded 
rationality,” a concept first used by the economist Herbert Simon, meaning we have a 
limited capacity for rationality. Neither do we have unlimited information-processing 
abilities (something only our hypothetical homo economicus is blessed with), a “flaw” 
that might explain why the literary characters in the following chapters frequently make 
imperfect decisions with poor economic outcomes. And finally, while mainstream 
economists emphasize that self-interest is the impulse underlying our economic choices, 
the behavioral phenomenon of “bounded self-interest” may be closer to what we are in 
our daily lives: we perform acts of silent altruism and quiet charity, as many eighteenth-
century texts prove. 
Behavioral economics came into prominence in the 1970s, coinciding with the 
research of two psychologists Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman on the cognitive 
inconsistences that influence the way people take decisions.4 This research paper, 
“Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases” (1974) was followed by two that 
proved even more influential across the social sciences: “Prospect Theory: An Analysis 
of Decision under Risk” (1979) and “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of 
                                                
4 Kahneman and Tversky’s original research centered on three mental shortcuts or 
“heuristics” we apply in our daily lives to reduce the complexity of the large number of 
decisions with which we are faced: anchoring, availability, representativeness. They 
included many more heuristics over the years, expanding this original list considerably. 
For more, see David Laibson and Richard Zeckhauser, “Amos Tversky and the Ascent of 
Behavioral Economics,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 16 (1998): 9-11. 
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Choice” (1981). Kahneman and Tversky’s experiments, based frequently on economic 
subjects, soon influenced many allied disciplines, but especially the field of behavioral 
economics.  
 
The Economics of History; or, Towards a Behavioral Historicism  
The eighteenth century has been called the “Age of Enlightenment” and the “Age 
of Reason”; many of mainstream economics’ long-held theoretical premises can be traced 
back to the work of eighteenth-century economists such as David Ricardo and Adam 
Smith.5 The period’s concept of the individual as an unemotional and self-maximizing 
economic agent, termed homo economicus, abounds in eighteenth-century fiction: 
Defoe’s Captain Singleton and Robinson Crusoe are early examples. The “financial 
revolution” of the eighteenth century has received much critical attention.6 Literary 
scholars have frequently focused on the rise of paper credit, and the implications of 
extending unsecured personal loans based on reputation or perceived financial worth.7 
                                                
5 We might, however, convincingly argue Adam Smith is as much a psychologist as an 
economist, describing loss aversion in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) through 
his observation that “we suffer more … when we fall from a better to a worse situation, 
than we ever enjoy when we rise from worse to better.” See Smith, Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, 213. 
6 See P. G. M. Dickson, The Financial Revolution in England (London: Macmillan, 
1967), especially chapter 2. Also J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton: 
Princeton UP, 1975), particularly chapters XIII (“Neo-Machiavellian Political Economy” 
and XIV (“The Eighteenth-Century Debate”); and Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and 
History. See also Eric Kerridge, Trade and Banking in Early Modern England 
(Manchester: Manchester UP, 1991), particularly chapter 3 (“Commercial Credit”). 
7 Three frequently cited works are Catherine Ingrassia’s Authorship, Commerce, and 
Gender in Early Eighteenth-Century England: A Culture of Paper Credit, Margot Finn’s 
The Character of Credit, and Patrick Brantlinger’s Fictions of State: Culture and Credit 
in Britain, 1694-1994. 
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My dissertation, however, begins with my interest in one cultural phenomenon has been 
largely ignored in the literature: the financial crisis.  
A stupendous thirteen financial crises occurred between 1701 and 1797.8 One 
financial crisis, leave alone waves of such crises, derails a society’s conception of itself. 
Similar to the idea of paper credit—part substance, part abstraction—a financial crisis 
emerges within the context of fact and fiction.9 Julian Hoppit notes, “[C]rises are 
produced by sudden alterations of expectations that are rooted partly in reality and partly 
in the imagination.”10 To draw a connection with behavioral economics, which also 
investigates the irrational quirks in human nature, a financial crisis gains momentum 
from small, seemingly unrelated choices made by thousands of individuals, and is 
considered a random, inexplicable phenomenon when it happens, but is retrospectively 
                                                
8 The classic text on financial instability in eighteenth-century England is T. S. Ashton, 
Economic Fluctuations in England, 1700-1800 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959). While 
financial crises remain phenomena rooted in both financial reality as well as investor 
perception, Ashton attempts a combination of quantitative and qualitative analysis. By 
analyzing movements in prices of Bank of England shares, East India Company stock and 
South Sea company shares, and changes in Bank of England bullion holdings, Ashton 
concludes that the crisis years were 1701, 1710, 1715, 1720, 1726, 1745, 1761, 1763, 
1772, 1778, 1788, 1793, and 1797.  
Nor is this is a phenomenon restricted to the eighteenth century. Charles 
Kindleberger and Robert Aliber note that “[i]n the first two-thirds of the nineteenth 
century, crises occurred regularly at ten-year intervals (1816, 1826, 1837, 1847, 1857, 
1866), and thereafter crises occurred less regularly (1873, 1907, 1921, 1929).” For more, 
see Kindleberger and Aliber, Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises 
(Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2005), 21.  
9 Alexander Pope’s anthropomorphic characterization of credit in is well known:  
Blest paper-credit! last and best supply!  
That lends Corruption lighter wings to fly!”  
(Pope, Epistle to Bathurst, 69-70) 
Daniel Defoe famously gendered credit as a woman: Lady Credit, who “will keep 
Company with none but the Industrious, the Honest, the Laborious, and such, whose 
Genius, the Bent of their Lives, tends to Maintain her good Opinion.” Defoe's Review, 
XVII, 221, 5 Aug. 1710. 
10 Julian Hoppit, “Financial Crises in Eighteenth-Century England” The Economic 
History Review 39 (February 1986): 41.  
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understood as perfectly predictable. Charles Kindleberger and Robert Aliber note that in 
the build-up to a financial crisis, “[s]omeone with ‘perfect foresight’ should have 
foreseen that the process was not sustainable and that an implosion was inevitable.”11 
This bias in human perception can be traced to our tendency to collect a small sample, 
gather evidence, and then draw conclusions that apply to an entire domain of life, a 
characteristic behavioral economists study closely. In many of the chapters that follow, I 
will argue that by holding on too rigidly to what they know and can predict—about 
human nature and about the direction of their financial lives—men and women in 
eighteenth-century fiction frequently display many of the traits also of deep interest to 
behavioral economists.  
The decision to select texts from 1770 to 1820 was based on my reading of this 
fifty-year period as one of “radical discontinuity,” as Dror Wahrman observes:  
Characterizing this shift as a revolution—a ‘cultural revolution’—is meant to 
highlight the surprising rapidity of the transformation from one identity regime to 
another, the far-reaching range of its effects, and the magnitude of the change that 
it brought about—that is to say, how very dissimilar the new regime of identity 
was to the ancien régime that had preceded it. So dissimilar, indeed, that we will 
repeatedly encounter turn-of-the-century observers who looked back at the 
eighteenth century with expressions of distance, incomprehension and disbelief.12  
 
With a particular interest in creative “expressions of distance, incomprehension and 
disbelief,” I turn my attention to late eighteenth-century fiction through a theoretical 
mode of critical inquiry I call ‘behavioral historicism.’ This historicist framework 
examines the behavioral processes of literary characters, especially as they manifest in 
economic choices and decision-making. I extend and modify the New Historicism by 
                                                
11 Kindleberger and Aliber, Manias, Panics and Crashes, 26. 
12 Dror Wahrman, The Making of the Modern Self: Identity and Culture in Eighteenth-
Century England (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), xiv. 
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engaging in literary interpretation that uses, extensively and innovatively, theories and 
models emerging from behavioral economics and its allied disciplines. Behavioral 
historicism examines the choices of literary characters, especially as they manifest in 
economic decision-making, as revealing what people value within particular cultural 
contexts and why such value and meaning is assigned. 
Behavioral historicism argues that eighteenth-century cultural historians and 
literary scholars have much to learn from the period’s fiction and its representation of 
economic behavior as seen through the lens of historical energies. Emotions such as trust, 
fairness, altruism, and competitiveness often underlie literary characters’ economic 
decisions but are also expressions of cultural context. In the chapters that follow, I use 
behavioral historicism as a theoretical mode for reaching new interpretations of literary 
texts. The dissertation’s larger impetus is to introduce to the conversation in eighteenth-
century cultural studies new frames of inquiry, different ways of answering some 
longstanding questions, and a healthy skepticism (or the “hermeneutics of suspicion”) 
through a dynamic dialogue with behavioral economics.  
My theoretical position in this dissertation emerges from my interest in the 
uncertain nature of life in late eighteenth-century England, and the consequences of such 
instability on the behavior portrayed in the period’s literature. Protracted wars with 
France and in the American colonies reinforced a sense of unease about the unpredictable 
nature of life. The Industrial Revolution created rural migration and urban displacement; 
the period’s fiction often depicts the challenges in navigating a new kind of society with 
changed contours of personal identity. England’s colonial empire expanded, making the 
world even bigger and more unknowable for late eighteenth-century men and women. In 
 9 
the stock markets, the South Sea Bubble in 1720 succeeded by intermittent financial 
panics and crises from the 1760s onward engendered sweeping fears about financial and, 
ultimately, personal valuation. Given that far-reaching cultural turbulence tends to affect 
our relationship with money, I believe we need to revisit the existing framework through 
which we read the period’s literature. I propose we do this by analyzing the economic 
behavior delineated in fiction, particularly when interpenetrated with historicist contexts.  
Today with our hindsight of history, we look at refugee poverty, forced migration, 
and prolonged wars, with a certain sense of fatigue. We in the twenty-first century have 
seen it all before. But readers of fiction between 1770 and 1820 would have seen their 
lives restructured by the caprice of history. The French Revolution, the Anglo-American 
and the Napoleonic Wars, the constant cessation and rekindling of Anglo-French conflict, 
domestic sedition and treason trials, the anti-slavery movement, the Industrial Revolution 
and rural displacement, a series of financial crises in the stock markets, all taken together 
would have caused something of an avalanche of turbulence creating what Colin 
Nicholson calls “both an end and a beginning.”13 To provide only one example, in 
Chapter 4 (“Negotiating Money in The Wanderer”) Burney makes her heroine a working 
woman, one who is dealing with unpredictability in every area of life, and is trying to 
make her way out of it without knowing how it will all end, making The Wanderer, in my 
reading, a watershed text for our understanding of the late eighteenth century: a society in 
a state of “unease” and an “intense feeling of helplessness” in “a world that more and 
more seemed not to have a satisfactory, nor even particularly discernible, order.”14  
                                                
13 Colin Nicholson, “‘Illusion on the Town’: Figuring out Credit in The Dunciad,” 
Literature and History 12.2 (1986): 184. 
14 Mona Scheuermann, Social Protest in the Eighteenth-Century English Novel 
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Social, political, and financial turbulence are always mirrored in human behavior. 
We do not live our lives in siloes, hermetically sealed from the world around us. 
Behavioral economists have long affirmed that human beings tend to dismiss outliers—
seemingly impossible events—and are blind to probability (‘this could never happen to 
me’) in our assumption of risky economic choices. We believe the past will reliably 
predict the future, and are hence unprepared, even shocked, when hit by extreme events. 
Nassim Nicholas Taleb (more on his work in Chapter 3) who studies randomness in stock 
markets describes this behavioral trait: “It is a problem with the way we construct 
samples and gather evidence in every domain. We shall call this distortion a bias, i.e., the 
difference between what you see and what is there.”15 But in the transitional world of late 
eighteenth-century England, there was no longer any way to view events with past 
experience, because the past often did not match up to the present.  
The primary texts I have selected all seem to suggest that the human mind is not 
equipped, adequately at least, to handle unpredictability, and hence we must incorporate 
such unpredictability into our behavior constantly, incorporating new information and 
new insights every day. Centering my attention on, what was retrospectively, a defining 
historical period in English history and one characterized by shifts in both economic and 
social configurations, I consider the question: how do writers depict random events that 
the mind can neither comprehend nor predict? The texts I study all suggest they were 
produced at a specific cultural ‘moment’—an irregular ‘break’ in the economic system, 
as it was in English society. Ultimately, the larger claim this dissertation puts forward is: 
                                                                                                                                            
(Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1985), 140. 
15 Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (New 
York: Random House, 2007), 102. 
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any historical period that witnesses extreme events demands that we pay attention to how 
human beings respond to these events through their economic choices; standard (or 
normative) rules of behavior are, typically, thrown out during unreliable times, and this 
phenomena will always find creative expression in cultural products.  
 
The Problem under Study 
My project is focused specifically on behavioral economics’ exploration of the 
departures and contradictions in our economic decisions and what this behavior reveals 
about who we are as a society. This inquiry is intellectually and historically relevant to 
our study of late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century fiction. My project argues that 
in these literary texts we find financial transactions between fictional characters reflect 
the unpredictable nature of the time with its forces that exposed systemic and personal 
vulnerabilities. 
The project is based on the overarching hypothesis that creative works produced 
within this fifty-year period, with its often cataclysmic social and political upheavals, 
modify and usually defy the characteristics of homo economicus. Specifically, I use 
approaches from behavioral economics to posit that the three central qualities of homo 
economicus—unbounded rationality, unbounded awareness, and unbounded self-
interest—are inadequate for explaining the actual economic behavior we encounter in late 
eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century texts. Writing in a society that was increasingly 
disordered, authors of the period posit that one could rise above the instability by 
managing financial relationships differently. Money thus becomes much more than a 
symbol of aspiration and power; I argue that analyzing the embedded financial narratives 
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within the period’s literary texts provides insights about the fantasies and anxieties that 
shaped society at this time.  
 
Some Central Questions 
While the dissertation grows out of previous concerns in eighteenth-century 
cultural studies, its focus is on the intersection of financial narratives in fiction and 
conceptual models from behavioral economics. Here are some questions I pursue within 
an interdisciplinary framework. 
England in the late-eighteenth century experienced an excessively high number of 
financial crises, seven of which occurred between 1760 and 1797 alone. Not surprisingly, 
the period’s fiction and drama often relate narratives of personal bankruptcies or anxieties 
about them. I investigate how literature makes sense of the irrationality of an individual’s 
financial destiny. 
Eighteenth-century economic theory correlates good (i.e., prudent) economic 
behavior with self-maximizing individualism, thereby establishing an equation that has 
assimilated itself into mainstream economics. Yet eighteenth-century literature abounds 
in instances of charity, generosity, and philanthropy. How do fiction writers and 
dramatists resolve the paradox of benevolence amidst the cultural prescription for self-
interest?  
Eighteenth-century literary texts are replete with characters indulging in 
conspicuous consumption and luxury that is financed through credit. How can these texts 
cast new light on why people take on excessive levels of personal debt and on the larger 
cultural implications of such indebtedness? I focus on behavioral economic concepts such 
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as ‘intertemporal choice’ and ‘mental accounting’ to investigate, innovatively, the 
representation of credit culture in fiction, with a focus on psychological paradoxes about 
credit. 
Forgery, often committed by socially respectable individuals, is a common feature 
of many of the literary texts I study. One explanation I propose is that eighteenth-century 
society had fixed, often bias-ridden, cognitive heuristics for financial valuation of 
individuals, and forgery plays with the limits of such heuristics. The question that 
emerges is: how do fictional characters extrapolate financial information about other 
characters? In other words, how does one recognize a forger? 
Gambling and card playing, often for high financial stakes, constitute a common 
literary trope in eighteenth-century drama and fiction. The popularity of this trope is an 
intriguing cultural phenomenon. I examine fictional depictions of games of chance and 
what they reveal about eighteenth-century culture when viewed through the lens of 
behavioral economic theories of probability. 
 
Outline 
 My dissertation derives its title from my interest in the ways in which authors 
depict literary characters taking decisions under conditions of conflict and uncertainty, 
whether personal or social. In the chapters that follow, I argue that authors represent the 
attempt to navigate a probabilistic world through literary characters’ economic choices, in 
particular, their underlying cognitive biases and heuristics (mental “rules-of-thumb”). 
Chapter 2 interprets Hannah Cowley’s The Belle’s Stratagem (1780) through economic 
research on trust, in particular, contract theory and information economics to examine, 
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“What does it mean to trust another person?” Chapter 3 reads Thomas Holcroft’s Jacobin 
novel The Adventures of Hugh Trevor (1794) as an instructional “guidebook” on luck 
against the backdrop of political turbulence of the 1790s’ Treason Trials (in which the 
author was indicted). Incorporating insights from financial theories of probability, I argue 
luck reveals the inner workings of personal and political agency, manifest particularly 
during historical moments of volatility. Chapter 4 analyzes Frances Burney’s The 
Wanderer (1814) to investigate how literary characters negotiate with others under 
conditions of conflict and risk. I focus my attention on the protagonist’s economic 
choices as a powerless French émigré facing a competitive and hostile society, 
demonstrating that the knowledge of cognitive and social psychology forms the 
underlying framework of economic negotiation. Chapter 5 examines the relationship 
between financial forgery and marital infidelity in Georgiana Cavendish’s epistolary 
novel The Sylph (1779). Incorporating evidence from two of the most infamous forgery 
trials of the 1770s—Doctor Dodd and the Perreau Brothers—I posit forgery is connected 
to the phenomena of financial crises and that duplicity, in the form of inexplicable events 
such as forgery and adultery, infiltrated every aspect of late eighteenth-century life. I 
conclude the dissertation by observations on an interdisciplinary conversation between 
cultural studies and behavioral economics, considering the broader theoretical 
implications of a dialogue between the humanities and the social sciences, its dangers as 
well as its possibilities. 
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Chapter 2 
Trust and Reciprocity in The Belle’s Stratagem 
 
Premiering on 22 February 1780,16 Hannah Cowley’s The Belle’s Stratagem17 
remains one of the eighteenth century’s most popular comedies. With its “seemingly 
effortless dialogue and … well-drawn high-spirited characters who test the boundaries of 
decorous behavior,” Stratagem is a throwback to the sparkling comedies of the 
Restoration and the Augustan Age.18 Its marriage plot, verbal sparring, false friends, and 
a title that references a famous dramatic predecessor—George Farquhar’s The Beaux’ 
Stratagem (1707)—help trace its theatrical lineage to the dramatic legacy of Aphra 
Behn’s The Rover (1677), Mirabell and Millamant in William Congreve’s The Way of the 
World (1700), and Susanna Centlivre’s The Busybody (1709), among others. Fred Link 
provides an account:  
The first part of [Letitia’s] stratagem is of course borrowed from She Stoops to 
Conquer, but there are only a few echoes of Kate Hardcastle in her character. She 
and Doricourt look back to the gay couples of Restoration comedy. ... Doricourt is 
more than a little reminiscent of Valentine in Love for Love. Saville suggests 
Cowley’s own Mr. Drummond, though a much younger version; Courtall 
resembles Horner in The Country Wife. Wycherley’s play may also have given 
hints for the Touchwoods; their conflict resembles that of the Pinchwives 
transferred to “higher” characters more like Sir Peter and Lady Teazle. Flutter is 
                                                
16 The Belle’s Stratagem was published in April 1782. Dublin piracies of the play had 
already appeared in 1781. Another Dublin edition was published in 1783 and a second 
London edition in 1787. The play was included in numerous collections—Elizabeth 
Inchbald’s British Theatre (1808) and William Oxberry’s New English Drama (1819), for 
example. It was also published in America. See Frederick M. Link, introduction to The 
Plays of Hannah Cowley, vol. 1, by Hannah Cowley (Garland: London, 1979), xlviii. 
17 Hereafter referred to as Stratagem. Lines from the play are taken from Melinda 
Finberg’s edition. Hannah Cowley, The Belle’s Stratagem, in Eighteenth-Century Women 
Dramatists, edited by Melinda C. Finberg (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001): 
211-80. 
18 Finberg, introduction to Eighteenth-Century Women Dramatists, xxxix. 
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not especially different from the century’s other fops, except perhaps in being less 
extreme.19 
 
The absence of anything “extreme” may well describe Cowley’s personal and 
professional agenda. She is at pains to avoid any suggestion that moral impropriety is 
approved within her creative world: Stratagem’s only immoral character, Courtall, is 
banished to Paris after being discovered as a villain. As a recent editor Melinda Finberg 
points out, after retiring from the stage in the late 1790s, Cowley “dedicated herself to 
respectability and began revising, or rather expurgating, her plays, [a revision that] set the 
tone for her biographers.”20 Hence Angela Escott’s claim that although “Cowley 
sometimes assumes the mask of the amateur,” “[s]urviving correspondence … provides 
an indication of [her] manipulation of her own professional life, and reveals that she did 
not passively accept her positioning as virtuous wife, mother, and amateur dramatist.”21 
Indeed, the intention to revise first impressions may well describe the plot of Stratagem.  
Stratagem’s hero and heroine, Doricourt and Letitia, are betrothed thanks to a 
shrewd financial contract drawn up by her father, John Hardy.22 As the play begins, they 
are meeting for the first time as adults. Determined to win the heart of her future husband, 
Letitia designs an elaborate stratagem. She will pretend to be a garrulous simpleton 
(thereby repelling the sophisticated Doricourt). Then she will disguise herself at a 
masquerade and make him fall in love with her.  
                                                
19 Link, introduction, xx-xxi. 
20 Finberg, introduction, xlii. 
21 Angela Escott, ‘The Celebrated Hannah Cowley’: Experiments in Dramatic Genre, 
1776-1794 (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2012), 23, 11. 
22 We are reminded of this when Doricourt plans to break off his engagement with 
Letitia: “The moiety of the estate which [Hardy] will forfeit shall be his the next moment 
by deed of gift.” Cowley, Stratagem, 5.2.27-28. 
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Predictably, Doricourt is unimpressed by the ‘rustic Letitia’ but decides 
nonetheless to honor their marriage contract. Then at the masquerade, he falls in love 
with the ‘masked Letitia,’ but though she will entice and flirt, she refuses to disclose her 
name. At the play’s conclusion as Doricourt and Letitia prepare to marry, she reveals 
herself as the same masked woman, thereby proving ‘the belle’s stratagem’ has indeed 
succeeded. A secondary stratagem concerns a false friend, Courtall and his deceptive 
scheme to seduce the virtuous Lady Frances, disguised as her husband Sir George 
Touchwood. The real Sir George is madly, if possessively, in love with his wife, which in 
turn is precisely the motivation Courtall needs: the thrill of sexual conquest. 
Existing scholarship on Stratagem reads it through the interpretive framework of 
the masquerade, which many scholars consider the play’s dramatic crux. Elizabeth 
Kowaleski Wallace examines the play as an “endorsement of a theatrical 
cosmopolitanism that forms the basis of a potentially progressive nationalism, one in 
which individuals are free to make themselves—as British women and men—what they 
will.”23 Finberg discusses the issues of appearance and identity as they appear in the play, 
also paying particular attention to the trope of the masquerade. Betsy Bolton states that 
“[a]t the end of the eighteenth century… femininity was equated with changeability,” 
adding that, consequently, Stratagem “emphasize[s] the plasticity of female character.”24 
In her comparative study of Cowley and Eliza Haywood, Tassie Gwilliam “sketch[es] 
ways that Fantomina can open up a reading of disguise, fantasy, and misrecognition in 
                                                
23 Elizabeth Kowaleski Wallace, “Theatricality and Cosmopolitanism in Hannah 
Cowley’s The Belle’s Stratagem,” Comparative Drama 35 (2001): 417.  
24 Betsy Bolton, “Hannah Cowley, Gender Identity, and A Bold Stroke for a Husband,” in  
Teaching British Women Playwrights of the Restoration and the Eighteenth Century, 
edited by Bonnie Nelson and Catherine Burroughs (New York: MLA, 2010), 167. 
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The Belle’s Stratagem,” reading both texts as “masquerade[s] of femininity.”25 The 
common thread in Cowley criticism is a focus on disguise, performance, and gender, all 
of which converge in the literary trope of the masquerade. Aside from its role as the 
centripetal point of Stratagem, the masquerade is particularly interesting from a 
behavioral economic perspective: it tests the boundaries of human rationality by showing 
up discontinuities between appearance and reality. The masquerade’s central gesture, that 
which Terry Castle describes as dismantling “institutionalized oppositions [and] 
ideological categories”26, finds a parallel in behavioral economists’ fundamental 
conviction that human beings abound in cognitive and behavioral biases. In my critical 
reassessment of Stratagem, I set out to formulate an alternative interpretation formulated 
at the meeting-point of literary criticism and behavioral economics, namely by reading 
Stratagem through the framework of economic research on trust and reciprocity.  
I argue Stratagem is a study of how human beings decide to trust, especially when 
such a decision is framed within the context of a financial contract in which the parties do 
not know each other. I start my exposition with the Investment Game, a conceptual model 
emerging out of experimental economics and game theory (more on this in section one) 
that I use to interpret issues of trust and reciprocity as they emerge in the play. I argue 
society has evolved complex rituals to test trustworthiness that, in turn, have established 
social norms and social history.27 Further in a new reading of this popular literary trope, I 
                                                
25 Tassie Gwilliam, “Disguise, Fantasy, and Misrecognition in The Belle’s Stratagem and 
Fantomina,” in Teaching British Women Playwrights, 275. 
26 Terry Castle, Masquerade and Civilization: The Carnivalesque in Eighteenth-Century 
Fiction (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986), 78. 
27 I use the term ‘social history’ with the same meaning intended by the authors of the 
Investment Game, namely the sum total of all our past interactions with others and the 
economic information (related to trust and reciprocity) these interactions reveal. This is 
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claim that by offering complete anonymity (the equivalent of an experimental “double 
blind” study), the masquerade demonstrates, in the purest form, how and why we decide 
to trust strangers.28 
In the first section, I introduce the Investment Game and investigate the 
behavioral drivers of trust. To explain the role of gossip in the play, section 2 introduces 
concepts from social network theory. The third section is a discussion of the problem of 
moral hazard, an economic concept I use to explain Doricourt’s apprehension of the 
marriage contract. The fourth section moves its focus to what I see as the play’s 
governing metaphor: the masquerade. I examine the masquerade through two economic 
concepts: paltering and sign posting. In the fifth and final section, I lay out the 
complexities of trust within an eighteenth-century marriage.  
This chapter builds on, but takes further, the central argument of this dissertation 
and of its individual chapters. Both the Investment Game I describe in the next section 
and the Prisoner’s Dilemma in chapter 4 (“Negotiating Money in The Wanderer”) have 
game theoretic origins. The problem of how to trust, especially within the intimacy of 
marriage, is also the focus of chapter 5 (“The Performance of Forgery in Georgiana 
                                                                                                                                            
not the same as ‘social history’ as a historian would understand it. The decision to trust 
another person, especially in the face of little or no information, is cognitively complex, 
and one influenced by our past history with individuals and large social groups. This 
shared repository of memory is what I am thinking of when I use the term ‘social 
history.’ For more see Joyce Berg, John Dickhaut and Kevin McCabe, “Trust, 
Reciprocity, and Social History,” Games and Economic Behavior 10 (1995): 132-35.  
28 This is analogous to Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe’s experimental design in the 
Investment Game: “By guaranteeing complete anonymity and by having subjects play the 
investment game only once, we eliminate mechanisms which could sustain investment 
without trust; these mechanisms include reputations from repeat interactions, contractual 
pre-commitments, and potential punishment threats.” In other words, anonymity and the 
absence of a ‘history’ allow a better understanding of the behavioral and cognitive 
influences on trust. Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, “Trust, Reciprocity, and Social 
History,” 123. 
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Cavendish’s The Sylph). Lastly, the strategic configuration of uncertainty, specifically the 
idea that luck and randomness can be manipulated at will, will be examined in chapter 3 
(“How to Be Lucky: Lessons from The Adventures of Hugh Trevor”) and is also under 
the spotlight in Letitia’s ‘stratagem.’   
In sum, instead of mapping Cowley’s text to my central argument, I cross-read a 
variety of economic concepts on trust against the text, trying to discover if such cross-
pollination helps us arrive at new ways of reading. Behavioral economics is a discipline 
that has long studied trustworthiness, and hence intersects domains wonderfully with 
literary criticism. The payoff of such cross-pollination would be having both disciplines 
share in a common, mutually accessible, conversation. After all, we might argue literary 
critics and behavioral economists study the same thing: theories of human behavior. 
 
1. The Investment Game  
The Investment Game has ties to the Prisoner’s Dilemma I discuss in chapter 4: 
both frameworks emerge out of game theory and share the same game theoretic mission, 
namely to simulate real-world financial scenarios and to construct models based on how 
people make choices within these scenarios.  
The Investment Game is designed in this manner. Subjects in room A decide how 
much of $10 to send to anonymous counterparts in room B. Room A is told each dollar 
sent will triple by the time it reaches room B. Room B then decides how much of the 
tripled money to keep and how much to send back to their respective counterparts. The 
rational strategy29 would be to send no money, i.e., to pocket the entire $10. Yet Room A 
                                                
29 Here Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe use the term ‘Nash equilibrium’ which in game 
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sends, on average, $5.16 to Room B. How does one explain this behavior? Are 
individuals predisposed to trust?30  
The Investment Game reveals that trust and reciprocity are not straightforward 
behavioral decisions. Trustworthiness is created through a complex mental process that 
involves conjecture, interpretation, and the positive expectation of reciprocity. The 
Investment Game allows me to draw four conclusions I apply in my analysis of 
Stratagem. Firstly, trust and reciprocity are behavioral ‘primitives’—cognitive 
predispositions essential for the survival of the human species.31 Berg, Dickhaut and 
McCabe call trust “an evolutionarily stable strategy” that “maximizes genetic fitness” and 
“guides behavior in new [and unknown] situations.”32  
Secondly, social history has a complicated relationship with trust.33 One of the 
most interesting results of the Investment Game is that moving from a context of ‘no 
history’ between participants (namely a one-shot, double-blind study) to that of ‘social 
history’ (or iterated moves involving decisions to send money) results in an increase in 
the amount of money Room A and Room B subjects send back.34 This finding is germane 
to our reading of Stratagem and, by extension, many eighteenth-century texts involving 
                                                                                                                                            
theory refers to a state of stability between the participants in a competitive interaction. In 
this state of ‘equilibrium,’ no participant can gain from changing strategies unilaterally if 
the strategies of others do not change. Put simply, it is the best possible strategy or plan 
of action for us regardless of the strategy of others.  
30 Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, “Trust, Reciprocity,” 123. 
31 For more on evolutionary approaches to trust, see Jack Hirshleifer, “Economics from a 
Biological Viewpoint.” Also Werner Güth and Menahem Yaari, “Explaining Reciprocal 
Behavior in Simple Strategic Games: An Evolutionary Approach.”  
32 Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, “Trust, Reciprocity,” 124. 
33 See my earlier note about ‘social history’ in which I define the term somewhat 
differently than a historian would. ‘Social history’ in this chapter refers to the collective 
repository of our past interactions with others, which includes factors as varied as 
reputation and internalized cultural norms.  
34 Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, “Trust, Reciprocity,” 137. 
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deception. Are we predisposed to trust people even when we know very little about them 
simply because we are behaviorally inclined to do so, expecting our trust will be 
reciprocated?  
Thirdly, we interpret certain behaviors as ‘signaling,’ or gesturing, 
trustworthiness. In the Investment Game, sending money to a stranger indicates ‘forward 
signaling’ of trustworthiness; the stranger then signals back by reciprocating through a 
larger amount. Finally, while we reward trustworthiness, we punish deceit often for no 
other reason than to uphold social cohesion. Courtall’s banishment from the light and 
sparkling world of Stratagem, “laughed at and despised”35 for his untrustworthiness is 
one instance of a “negative form of reciprocity.”36 
Let us examine each of these observations one by one. Trust and reciprocity are 
behavioral primitives; we are evolutionarily hard-wired to trust not only our friends but 
also casual acquaintances. (As an aside this is also why duplicity and betrayal, 
particularly from those we consider socially intimate, resonates deep within the psyche.) 
However, Cowley’s use of the figure of the false friend might speak for a different, more 
cynical, reality—namely that trust “may in some circumstances … be superseded by an 
individual’s capacity to engage in self-interested decision-making.”37 Thus, in Stratagem, 
Courtall’s plot to seduce a married woman, disguised as her husband, is propelled by self-
interest. A successful seduction gives him the opportunity to “boast of [his] influence 
                                                
35 Cowley, Stratagem, 4.2.65. 
36 Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe observe this is true regardless of experimental design:  
[E]xperiments on ultimatum game[s], repeated prisoners’ dilemma games, and 
other extensive form games provide strong evidence that people do punish 
inappropriate behavior even though this is personally costly. Furthermore, 
subjects take this into account when they make their decisions.  
See Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, “Trust, Reciprocity,” 138. 
37 Ibid., 124.  
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with women of rank”38; he also adds to his growing catalog of sexual conquests: “You 
shall see her name tomorrow morning in red letters at the end of my list.”39 Because 
Courtall is an inept schemer, his plan—clumsy in both thought and execution—is 
stymied and Courtall himself banished to the outer reaches of Stratagem’s trusting world. 
But the danger lingers. Trust, naïvely placed, may be our undoing.  
Trust has been famously termed as “an important lubricant of a social system,” 
but on the other side of the coin lies the danger of unthinking, careless trust.40 Economists 
Alberto Alesina and Eliana La Ferrara incorporate this idea in their ‘reciprocity 
argument’: 
[T]rust may be based on past experience. One trusts others if he is used to be[ing] 
treated fairly by his fellow men. This is a sort of a reciprocity argument for trust. 
[T]his argument may apply both at an individual level and at a ‘group’ level. If an 
individual has been hurt in past interactions with others he may trust less. Also if 
a group has been discriminated against de jure or de facto, members of that group 
will not expect to be treated fairly in the future and therefore will trust less.41  
 
The intricate architecture of inter-group trust raises the question: what is the relationship 
between group (dis)trust and social history?  
Consider Hardy’s entrance in the masquerade scene in Act 4, disguised as a 
Jewish moneylender. When greeted by racial slurs, Hardy’s reply acknowledges that 
while a social history of distrust exists, this history is evolving with the passage of time: 
“Some of us turn Christians, and by degrees grow into all the privileges of Englishmen! 
                                                
38 Cowley, Stratagem, 4.2.67-68. 
39 Ibid., 4.2.37. 
40 Kenneth J. Arrow, The Limits of Organization (New York: Norton, 1974), 23. 
41 Alberto Alesina and Eliana La Ferrara, “The Determinants of Trust,” NBER Working 
Paper No. 7621, 2000, 3. 
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In the second generation we are Patriots, Rebels, Courtiers, and Husbands.”42 But as 
Kowaleski Wallace notes, this is a problematic riposte:  
Is a Jew who has turned Christian still a Jew who only masquerades as what he is 
not? Does he therefore only perform the role of Patriot, Rebel, Courtier, or 
Husband, thereby covering, hiding, or disguising what was originally stamped 
upon his character? Or, is Cowley here endorsing the idea that the Jew turned 
Christian leaves behind his origins and that he successfully adopts a new English 
identity?43 
 
One way to answer these questions is through the economic concept of ‘signaling.’  
Signaling44 refers to using for economic advantage “those observable 
characteristics attached to the individual that are subject to manipulation by him.”45 
Signaling transmits information, usually favorable, from one party to another to secure 
economic benefits. Spence’s original thesis considered how employers make hiring 
decisions based on candidates’ use of the expensive ‘signal’ of a college education to 
prove their merit for the job position. During the Investment Game, Berg, Dickhaut and 
McCabe discovered that “forward signaling, i.e., sending money in the investment game, 
may be essential for reciprocity,” proving in other words, that participants in the game 
                                                
42 Cowley, Stratagem, 4.1.30-32. 
43 Kowaleski Wallace, “Theatricality and Cosmopolitanism,” 416. 
44 Michael Spence’s theory of signaling won him the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2001 
(along with George Akerlof and Joseph Stiglitz). Spence’s argument is that the individual 
demonstrates and transmits information regarding skills for a job position to future 
employers by acquiring expensive ‘signals’ in the form of a college degree. The very 
process of acquiring this ‘signal’ differentiates the capable candidate from one less 
capable. Since an employer rarely knows the abilities of a future employee, “[t]o hire 
someone … is frequently to purchase a lottery,” effectively making an investment 
decision under uncertainty. Hence the possession of differentiators such as a college 
education demonstrates motivation and ability. The ‘signal’ thus becomes an indicator of 
intangible but potentially valuable qualities, although it might not reveal anything 
relevant about the candidate’s future job performance. Spence argues that, as a 
“conceptual lens,” signaling can be applied to several other phenomena including college 
admissions, job promotions, and loan applications. 
45 Spence, “Job Market Signaling,” 357. 
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‘signaled’ their capacity to trust by sending money to their anonymous counterparts, a 
gesture that invited reciprocity in kind.46 How may we apply the concept of ‘forward 
signaling’ to Hardy’s speech above? 
Hardy’s disguise as ‘Isaac Mendoza’ signals the ‘social history’ of racial 
prejudice, but also signals a movement away from it.47 Hence his point that “[i]n the 
second generation we are patriots, rebels, courtiers, and husbands.” We can, of course, 
disagree and say instead that this meta-theatrical moment suggests “the notion that 
identity (even ethnic identity) need not be stamped irretrievably and essentially”48; or we 
can hypothesize that Hardy’s ‘forward signaling’ of trust hints that social history can be 
overcome by cultural assimilation and reciprocity.49 We might speculate such forward 
signaling can be a useful tool in overcoming the collective paranoia of social groups 
throughout history.50 Signaling may also be something playwrights do, understanding 
                                                
46 Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, “Trust, Reciprocity,” 138. 
47 Cowley’s audience would have been quick to recognize the character of Isaac Mendoza 
from Richard Brinsley Sheridan’s popular comedy, The Duenna (1775). In the play 
Mendoza, a Portuguese Jew, is an avaricious and ridiculous merchant planning to marry a 
rich Spanish lady, Donna Louisa, but is outsmarted into marrying Lady Margaret, 
Louisa’s duenna instead. Both roles—Mendoza in The Duenna and Mr. Hardy in 
Stratagem—were played by the same actor, John Quick.   
48 Kowaleski Wallace, “Theatricality and Cosmopolitanism,” 417. 
49 On the subject of forward signaling, Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe observe: 
An important feature of the investment game is that different amounts … can be 
sent from [room A to B and vice versa]. … At one extreme, sending $1 may 
signal a very weak belief in reciprocity; at the other extreme, sending $10 may 
signal a strong belief in reciprocity. From an evolutionary perspective, someone 
with a predisposition to reciprocate may be more willing to reciprocate when they 
believe their counterpart shares a common regard for trust. 
Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, “Trust, Reciprocity,” 127. 
50 At another level, the play’s anti-Semitism reveals social mobility in Georgian England 
was difficult to achieve even across generations. Roy Porter gives us the example of 
“[t]he fabulously rich Jewish financier and government contractor Sampson Gideon 
[who] converted to Anglicanism, but it was his son who became a baronet.” Roy Porter, 
English Society in the Eighteenth Century (London: Penguin, 1990), 52. For more on 
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intuitively that different audiences receive and interpret information differently. We are 
passed on information about dramatic characters through a variety of “signals”: dialogues 
at key moments in the plot, monologues that work as “confessions” to the audience, 
subplots that turn out to be red herrings. These information signals interact, seemingly 
random but actually placed by design, to culminate in the theatrical impact of the play. 
The economics of information thus crosses seamlessly into the creative world. 
 
2. Gossip: Insights from Social Network Theory 
“What events have happened in the world since yesterday?”51 In answer to 
Villers’ question, Flutter narrates all the gossip he can recall, adding, “[T]he common 
events of this little dirty world are not worth talking about, unless you embellish ’em.”52 
Villers concedes he would “never believe one tenth part of what you say … [b]ut your 
intelligence is amusing.”53 
Such rabid interest in the lives of others confirms Patricia Meyer Spacks’s 
description of gossip as “an instrument … of control. … Gossip—verbal speculation—
derives from and reflects a way of seeing; it confirms the vision of its group.”54 Echoing 
this viewpoint is Edith Gelles who notes the movement of gossip makes it a means of 
“convey[ing] the unwritten conventions of a circle of people, it is far from idle talk,”55 
and that “underlying … the discourse [of gossip] is the elementary understanding that 
                                                                                                                                            
anti-Semitism in eighteenth century England, see Dror Wahrman, The Making of the 
Modern Self. 
51 Cowley, Stratagem, 1.4.5. 
52 Ibid., 1.4.19-20. 
53 Ibid., 1.4.12-13. 
54 Patricia Meyer Spacks, Gossip (New York: Knopf, 1985), 172. 
55 Edith B. Gelles, “Gossip: An Eighteenth-Century Case,” Journal of Social History 22, 
no. 4 (1989): 668. 
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language has power, and that the power inherent in the language of gossip derives from 
… the behavior of other human beings.”56 Blakey Vermeule describes fiction as 
“reporting on the world’s shifting shapes and trying to unpack the motives, intentions, 
feelings, and plans of the people in it,” qualities that make it somehow analogous to a 
pruriently satisfying gossip-session.57   
Consider these statements against the backdrop of two seemingly discrete plot 
events. In the first event, Courtall’s scheme unfolds with a little help from an intricate 
network of information. (Note the recurrence of the phrase “do you know.”):  
Courtall. Dick, do you know any of the servants at Sir George Touchwood’s? 
Dick. Yes, sir; I knows [sic] the groom, and one of the housemaids. For the matter 
o’ that, she’s my own cousin, and it was my mother that helped her to the place.  
Courtall. Do you know Lady Frances’s maid? 
Dick. I can’t say as how I know she [sic]. 
Courtall. Do you know Sir George’s valet? 
Dick. No, sir, but Sally’s very thick with Mr. Gibson, Sir George’s gentleman.  
Courtall. Then go there directly and employ Sally to discover whether her master 
goes to Lady Brilliant’s this evening, and, if he does, the name of the shop that 
sold his habit.  
Dick. Yes, sir.  
Courtall. Be exact in your intelligence, and come to me at Boodle’s.58  
 
In the second event, the abovementioned Gibson, Sir George’s valet, speculates on the 
maid Sally’s curious behavior. Gibson has been overhearing the Touchwoods discuss 
what they will wear to the masquerade: “A pink domino trimmed with blue, and a hat of 
the same.—What the devil can it signify to Sally now what his dress is to be?”59 The 
connecting thread between these two events is the exchange of information and, 
                                                
56 Gelles, “Gossip,” 667. 
57 Blakey Vermeule, “Gossip and Literary Narrative,” Philosophy and Literature 30, no. 
1 (2006): 103. 
58 Cowley, Stratagem, 3.2.89-102. 
59 Ibid., 3.4.99-100. 
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ultimately, power.60 These exchanges “reflect emergent dimensions of complex social 
systems that cannot be captured by simply summing or averaging its members’ 
attributes.”61 And so it is the world of Stratagem. Social network theory lets us trace the 
significance of plot events through underlying patterns of ties and relationships.  
Social network theory is a vast interdisciplinary field that draws felicitously from 
computer science, mathematics, and sociology, so I will elucidate only the basic terms 
here.62 The main elements of a social network are ‘actors’ and ‘ties.’63 Actors 
(occasionally termed ‘nodes,’ ‘social atoms,’ or ‘vertices’) can be human entities such as 
individuals, communities, and families.64 They can also be non-human, such as nations 
and communities. Actors form and maintain formal (e.g., legal, economic) or informal 
(friendship, gossip) ‘ties’ or relationships. The term ‘ties’ in social network theory (also 
called ‘links’) refers to connections between actors. Another important term is ‘network 
path.’ This is determined by tracing the number of degrees of separation between actors. 
                                                
60 For instance Courtall’s real goal behind the seduction of Lady Frances is power, 
specifically the ability to “boast of [his] influence with women of rank” because a 
successful seduction confers power over both the woman and the cuckolded husband. 
Cowley, Stratagem, 4.2.67. 
61 David Knoke and Song Yang, Social Network Analysis, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage, 2008), 7.  
62 See also Bernice Pescosolido, “Sociology of Social Networks,” in 21st Century 
Sociology: A Reference Handbook, edited by Clifton D. Bryant and Dennis L. Peck 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2007), 212-13. 
63 While Bruno Latour’s Actor-Network Theory deserves a mention here, the motivation 
for this section emerged from social network theory and not the line of science studies’ 
research for which Latour is best known. See Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How to 
Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1988); and also Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-
Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
64 Social network theory has hybrid origins, and multiple names for the same concept 
reflect the variegated nature of this discipline’s evolution. For example, the term ‘actor’ 
derives from sociology whereas ‘nodes’ and ‘vertices’ are drawn from graph theory, a 
field studied by computer scientists and mathematicians.  
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Thus, if two actors are directly connected, the value of the path is 1. Lastly, tie ‘strength’ 
is a measure of intensity of a tie in terms of frequency of interaction and intimacy. 
More formally, a social network is a system of interactive channels linking actors 
within the system.65 This system might be a community or a social group or, within the 
context of this play, the world of the dramatic characters. The social network enables the 
flow of information (also called relational data) between the actors. Each social network 
has distinctive underlying structural patterns of relations, and these patterns determine the 
flow of information, power, and trust. Fictional and dramatic texts draw regularly from 
the central concept of social network theory—namely, the idea that social structure is a 
web of relationships and that information moves through this web, ‘interlocking’ and 
‘interweaving’ a tapestry of connections.  
So to bring these concepts together, gossip flows within Stratagem’s dramatic 
world not only as a way for people to talk about each other but also to exert influence. Or, 
as sociologist Charles Kadushin notes, “[C]onnected people tend to have an effect on one 
another.”66 Servants play an especially significant role: Courtall’s servant Dick has a 
social network that gives him privileged access to information through a line (or ties, 
both strong and weak) of personal and professional relationships. For instance, his cousin 
Sally owes Dick a favor because his mother helped Sally gain employment.  
Visualize the social network of Stratagem as a ‘wheel’ with individual persons as 
‘spokes’ in this wheel. The figure of the servant functions as the hub, or the central point, 
                                                
65 The term ‘actor’ when used within the context of social network theory means an 
individual (or non-human entity) occupying a specific place within a network of 
information and resource sharing. Actors are the basic building blocks of social networks.  
66 Charles Kadushin, Understanding Social Networks: Theories, Concepts, and Findings 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 9. 
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of this ‘wheel.’ Servants uphold the status quo; they perform the role of gatekeepers of 
access and information; most importantly, they hold the power to disrupt ties through 
their ingenuity and resourcefulness, should they choose to abuse their power. 
The role of servants illustrates two important networking concepts: ‘centrality’ 
and ‘betweenness.’ Centrality highlights “an actor’s prominence within [the] network”; a 
high measure of centrality indicates the actor “has high involvement in many relations” 
and significantly more connections than others.67 In other words, the relative centrality of 
the position of servants within the social network of Stratagem both determines and 
reflects the balance of power inside this world. Betweenness “is a measure of a position 
that serves as a switching point or a gateway between different parts of a network,” an 
idea I incorporate in my reference above to the visual of a wheel.68 In other words, 
servants occupy a high ‘betweenness’ rank by virtue of their ability to mediate between, 
and bridge, the different parts of the network.  
Gossip would not spread pervasively unless servants made good use of the 
economic implications of ‘centrality’ and ‘betweenness.’ Often they know this 
intuitively, for instance in this exchange between the (self-styled) journalist Crowquill 
and Doricourt’s Porter:   
Porter. Well, what do you want with me?  
Crowquill. Sir, you must know that I am—I am the gentleman who writes the 
tête-à-têtes in the magazines. 
Porter. Oh, oh! What, you are the fellow that ties folks together in your sixpenny 
cuts that never meet anywhere else.  
Crowquill. Oh, dear sir, excuse me! We always go on foundation; and if you can 
help me to a few anecdotes of your master, such as what marchioness he lost 
money to in Paris—who is his favorite lady in town—or the name of the girl he 
first made love to at college—or any incidents that happened to his grandmother, 
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or great aunts—a couple will do, by way of supporters—I’ll weave a web of 
intrigues, losses, and gallantries between them that shall fill four pages, procure 
me a dozen dinners, and you, sir, a bottle of wine for your trouble. 
Porter. Oh, oh! I heard the butler talk of you when I lived at Lord Tinket’s. But 
what the devil do you mean by a bottle of wine? You gave him a crown for a 
retaining fee.  
Crowquill. Oh, sir, that was for a lord’s amours; a commoner’s are never but half. 
Why, I have had a baronet’s for five shillings, though he was a married man and 
changed his mistress every six weeks.69 
 
The conversation here is framed in explicitly economic terms: Crowquill needs the Porter 
to acquire access to other positions within the network. Thus even though the Porter is 
directly connected to one person only—his employer, Doricourt—he serves as an 
important bridge between parts of the network to which Doricourt has an entrée. 
Crowquill needs a scarce economic resource: information for his insalubrious gossip 
columns (“the tête-à-têtes”), but to supply content sufficient to “fill four pages,” he needs 
access to gossip: “anecdotes” from the lives of the rich. The Porter bridges the ‘distance’ 
between these two points on the network: Doricourt and Crowquill.70 Stratagem’s motley 
collection of servants—the Porter, Lord Tinket’s butler, untrustworthy valets and maids 
such as Dick and Sally—serve to bridge distance in a similar manner. We discover also 
that in network theoretic terms, these distances are surprisingly small. 
In the 1960s, social psychologist Stanley Milgram ran a series of experiments to 
measure this distance. Today when we use the popular phrase ‘six degrees of separation,’ 
we are referring to Milgram’s ‘Small World’ study: 
The small world method consists of presenting each of the persons in a ‘starting 
population’ with the description of a given ‘target person’—his name, address, 
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70 The distance between two points (or ‘nodes’) within a network is the length of the 
shortest path (or ‘geodesic distance’) that connects them. See Stanley Wasserman and 
Katherine Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications (Cambridge: 
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occupation, and other selected information. The task of a starter is to advance a 
booklet toward the target person by sending the booklet to a personal 
acquaintance who he considers more likely than himself to know the target. Each 
person in turn advances the booklet in this manner until the chain reaches the 
target.71  
 
Milgram discovered that the actual number of steps between two points on the network is 
six, reached through five intervening persons. These ‘six degrees of separation’ 
demonstrate no one is a stranger, and that people are instinctively skilled at making 
connections. Indeed it is ‘such a small world!’   
Consider the implications of the ‘Small World’ experiment in the light of the 
rumor-mongering Silvertongue’s description of London life: 
A lively imagination would convert this waxen city into an endless and interesting 
amusement. For instance, look into this little house on the right-hand. There are 
four old prudes in it taking care of their neighbours’ reputations. This elegant 
mansion on the left, decorated with Corinthian pillars—who needs to be told that 
it belongs to a court lord and is the habitation of patriotism, philosophy, and 
virtue? Here’s a City Hall—the rich steams that issue from the windows nourish a 
neighbouring work-house. Here’s a church—we’ll pass over that; the doors are 
shut. The parsonage-house comes next; we’ll take a peep here, however. Look at 
the doctor! He’s asleep on a volume of Toland whilst his lady is putting on rouge 
for the masquerade.—Oh! Oh, this can be no English city; our parsons are all 
orthodox, and their wives the daughters of modesty and meekness.72  
 
In other words, Silvertongue describes London as one large social network. In it class 
barriers do not seem to impact network linkages: everyone has their nose in everyone 
else’s business. The ‘Small World’ of urban life is an extraordinarily ‘dense’ network 
(i.e., a large number of connections exist linking ‘actors’ within the network), but also 
one with an underlying tension between ‘distance’ and closeness. People can be far apart 
socially—consider the “elegant mansion” adjacent to a “neighbouring work-house”—yet 
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are linked closely through common behavioral traits: “prudes” gossiping about 
“neighbours’ reputations,” the pretense at religious piety as symbolized in the “church 
[whose] doors are shut.” The ‘Small World’ of London provides “endless and interesting 
amusement” for denizens inclined to gossip. 
But what does such gossip tell us about trust within this social network? 
Stratagem’s ‘actors’73 and their eagerness to share morsels of information, often 
irrelevant, about other actors reveal what they are really seeking is a human connection 
no matter how tenuous: 
In network terms, safety or supportive systems are usually equivalent to density in 
networks, a condition that has been generally associated with ‘social support,’ 
‘cohesiveness,’ and ‘embeddedness.’ Dense social networks are characterized by 
the sense of ‘trust.’ That is, it is assumed that if you act in a certain way toward 
the other, the other will in turn satisfy your needs.74  
 
In other words, behavioral gestures of trust may well be the glue society needs in an 
uncertain and unsafe world. Paradoxically, gossip is such a gesture. Gossip whispers that 
the world is a little bit safer because now, two people know the same thing. They are both 
witness to this event, this anecdote. It has not gone unnoticed. 
 Gossip thus creates (paradoxically, one might add) a sense of safety by 
engendering the feeling of social solidarity. Whether or not such solidarity is real, or 
lasting, is questionable, but gossip, by its very nature, plays up the underlying dynamic of 
insiders versus outsiders. Thus, our reputation, and our place, in the community is safe 
when we escape mention in the “web of intrigues, losses, and gallantries”75 that constitute 
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the tawdry content of Crowquill’s “sixpenny cuts.”76 We gossip about outsiders—‘friends 
of friends’—but in our relationships with insiders we are (for the most part) honorable, 
and ultimately, trustworthy human beings.  
 
3. The Problem of Moral Hazard; Or, How to Buy Marital Insurance 
Doricourt is afraid of marriage.  
Long before we see him on stage the other characters refer to his fear, observing 
wryly that Doricourt’s impending marriage is “the happiest tidings … next to his being 
hanged.”77 Doricourt makes his first appearance expressing indifference towards 
matrimony: “[T]he hour of expectation is past”78; he continues with such apathy 
throughout the play, noting at one point that his “indifference… [has] advanced thirty-
two degrees towards hatred.”79 Then, once he has seen the woman at the masquerade 
(Letitia in disguise), he is desperate to extricate himself from his marriage contract: “Her 
name has given me an ague. … [H]ow shall I contrive to make old Hardy cancel the 
engagements! The moiety of the estate which he will forfeit shall be his the next moment 
by deed of gift.”80 The conflation of money with marriage takes me to the problem of 
‘moral hazard.’  
Moral hazard is the risk that one party in a contract assumes when dependent on 
the behavior, usually virtuous or moral, of the other party in the contract. These risks 
increase when there is no effective way to control this behavior. Typically, moral hazard 
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problems arise in situations wherein two or more parties form a contractual relationship, 
and the nature of the contract itself creates the incentives for misbehavior.  
The problem of moral hazard occurs regularly within the field of medical 
insurance (the insurance company does not know whether the insured is healthy) and car 
insurance (car insurance companies know little about the driving skills of policyholders). 
Another example is the relationship between stockholders and managers of publicly 
traded companies (technically termed an ‘agency relationship’). Stockholders have no 
way of knowing, at least on a daily basis, whether management is running the 
organization with stockholder interests in mind or whether questionable decisions are 
being taken to increase stock prices in the short term (and consequently, executive 
compensation such as in the case of Enron’s ‘creative accounting’ scandal). With respect 
to Stratagem, we might say the problem of moral hazard lies in the financial (and 
emotional) risk arising from the play’s unusual marriage contract. Doricourt believes the 
other party in this contract, namely his future wife, is a source of risk. May we extend the 
concept of moral hazard to their contract and draw comparable implications?  
Returning to the idea of insurance and its ties with moral hazard, we buy 
insurance to protect ourselves from unpredictable risks in many areas of life. 
Behaviorally, human beings are risk averse, preferring that someone else face our risk, 
perhaps in exchange for payment.81 Moral hazard emerges when the knowledge that 
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someone else (an insurance company, for instance, or the employer at our new job) will 
bear the cost of the risk motivates us to indulge in risky behavior—precisely because the 
other party, and not we, will have to pay for it. When two strangers are obliged to marry 
through a legal contract and little else, can one partner put the other at unforeseen risk—
of mismatched temperaments, emotional incompatibility, and a lifetime of unhappiness? 
Does Doricourt really have something to fear? 
Consider the conditions of their marriage contract: 
Courtall. Who is the bride elect? 
Saville. I never saw her; but ’tis Miss Hardy, the rich heiress. The match was 
made by her parents, and the courtship begun on their nurses’ knees … [T]hey 
have never met since ….  
Courtall. Never met! Odd! 
Saville. A whim of Mr. Hardy’s. He thought his daughter’s charms would make a 
more forcible impression if her lover remained in ignorance of them till his return 
from the continent.82  
 
Why, we might ask, is Letitia’s father so keen to keep his daughter’s “charms” hidden 
from her future husband? Is Doricourt’s unease about “an uninformed mind or inelegant 
manners” justified?83  
Moral hazard exists here because of three conditions. As the economic agent for 
Letitia, namely someone who makes decisions on her behalf, Mr. Hardy may not be 
acting in ‘good faith.’84 Secondly, Letitia and her father may have provided misleading or 
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inadequate information, leading to a condition of ‘asymmetric information.’85 Lastly, 
they have a strong financial incentive (“moiety,” or half, of Doricourt’s estate) for 
undertaking such false representation. Doricourt, the other party in this contract, does not 
really know the woman he is marrying, the overt (and covert) motivations she brings into 
the marriage, or even her physical appearance. Aside from its value as a dramatic device, 
the scale of this ignorance makes his fears very real. It is hardly surprising that the 
contractual nature of this marriage is not lost upon him: he evaluates his future bride with 
the appraising eyes of a curator (“she’s only a fine girl … nothing more”86) and is 
unimpressed by what he has paid for (“Like a good design, spoilt by the incapacity of the 
artist”87). 
Somewhat unusually, the courtship process in which both partners find out more 
about each other has been bypassed entirely, if not actively disrupted. Instead Doricourt 
and Letitia’s brief ‘courtship’ occurs within the masquerade scene, where it is suffused 
heavily by disguise and innuendo since she is determined not to disclose her identity. We 
might easily speculate this asymmetry of information will likely infiltrate all aspects of 
their future married life. 
It would be difficult to separate the problem of moral hazard from Doricourt’s 
suspicion of the contract itself. Indeed he believes the contracting party has an overt 
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financial end in mind (“in obedience to the will of Mr. Hardy, we met to sign and 
seal”).88 He is deeply suspicious of Letitia’s true character (“Do you know the creature’s 
almost an idiot?”89) and of the institution of marriage (“The chains of matrimony are … 
heavy and vulgar”90). In their study of deception, social psychologists Yaacov Schul, 
Eugene Burnstein and Anat Bardi performed experiments whose results suggested 
suspicious individuals elaborate on the messages they receive more than 
unsuspicious individuals. [S]uspicious individuals prepare to cope with 
potentially invalid information by entertaining multiple interpretations of the 
information. In contrast, unsuspicious individuals analyze messages within a 
single interpretive frame.91  
 
The concept of an ‘interpretive frame’ works on many levels; we might read Letitia’s 
entire stratagem as an attempt to change the ‘frame’ through which Doricourt sees her. 
Behavioral economists Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman point out the paradox in 
such ‘mental framing,’ a cognitive phenomenon wherein the way we ‘frame’ a problem 
influences the decisions we take about this problem: “We use the term ‘decision frame’ to 
refer to the decision-maker’s conception of the acts, outcomes and contingencies 
associated with a particular choice. … It is often possible to frame a given decision 
problem in more than one way.”92 But try as she may to frame herself differently, 
Letitia’s conviction that behavioral malleability93 will protect her from future 
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unhappiness is misguided; it is an attempt to purchase marital insurance “as protection 
against worry, [believing] that worry can be manipulated by the labeling of outcomes and 
the framing of contingencies.”94 Of course, none of this would be necessary if she only 
trusted her future husband. 
But what about Letitia’s own risk of moral hazard? Is she not in danger of hidden 
information about Doricourt emerging after they are married? Are we to believe she will 
have perfect control over all her husband’s actions? For dramatic purposes, Cowley’s 
chooses to write about the problem of moral hazard purely from the man’s experience, 
not the woman’s. (Incidentally, this makes for a more satisfying play for female 
audiences—women’s romantic fantasies generally involve bringing a sophisticated 
playboy to his knees.)  
In any case, there is no moral hazard in Letitia’s case precisely because she is 
armed with knowledge about future behavior. She is aware, for instance, women have 
little control over husbands: “The woman that has not touched the heart of a man before 
he leads her to the altar has scarcely a chance to charm it when possession and security 
turn their powerful arms against her.”95 Instead she applies information about Doricourt’s 
preferences in women to execute her stratagem and negotiate the marriage contract post 
hoc. Such a solution may not, as Misty Anderson notes, “present an utopia, but rather a 
hopeful resolution to her … existential dilemma in an imperfect world.”96 So while 
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women do not broker contracts (only men do), Letitia’s stratagem integrates “extralegal 
negotiations through which [to] imagine the … union.”97  
The problem of moral hazard is at its core a problem of trust. It says, ‘I do not 
believe you will act in my best interests although we have a contractual relationship 
which predicates that you should.’ George Touchwood may be the poster boy for this 
problem. Figuratively speaking, Sir George sleeps with one eye open, always expecting 
his wife’s true character will emerge and catch him by surprise (the problem of 
asymmetric information once again); and second, that his uxoriousness will get in the 
way of contractual compliance (i.e., he is too besotted with her to monitor her behavior as 
a dutiful wife). He admits he “married Lady Frances to engross her to myself; yet … her 
eyes, thoughts, and conversation, are continually divided among all the flirts and 
coxcombs of fashion.”98  
What both men really fear is risk—the risk of trusting too much, the risk of being 
controlled in a marriage of equals—and such risk aversion is a fundamental human 
quality, problematic for playwrights and economists alike.99 So the problem of moral 
hazard works on many levels in this play, but best of all for explaining the complicated 
business of getting married and staying married in the absence of insurance against future 
marital vicissitudes:  
Because no form of protective action can cover all risks … all insurance is 
essentially probabilistic: it reduces but does not eliminate risk. The probabilistic 
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nature of insurance is commonly masked by formulations that emphasize the 
completeness of protection against identified harms, but the sense of security that 
such formulations provide is an illusion of conditional framing.100 
 
The masquerade in Act 4 may be the perfect mise en scène for illusions of every kind. 
Two economic concepts—paltering and sign posting—allow us to read the cultural 
phenomenon of the masquerade, with its transformative (and unpredictable) energies, as 
an exercise in how we buy and sell, both the real and the imagined.101 
 
4. Life is a Masquerade: Truth, Falsehood, and Somewhere In-Between  
The masquerade, or the masked ball, is tied inextricably to eighteenth-century life 
and its literature. The period’s fiction memorably preserves the fascination, and the 
dread, that the masquerade exerted on the public consciousness. Sir Charles Grandison’s 
(1753) obsessive suitor Hargrave Pollexfen kidnaps Harriet Byron while she attends a 
masquerade at the Haymarket. In Elizabeth Griffith’s The Times (1779), the false friend 
Mrs. Bromley encourages Lady Mary Woodley to attend a masquerade without her 
husband, thereby deliberately inciting adultery. Georgiana Cavendish’s The Sylph (1779) 
and Frances Burney’s Cecilia (1782) both feature the masquerade as a key scene. 
As Finberg notes, the masquerade was a public event that was democratic, 
enormously popular, yet morally suspect, in which “the anonymity created by disguise 
provided the opportunity for promiscuous mixing of classes and sexes, and the aura of 
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sexual intrigue was pervasive.”102 If the masquerade had a star performer it would be the 
costume, as Castle points out in her celebrated work: 
Masqueraders did not dress as themselves, nor did they dress as people like 
themselves. … At the moment of unmasking … one’s disguise, seen suddenly in 
relation to one’s real identity, was to excite the onlooker by its absolute 
impropriety. The conceptual gap separating true and false selves was ideally an 
abyss.103 
 
This “conceptual gap” makes Stratagem’s masquerade a theatrical playground for hidden 
emotions, veiled motivations, narcissistic competitiveness and, above all, deception.  
Sequentially, four events occur within Stratagem’s masquerade scene. Hardy, 
Mrs. Racket, Lady Frances, Sir George, and Flutter enter the masquerade and comment 
on the action. Then Letitia enters in disguise; by the end of the scene, Doricourt is in love 
with this anonymous masked woman. In another development Courtall, disguised as 
Lady Frances’s husband Sir George, flirts with and then absconds with her to his house. 
Saville and friends catch Courtall by surprise at home just as he is about to seduce (who 
he thinks is) ‘Lady Frances.’ She turns out to be the prostitute Kitty Willis in disguise. 
“Laughed at and despised,” Courtall’s embarrassment is so acute he “set[s] off for Paris 
directly.”104 I analyze these events through two conceptual models borrowed from 
behavioral economics: ‘paltering’ and ‘sign posting.’  
Paltering occurs when individuals protect themselves either by providing 
misleading information or attempt to impress others by mentioning selective good deeds 
but omitting significant failures, all for economic advantage. From a moral perspective, 
paltering feels like a better—and a safer—choice than an outright lie, but is just as 
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unethical. Yet people continue to palter in ways both “active and creative” because it is 
extraordinarily successful in influencing others.105 Sign posting is a form of paltering, and 
involves providing selective information, “indicat[ing] specific, truthful, and important 
characteristics while simultaneously omitting other[s].”106 Before we see how these 
concepts work, first let us consider why they work. For our purposes, what is the payoff 
for literary scholars when we adapt (or adopt) economic theory built around buyers and 
sellers?  
Authors use paltering and its cognate signposting to depict the myriad ways in 
which literary characters skirt the edges of falsehood and truth. Seemingly less harmful 
than a blatant lie but just as dangerous in consequences, paltering embodies, at its core, 
the problem of identity—also a constant theme in eighteenth-century fiction. For literary 
scholars studying the ways in which the masquerade infiltrated eighteenth-century life, 
paltering offers a new hermeneutic framework for interpreting the fluid boundaries 
between outright deception and artful fabrication. Hence what Kowaleski Wallace terms 
as Stratagem’s main point—namely, that “human identity is fulfilled … in the 
recognition that all social interaction is necessarily an act,”107 is very similar to 
behavioral economics’ stance that “throughout our lives … we are all engaged in the 
game of sign posting, the selective revelation and partial decoding of information.”108 
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Similarly, Stratagem’s depiction of everyday role-playing—between husbands and wives, 
between participants at a masquerade—creates contexts in which audience members are 
forced to reconcile theatrical representations of duplicity with those they most likely 
perform in their own daily lives. To make a specific cross-disciplinary connection, this 
variety of deception—arguably mild, seemingly harmless, hard to identify—are also 
qualities of effective paltering and sign posting.  
At this point, it might be enjoyable to attempt a cognitive ‘warm up’ as we apply 
these concepts to dramatic fiction. Let us see how they can help elucidate this scene in 
which Flutter comments on the masquerade: 
Flutter. Look, Lady Frances! D’ye see that figure strutting in the dress of an 
emperor? His father retails oranges in Botolph Lane. That gypsy is a maid of 
honor, and that ragman a physician. 
Lady Frances. Why, you know everybody. 
Flutter. Oh, every creature. A mask is nothing at all to me. I can give you the 
history of half the people here. In the next apartment there’s a whole family, who, 
to my knowledge, have lived on watercresses this whole month to make a figure 
here tonight; but, to make up for that, they’ll cram their pockets with cold ducks 
and chickens for a carnival tomorrow.109  
 
The masquerade has disrupted the social architecture of eighteenth-century London: those 
in trade and the professions mix freely, perhaps audaciously, with the wealthy elite. There 
is also some sort of social payoff to attending a masquerade: the participants have 
scrimped and scrounged (“lived on watercresses this whole month”) for the opportunity 
for self-exhibition.110 Like a good palter, nobody’s disguise is “literally false” but an 
                                                
109 Cowley, Stratagem, 4.1.75-85. 
110 Flutter’s observations are a great opening point to a behavioral economic discussion. 
This idea of ‘living for the present because who knows what tomorrow may bring’ is 
articulated also in the concepts of ‘discounted utility’ and ‘intertemporal choice.’ 
Discounted utility refers to the way in which we cognitively ‘discount’ the expected 
utility (or satisfaction) derived from consuming something—goods, services, or 
experiences. We ‘trade off,’ or discount, this satisfaction against other goods and services 
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exercise in creative misrepresentation—or as Frederick Schauer and Richard Zeckhauser 
point out, “we make no charge against [someone who palters], in part because we are 
embarrassed to have been fooled.”111  
Does this mean any playful game of artifice—a masquerade, dressing up for 
Halloween, a children’s party involving a ‘fancy dress’—is an example of paltering? No. 
Paltering is a specifically economic stratagem involving pretense, and hence intersects 
seamlessly with the scheme Letitia and her father have in mind. Ultimately, paltering 
occurs when the consequence of misimpressions are harmful, or are deliberately intended 
to benefit one party at the (economic) cost of the other. Interestingly, this was one of the 
central anxieties associated with the masquerade: that underneath the “sartorial exchange, 
masking, collective verbal and physical license”112 lay a social problem equivalent to 
paltering: both fit into the category of strategic behavior that is “an intentional act, 
                                                                                                                                            
based on current and (known or anticipated) future prices. Human beings are 
economically ‘impatient,’ and value future utility less than present utility. Thus, the 
masquerade’s poorer participants have “lived on watercresses this whole month to make a 
figure here tonight” and to ‘pay’ for the next round of revelry, they will economize on 
food by “cram[ming] their pockets with cold ducks and chickens.” But what makes the 
masquerade worth such financial sacrifices? This question is studied under the larger 
umbrella of intertemporal choice, or how we make economic choices across different 
time-periods. Economists studying intertemporal choice seek answers to the question: 
how do we mentally ‘weigh’ the future against the present? Research reveals people 
prefer instant gratification to future gratification. We overvalue the present despite the 
ubiquity of advice such as ‘it is good to save for a rainy day.’ We defer pain but not 
pleasure. When faced with the choice of a cookie or a salad, we almost always choose to 
eat the salad tomorrow. While discounted utility and intertemporal choice add interesting 
dimensions to our reading of eighteenth-century literature, both concepts also further our 
understanding of the period’s financial life. After all, our preferences within the context 
of time communicate much about what we value at a certain historical moment. For 
more, see Shane Frederick, George Loewenstein, and Ted Donoghue, “Time Discounting 
and Time Preference: A Critical Review,” Journal of Economic Literature XL (2002): 
351-401; and Drazen Prelec and George Loewenstein, “Beyond Time Discounting,” 
Marketing Letters 8, no. 1 (1997): 97-108. 
111 Schauer and Zeckhauser, “Paltering,” 3. 
112 Castle, Masquerade and Civilization, 11. 
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[wherein] even though the act is different from (although not necessarily less harmful 
than) lying, … [it] may well be intended to defraud.”113  
Along the same lines, sign posting is also not without its dangers. At the 
masquerade, everyone is posting a sign. The “figure strutting in the dress of an emperor” 
is not really an emperor any more so than the disguised “gypsy” or the “ragman.” But this 
simple game of disguise opens up more complex issues. When deciding which 
characteristics to post, sellers expect buyers “will decode the signs, perhaps 
imperfectly.”114 The more interesting question here is to ask: is there a payoff to applying 
an economic concept to a masquerade? We might find the answer if we move this 
concept to a realm beyond the masquerade, asking, what would happen if we considered 
that all of Stratagem’s dramatic personae are, quite possibly, posting signs to other 
characters and their readers (or viewers), “making truthful but fuzzy statements, … 
provid[ing] only the most favorable” information that might, very likely, be decoded in 
ways different than was intended.115 We are now, thanks to this economic concept, 
inching towards the boundaries of fiction, with unreliable narrators who manipulate our 
ways of reading. 
But when applied to Stratagem’s marital ‘game,’ there are lasting consequences to 
such imperfect interpretation. Are anonymity and selective information mechanisms that 
inhibit—or sustain—trust? Does Letitia’s masquerade persona allow her to “make 
truthful but fuzzy statements, [by] provid[ing] only the most favorable signs”?116  
                                                
113 Schauer and Zeckhauser, “Paltering,” 6. 
114 Zeckhauser and Marks, “Sign Posting,” 23. 
115 Ibid., 29. 
116 Ibid. 
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Consider this question against the backdrop of Doricourt and Letitia’s first 
encounter at the masquerade. On his side, there is nothing but intense physical attraction 
(“[Y]ou … awake me to admiration. Did you come from the stars?”) while on her part is 
a keen understanding of dispassionate self-management.117 She is mysterious (“My name 
has a spell in it. … [I]f revealed, the charm is broke[n].”118) yet socially acceptable (“[B]e 
content to know that I am a woman of family and fortune.”119).  
Letitia’s stratagem fulfills the two conditions for a successful palter: the palter 
may not be literally false; secondly, paltering appears to be less harmful than outright 
lying.120 By misleading but avoiding the impression of deceit, Letitia is dancing on the 
edge of falsehood, skillfully manipulating the social conventions of a masquerade to draw 
Doricourt in with breezy flirtation. But a gimlet-eyed attention towards economic 
advantage (through marriage) is not far from her mind. The “chains of matrimony,” she 
reminds Doricourt, “are the lightest” and “possible to wear … gracefully,” and not, as 
Doricourt insists, “heavy and vulgar.”121 Such enthusiasm for infinite changeability is 
itself a form of paltering. It will allow her to “escape unscathed and [perhaps] even 
uncriticized” if detected.122  Even more advantageously, the masquerade allows Letitia 
with a social platform to “post information about characteristics that are not directly 
postable.”123 
                                                
117 Cowley, Stratagem, 4.1.176. 
118 Ibid., 4.1.255-57. 
119 Ibid., 4.1.307. 
120 Schauer and Zeckhauser, “Paltering,” 3. 
121 Cowley, Stratagem, 4.1.265-70. 
122 Schauer and Zeckhauser, “Paltering,” 4. 
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Ultimately, an examination of sign posting leads us to the economics of 
information. As a “critical ingredient in [an] economic system,” sign posting is “the 
process [of conveying] information that would otherwise be costly or impossible to 
acquire.”124 When sellers provide prospective buyers with information about their 
products, they are ‘posting signs’—controlling what information to post and how to 
present this information.125 Sign posting may be said to take advantage of situations in 
which information flows poorly; hence revealing selective, but generally truthful, 
information about positive attributes, i.e., posting signs, has an economic payoff for the 
seller while the buyer decodes the contents of these signs, usually imperfectly.  
Let us return to the first time Doricourt and the masked Letitia meet.126 With the 
benefits of asymmetric information, she knows precisely the kind of woman Doricourt, a 
well traveled man-about-town, seeks: an “English beauty [but] French vivacity—wit—
elegance.”127 So she proceeds to ‘sign post’ precisely these attributes. Observe her 
famous speech about following her husband to the literal ends of the earth if she “loved 
[him], and he were worthy of [her] love”: 
                                                
124 Ibid., 22-23. 
125 See also my discussion of asymmetric information in the preceding section. 
126 Their conversation proceeds thus: 
Doricourt. By heavens! I never was charmed till now. English beauty—French 
vivacity—wit—elegance. Your name, my angel! Tell me your name, though you 
persist in concealing your face. 
Letitia. My name has a spell in it.  
Doricourt. I thought so; it must be Charming. 
Letitia. But, if revealed, the charm is broke. 
Doricourt. I’ll answer for its force.  
Letitia. Suppose it Harriet, or Charlotte, or Maria, or— 
Doricourt. Hang Harriet, and Charlotte, and Maria! The name your father gave 
ye!  
Cowley, Stratagem, 4.1-250-60. 
127 Ibid., 4.1.253-54. 
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Why, then, I’d be anything—and all! Grave, gay, capricious—the soul of whim, 
the spirit of variety—live with him in the eye of fashion, or in the shade of 
retirement—change my country, my sex, feast with him in an Eskimo hut, or a 
Persian pavilion—join him in the victorious war-dance on the borders of Lake 
Ontario, or sleep to the soft breathings of the flute in the cinnamon groves of 
Ceylon—dig with him in the mines of Golconda, or enter the dangerous precincts 
of the Mogul’s seraglio, cheat him of his wishes, and overturn his empire to 
restore the husband of my heart to the blessings of liberty and love.128  
 
Letitia is sign posting here, volubly but also strategically. She sign posts she is a woman 
open to sharing Doricourt’s interests in travel, has a mind informed and aware about the 
world, and perhaps most irresistibly to a man, is a woman who will remain “the spirit of 
variety,” i.e., perfectly malleable to her husband’s preferences.129 These are all “truthful 
but fuzzy statements, and provide only the most favorable facts.”130  
Given that “sign posters … must bear the costs of being considered exaggerators” 
are there advantages to paltering and sign posting that offset their dangers?131 Let us 
consider this question against the play’s ending, when Letitia finally unmasks herself: 
Letitia. This little stratagem arose from my disappointment in not having made 
the impression on you I wished. The timidity of the English character threw a veil 
over me you could not penetrate. You have forced me to emerge in some measure 
from my natural reserve and to throw off the veil that hid me.  
Doricourt. I am yet in a state of intoxication; I cannot answer you. Speak on, 
sweet angel! 
Letitia. You see I can be anything. Choose then my character; your taste shall fix 
it. Shall I be an English wife? Or, breaking from the bonds of nature and 
education, step forth to the world in all the captivating glare of foreign manners?  
                                                
128 Ibid., 4.1.278-87. 
129 Although beyond the scope of this chapter, Letitia’s speech also indicates the strong 
presence of empire in Stratagem. Fred Link terms it ‘jingoism’ and observes (as I am 
doing here) that “Letitia’s stratagem is necessary because [Doricourt] has been overly 
impressed by continental women.” Link, introduction, xxi. Kowaleski Wallace notes 
Doricourt’s views on continental travel indicate “[a] cosmopolitan experience makes 
Britain more, not less, British than it was.” Kowaleski Wallace, “Theatricality and 
Cosmopolitanism,” 422. 
130 Zeckhauser and Marks, “Sign Posting,” 28. 
131 Ibid., 30. 
 50 
Doricourt. You shall be nothing but yourself; nothing can be captivating that you 
are not. I will not wrong your penetration by pretending that you won my heart at 
the first interview, but you have now my whole soul. Your person, your face, your 
mind, I would not exchange for those of any other woman breathing.132 
 
This conversation is deeply troubling for all sorts of reasons. Doricourt admits he has 
been the victim of a successful palter (“I will not wrong your penetration by pretending 
that you won my heart at the first interview”), but despite knowing this was “an 
intentional act … intended to defraud,”133 he seems willing to forgive, forget, and even 
rejoice (“I am yet in a state of intoxication”). Letitia confesses she has been ‘sign posting’ 
all along, having manipulated both information and impression, yet suffers no cost 
(emotional or financial) for having made a series of false statements.  
Paltering involves the deliberate creation of such misimpression; as Schauer and 
Zeckhauser observe: “Often the recipient’s misimpression is a consequence of [the 
palterer’s] failing to correct a wrong impression.”134 Yet Doricourt insists these 
misimpressions do not mimic but are the real substance: “Your person, your face, your 
mind, I would not exchange for those of any other woman breathing.” Does this perfect 
symphony of Doricourt and Letitia, buyer and seller, their felicitous mental accord, reveal 
something deeper about human nature? 
One way to answer this question is through the ‘status quo bias,’ which indicates 
our cognitive preference, often irrational, for things as they are now.135 Doricourt’s 
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133 Schauer and Zeckhauser, “Paltering,” 6. 
134 Ibid., 8. 
135 The landmark paper on the status quo bias is William Samuelson and Richard 
Zeckhauser, “Status Quo Bias in Decision Making,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 1 
(1988): 7-59. See also Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler, 
“Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias,” Journal of 
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eagerness to accept the current state of affairs may be suggestive of his—and our—
reluctance to consider seriously, even disregard, information inconsistent with first 
impressions. One may argue that this argument is flawed: after all, isn’t Doricourt 
disregarding his first impression of Letitia for a second one? In fact, Letitia is clearly 
grieved that his first impression of her created all the “cutting indifference” or a “husband 
of fifteen months.”  
But note that in Doricourt’s experience these two versions—rustic Letitia and the 
masquerade’s ‘polished’ Letitia—do not belong to the same individual. He does not 
know (as the audience does) that these are, in fact, the same woman. So his first, and 
more lasting impression is that of Letitia at the masquerade. Doricourt’s very “act of 
choosing [this] alternative raises its value”; this is what “induces a bias toward retaining 
the choice in subsequent decisions even under changed conditions.”136 Hence, it is the 
masquerade’s breezy and sparkling Letitia who sets in motion Doricourt’s ‘status quo 
bias’; it is she who has impressed the man who has “been courted by half the fine women 
in Europe … [and] has seen a million of pretty women.”137 This second version of Letitia 
is Doricourt’s ‘status quo.’ 
Thus the status quo bias, as I see it, means our initial judgment of a person is 
something we tenaciously hold on to because changing it means admitting our own 
capacity for judgment is flawed. Conversely, we know intuitively how important it is to 
‘manage’ these first impressions—on job interviews, online dating profiles, and the first 
meeting with prospective in-laws. Doricourt’s status quo bias may indeed motivate him 
to “stick … with decisions already made, or with whatever alternatives … encounter[ed] 
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early on.”138   
Behavioral economists have long maintained that human beings are imperfect, 
irrational, and highly emotional decision makers. We choose directed by heuristics or 
mental rules-of-thumb, especially when we are facing a situation that is “complex and 
riddled with incomplete, ambiguous, or contradictory information.”139 “The careful 
reader of signs will inquire about information not given,” but most of us are not so 
careful in our assessment of the unknown.140 Letitia, determined and astute about human 
nature, uses this to her advantage when designing her paltering strategy. Perhaps, we 
might speculate, marriage is the ultimate ‘palter’?  
Incorporating paltering and sign posting, conceptual models involving buyers and 
sellers, into an analysis of a play about love and marriage may at first make us, literary 
scholars, uneasy. But why should it be so? After all, deception, amorous identity games, 
and sexual masquerade are staples in fiction, so paltering and sign posting serve us well 
by adding to our literary-critical toolbox.141 Stratagem is as much a play about economic 
appraisal, or how we assign values to things, as it is about love and marriage; as 
Anderson notes, Letitia has “inherited her father’s prescience in trade, and she uses it to 
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139 Robert A. Olsen, “Trust as Risk and the Foundation of Investment Value,” Journal of 
Socio-Economics 37 (2008): 2191. See also Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos 
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bolster her erotic value.”142 Applying the behavioral economic concepts of paltering and 
sign posting into our reading of Stratagem brings with it a definite literary-critical payoff: 
it allows us to answer the play’s central question—how do we know who to trust?—
through, not one, but two different lenses. Felicitously, these concepts coincide with the 
central impulse of the masquerade that is built on a frame of what Castle terms 
“doubleness”: “the alienation of inner from outer, a fantasy of two bodies simultaneously 
and thrillingly present, self and other together, the two-in-one.”143 Or, to put in 
differently, Letitia’s evasive scheme emerges from her conviction that “rustic Letitia” and 
“sophisticated Letitia” are indeed one; that hers is not an evasive scheme at all, a belief 
that is also at the heart of a successful palter. Letitia genuinely supposes she is expressing 
two subjectivities united within herself, or in Castle’s terminology, “two-in-one.” Her 
sustained ability to “masquerade” or palter, both before and, as is suggested, after 
marriage does not suggest to her a moral problem or a trait she will self-correct and self-
limit. If her future husband trusts he is marrying the “real” woman, then her stratagem 
has succeeded. 
 
5. Marriage. 1780. 
What if we considered the possibility that men and women weave falsehood, in 
imperceptibly subtle ways, into the tapestry of married life? Cowley insinuates that we all 
do this: “To gain a lover, hid[e] behind a mask! / What’s new in that?”144 If, as 
Kowaleski Wallace observes, the play’s “female audience members are reminded that the 
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most natural female face is already a mask,” has trust already been edged out of the 
eighteenth-century marriage?145  
The play’s Epilogue makes this point quite forcefully, arguing “’Tis plain, then, 
all the world … Appear in masks”146 and adding no woman “[e]’er won a lover—in her 
natural face.”147 This meta-commentary works on many levels among which is the 
intimation that trust, social and personal, is being challenged, if not acquiring entirely 
new contours.148 What does it mean in a marriage if “show[ing] your [true] features to 
each other” triggers no recognition from your spouse?149 
Marriage in 1780 was a form of exchange, both social and economic.150 Amanda 
Vickery observes, “Upon marriage a woman renounced her legal personality in common 
law (though she still could make financial claims in equity and ecclesiastical courts), but 
acquired significant social credit in compensation.”151 Mutual affection might evolve into 
the foundation of a happy marriage but was rarely the impetus; as Escott observes, 
Cowley employs humor “to expose the objectified status of young women as units of 
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commercial exchange in marriage.”152 Indeed Mrs. Racket, Stratagem’s ‘merry widow’ 
reminds us of the “good old maxim, ‘Marry first, and love will follow’.”153  
But unlike Cowley’s other plays, Stratagem turns this paradigm on its head.154 
Letitia’s entire plan is engineered to bring romantic love into marital life, creating “a 
modern and progressive … companionate marriage of intellectual equals.”155 Consider 
her confident claim that the woman who “has not touched the heart of a man before he 
leads her to the altar has scarcely a chance to charm it when possession and security turn 
their powerful arms against her.”156 Consider also the relationship between Sir George 
and his wife who, in a departure from many eighteenth-century marriages characterized 
by indifference and adultery, lead intertwined, even codependent, lives. This certainly 
complicates the argument that “marriage [was] conventionally … a critical means of 
consolidating wealth and status among the propertied class, and remained so in the long 
eighteenth century.”157 Instead, the Touchwoods’ marriage seems to be constructed on 
claims stronger on the side of love than of property. 
But is this a new model for marriage or simply the longing for one? The answer is 
not straightforward. On the one hand Lord Hardwicke’s Marriage Act of 1753 brought 
the long hand of law into married life, making a church wedding, prefaced by the 
publishing of banns, the sole proof of a legally binding marriage. Women under the age 
of twenty-one could not marry without parental consent, giving parents a longer period of 
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control over daughters. We might easily suspect Letitia’s determination to marry for love 
conceals the attempt to escape a mercenary and controlling father.158 
On the other hand, while Letitia insists that “never to be [Doricourt’s] wife will 
afflict me less than to be his wife and not to be beloved,”159 her path towards achieving 
the status of a “beloved” wife involves veiling her true character.160 Similarly although 
Sir George Touchwood and Lady Frances seem to love each other genuinely, he deems 
her untrustworthy: “With whom can a man trust his wife, in the present state of 
society?”161 At the end of the play he is eager to return to the country, away from 
London’s corrupting ambience. Trust, it would appear, is risky for both wives and 
husbands.162 
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A complicated paradox is at work here, something Vickery calls the “ambiguity at 
the heart of [a Georgian] marriage.”163 Stratagem posits two seemingly contradictory 
marital models: that of a companionate marriage of “mutually dependent intimacy”164 
and one that promotes the institutionalization of property, a goal the architects of the 
Marriage Act of 1753 surely had in mind: 
Marriage had conventionally been a critical means of consolidating wealth and 
status among the propertied class, and remained so in the long eighteenth century 
despite the growing distaste for purely mercenary marriages. Opponents of the 
1753 Bill claimed that it enshrined the claims of property over romantic love and 
concentrated wealth in fewer families. Both arguments were somewhat overdrawn 
but they did highlight the significance of marriage as a distributor of wealth, 
especially marriages involving members of the landed and commercial elite.165  
 
Hence I would like to offer the possibility that we find in Stratagem echoes of a 
collective female yearning for change in the way marriage was configured because actual 
change was slow. As Roy Porter reminds us, it was “the alliance of a gentleman’s son 
with a merchant’s daughter, the landed embracing the loaded, that was mariage à la 
mode.”166  
Ultimately, while placing trust in an intimate partner is risky—after all, husbands 
and wives may cheat and fall out of love—both partners are better off trusting one 
another. As opposed to the calculative trust that guides so many decisions we take in 
economic life—‘What can this person do for me if I trust her?’; ‘What might she do to me 
if I don’t?’—personal trust, the kind that Letitia and Lady Frances aspire to, is based not 
on calculation but on an instinctual ‘feeling.’ We might speculate the paradox of marriage 
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in 1780, one that Cowley investigates but fails to resolve, is made up of the many 
inconsistencies between personal trust and calculative trust.167  
 
6. Conclusion 
I began this chapter arguing Stratagem is a study of how human beings decide to 
trust, especially when such a decision is framed within the context of a financial contract 
in which the parties are near-strangers to each other. Along the way, I introduced a 
number of conceptual frameworks, many emerging from the economics of information. 
The question to ask at this point is: what is the payoff these frameworks have provided? 
Are we any closer to defining the concept of trustworthiness?  
I wish to offer two answers, and distilled within them is the position this 
dissertation is taking. Trust is imperative if human society is to thrive over the long-term: 
“Societies in their evolution have developed implicit agreements to certain kinds of 
regard for others, agreements which are essential to the survival of the society or at least 
contribute greatly to the efficiency of its working.”168 But while human beings appear to 
have always struggled with trust, the form this struggle takes changes from society to 
society and is often an aspect of social context. Margot Finn takes this view, stating 
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168 Arrow, Limits of Organization, 26. 
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eighteenth-century fiction provided readers with what Margot Finn calls “essential 
imaginative tools with which [they] probed the lineaments of individual character and the 
moral limits of market exchange.” In Finn’s assertion that authors “celebrated a more 
capacious view of economic behavior derived from the practices of daily life,” I see an 
instance of what I call “behavioral historicism,” a phenomenon whereby behavioral 
expressions of cognition, particularly those concerning monetary exchanges, change over 
time and are embedded in cultural specificity. Put another way, my interdisciplinary 
reading of Cowley here, and of the other authors in the chapters that follow, incorporates 
issues of historical differences into behavioral economic models. 
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Chapter 3 
How to be Lucky: Lessons from The Adventures of Hugh Trevor 
 
Today, a casual reader of The Adventures of Hugh Trevor169 might remark how 
lucky it is we are reading this novel at all. Only two editions of Hugh Trevor are in 
circulation and the most recent editor Wil Verhoeven observes, “Holcroft’s reputation 
even today exists somewhat vicariously in the memories and memoirs of greater 
luminaries of radical reform.”170 Thomas Holcroft, a card-carrying Jacobin—he was a 
member of the Society for Constitutional Information171—, an Angry Young Man172 for 
the 1790s and prolific playwright, wrote Hugh Trevor173 between imprisonments during 
the decade’s Treason and Sedition Trials, during which he was indicted for High Treason 
in 1792. His political radicalism is well known, mainly because he sought every attempt 
to publicize it; Verhoeven calls this “an ambitious leveling agenda aimed at removing all 
social, political and economic inequalities and restrictions from society … constitut[ing] 
                                                
169 Thomas Holcroft, The Adventures of Hugh Trevor. Ed. Seamus Deane (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1973). All further citations are to this edition. I was unable to 
find any other edition of Hugh Trevor published during the twentieth century, a revealing 
fact about Holcroft’s anonymity outside the academic community. I had better luck in the 
early twenty-first century: Pickering & Chatto, through its Pickering Masters Series, 
issued a five-volume edition in 2007, titled The Novels and Selected Plays of Thomas 
Holcroft, edited by W. M. Verhoeven.   
170 W. M. Verhoeven, “General Introduction” to The Novels and Selected Plays of 
Thomas Holcroft, vol. 1, by Thomas Holcroft (London: Pickering and Chatto, 2007), ix. 
171 Holcroft became a member in 1792; at the time he was also writing Hugh Trevor.  
172 Verhoeven narrates this anecdote: “When asked by Hazlitt whether he was much 
‘struck with’ Holcroft, Coleridge reputedly replied that ‘he thought himself in more 
danger of being struck by him’.” William Hazlitt, “My First acquaintance with Poets,” in 
The Complete Works of William Hazlitt, ed. P. P. Howe after the edition of A. R. Waller 
and Arnold Glover, 21 vols (London: J. M. Dent, 1933), vol. 17, p. 112 quoted in 
Verhoeven, “General Introduction,” ix. 
173 To avoid a confusion of nomenclature, I call our protagonist Hugh and the novel, 
Hugh Trevor. 
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nothing less than a proto-Marxist revolution aimed at founding a society that reflects the 
interests and the full human potential of each of its citizens in equal measure.”174  
Today, Holcroft’s rich and complex novel is rarely read outside academe. Hugh 
Trevor’s only twentieth-century editor Seamus Deane observes, a touch sadly, that 
“Holcroft lives on the margins of literary fame”175 remembered mostly through his 
associations with other revolutionary writers such as William Godwin,176 Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge, Thomas Paine, and Mary Wollstonecraft, among others. 
Despite these famous friendships and the possibility of reflected glory on 
Holcroft’s reputation, even some literary critics seem eager to distance themselves from 
the text. Gary Kelly avers that “in spite of its obvious historical importance, Hugh Trevor 
is a failure … [with] an obviousness [that] vitiates the novel’s persuasiveness”177, while 
Mona Scheuermann writes that “Hugh Trevor is a novel entirely of its time, chronicling 
the abuses to which each of the professions is liable; it is little more.”178 But if Holcroft’s 
reputation has been hanging on for dear life, “having slipped through the cracks of a 
wider reception,”179 recent scholarship has attempted to infuse it with the lifeblood of 
                                                
174 Verhoeven, “General Introduction,” xxi. 
175 Seamus Deane, introduction to The Adventures of Hugh Trevor, by Thomas Holcroft 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1973), vii. 
176 Holcroftian criticism tends, pervasively and often unfavorably, to compare and 
contrast Godwin with Holcroft. For example, discussing the conclusion of the novel, 
Deane observes that “[i]n contrast to Caleb Williams, there is no concentration upon the 
sufferings of the tortured conscience.” Deane, ‘Introduction,’ xiii.   
177 Gary Kelly, The English Jacobin Novel, 1780-1805 (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1976), 167. 
178 Mona Scheuermann Social Protest in the Eighteenth-Century English Novel 
(Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1985), 119-20. 
179 Shawn Lisa Maurer, “The Politics of Masculinity in the 1790s Radical Novel: Hugh 
Trevor, Caleb Williams and the Romance of Sentimental Friendship,” in Enlightening 
Romanticism, Romancing the Enlightenment: British Novels from 1750 to 1832, ed. 
Miriam L. Wallace (London: Ashgate, 2009), 96. 
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new analyses. Shawn Lisa Maurer explores the bonds of male friendship in Hugh Trevor, 
arguing this friendship is inseparable from the novel’s social commentary. A. A. Markley 
observes the narrative of Hugh Trevor follows many common conventions of the 
picaresque, and that “[b]y utilizing such figures as Turl and Evelyn, both articulate 
spokesmen for reformist political ideals, Holcroft cannily instructs his reader alongside 
his hero.”180 
In an essay on luck, it is perhaps best to start at the very beginning—with the plot. 
It is almost impossible to read Hugh Trevor without thinking, “Hugh is an oddly lucky 
young man.” After his father’s death and a short period of apprenticeship to an abusive 
master, young Hugh is adopted by his wealthy maternal grandfather. Hugh goes to 
Oxford but is rusticated academically for a year, one that he decides to spend in London. 
As a secretary to the Earl of Idford, Hugh ghostwrites a series of incendiary political 
letters for his employer that lead ultimately to a falling out between the two. Determined 
to reform society through his profession, Hugh tries writing, then law, and finally 
politics, each choice increasingly disillusioning. Finally, after a failed, and very 
expensive, political campaign, he finds himself imprisoned for debt. The ending is a 
series of lucky payoffs: his stepfather, Wakefield (also called “Belmont”) makes moral 
restitution; Hugh is reunited with his long-lost and very rich uncle who makes Hugh “the 
acknowledged heir of a man of great wealth.”181 If luck is the end result of many 
fortuitous chances and serendipitous encounters, then, yes, Hugh is a very lucky young 
man indeed.  
                                                
180 A. A. Markley, Conversion and Reform in the British Novel in the 1790s: A 
Revolution of Opinions (London: Palgrave, 2009), 38. 
181 Holcroft, Hugh Trevor, 494. 
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Let us begin by defining two of this chapter’s main terms: chance and luck. Often 
used synonymously in colloquial speech, they have a difference significant to my 
argument. Chance is an external attribution, typically an event over which one lacks 
control. Psychologist Albert Bandura describes it thus: “Although the separate chains of 
events in a chance encounter have their own causal determinants, their intersection occurs 
fortuitously rather than through deliberate plan.”182 This idea of deliberation is the crucial 
difference between chance and luck.183 Luck involves personal agency, putting oneself in 
the path of serendipity through energy and initiative. I define it as the likelihood or the 
probability of something happening. Luck, like chance, is also an external attribution but 
one, as I argue below, subject to human control depending on specific behavioral 
strategies. The study of luck in any historical period reveals interesting truths about a 
society, especially about the power and limits of agency. 
This chapter draws inferences by examining individual episodes, and the social 
interactions described therein confirm, refute, or complicate my theory on luck. Because 
Hugh always tells us what he feels and thinks before and while he does something, we 
are lucky too, as readers, because we can see the behavioral, cognitive, and social 
contexts of luck. In the first section, “How to be Lucky,” I make four observations on 
luck and the novel. In the next section, titled “Luck is a chain of opportunities,” I set my 
theorizing on luck within these specific observations. The final section discusses luck 
within the historical context of the 1790s. An overarching argument connects these 
                                                
182 Albert Bandura, “The Psychology of Chance Encounters and Life Paths,” American 
Psychologist 37.7 (July 1982): 747. 
183 Not surprisingly, chance is the most important constituent of probability theory and 
statistics, both of which became important areas of study beginning with the seventeenth 
century.  
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sections: luck is a function of personal agency and initiative, and not random chance. 
Hugh’s attempts to affirm such agency through economic and professional choices are 
constitutive of a profoundly political statement.   
 
1. How to be Lucky 
Peter Bernstein, in his provocative work Against the Gods, acknowledges the 
importance of personal agency in attracting luck:  
The principles at work in roulette, dice, and slot machines are identical, but they 
explain only part of what is involved in poker, betting on the horses, and 
backgammon. With one group of games the outcome is determined by fate; with 
the other group, choice comes into play. The odds—the probability of winning—
are all you need to know for betting in a game of chance, but you need far more 
information to predict who will win and who will lose when the outcome depends 
on skill as well as luck.184  
 
Proceeding from Bernstein’s distinction between a “game of chance” and a game of luck, 
let us investigate what happens when we read Hugh Trevor differently, and perhaps 
controversially, as a collection of vignettes, each illustrating how to attract (or repel) 
luck. Such a reading builds on, but also departs significantly from, existing scholarship 
that tends to assess the novel as picaresque fiction or evaluate Holcroft’s Jacobin vision, 
for example, in comparison with that of his intellectual collaborator and close friend 
William Godwin.185 I concur with Kelly that “Holcroft himself turned to the picaresque 
tradition, and tried to renovate it in the light of his English Jacobin philosophy,”186 but 
                                                
184 Peter L. Bernstein, Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk (New York: 
Wiley, 1996), 14.  
185 Markley reminds us that “Hugh continually struggles to impose the Enlightenment 
ideal of reason over his strong sense of pride and personal ambition in favor of the 
Godwinian ideals of simplicity, sincerity, and social benevolence. Often this struggle is 
one that we see Hugh lose.” Markley, Conversion and Reform, 39. 
186 Kelly, English Jacobin Novel, 145. 
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agree with Shawn Lisa Maurer’s argument that it is time to “reclaim Holcroft’s novel 
from those previous critical assessments that have granted it, at best, historical 
significance but little else.”187 However, my real starting point is A. A. Markley’s 
observation that “Holcroft can be profoundly inconsistent in his work to convert the 
reader to Hugh’s line of thinking.”188 Does the novel’s central inconsistency lie in the 
possibility that Holcroft is advocating the power of luck? If so, does this complicate his 
declared reformist philosophy, pace Godwin, that society is perfectible?189 
Four observations on luck as they emerge from the novel follow. Firstly, ambition 
and optimism are positively correlated with luck. Secondly, while luck may be the 
consequence of “being in the right place at the right time,” our cognitive processes draw 
us to this place: lucky people think like other lucky people. Luck is drawn to the well 
connected: lucky people have a constantly expanding network of social associations. 
Finally, if luck is a destination, there are many ways to get there. Behavioral and 
cognitive adaptability is positively correlated with good luck. 
In the first of the events that provide the context for my theorizing on luck, the 
young Hugh rescues his grandfather from an overturned carriage: 
I suddenly heard a cry of distress, and looking behind me saw the carriage 
overturned in the water. Perceiving the extreme danger of the person in the 
                                                
187 Shawn Lisa Maurer, “The Politics of Masculinity in the 1790s Radical Novel: Hugh 
Trevor, Caleb Williams and the Romance of Sentimental Friendship,” in Enlightening 
Romanticism, Romancing the Enlightenment: British Novels from 1750 to 1832, ed. 
Miriam L. Wallace (London: Ashgate, 2009), 95. 
188 Markley, Conversion and Reform, 39. 
189 The eccentric philanthropist Mr. Evelyn reminds Hugh “the moral system of society 
… wants reform. This cannot be suddenly produced, nor by the efforts of any individual: 
but it may be progressive, and every individual may contribute.” Holcroft, Hugh Trevor, 
300. 
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carriage, I … opened and relieved him…. [H]e exclaimed with prodigious 
eagerness, “God for ever bless you, my good boy; you have saved my life!190  
But while this initial meeting is entirely due to accident, has Hugh drawn such 
fortuitousness to himself? Bandura defines a chance encounter as “an unintended meeting 
of persons unfamiliar to each other.”191 Let us go back and review events that led to this 
chance encounter. Firstly, Hugh learns the art of speculation (“bold in his projects, lucky 
in his bargains”192) but also its whimsy from his father, who ends up bankrupt and dead 
on an East India Company ship. Then, through a chance encounter, he is apprenticed to a 
farmer who turns out to be a “passionate madman.”193 To escape life-threatening abuse, 
Hugh plans the first strategy that will bring him luck: “[C]ommitting myself to chance 
and the wide world, [I] made the best of my way.”194 So while his grandfather’s rescue is 
characterized by pure chance, the decisive encounter may not have occurred had Hugh 
lacked the courage to leave his abusive master. I said earlier that “luck” and “chance,” 
while often used interchangeably, are not the same: luck involves an element of personal 
agency, and this agency often springs from a cautious optimism. When outcomes are 
uncertain, optimistic people jump in without the risk-aversion of more pessimistic 
individuals.  
 The second event that sets the stage for my theory of luck is Wilmot’s 
suicide and rescue. Wilmot, an usher Hugh meets during his sojourn at Oxford, has tried 
and failed to become a writer:   
[T]o procure a patron … [I] wrote letters to three different persons, whose rank in 
society I imagined would insure a reception at the theater to the piece which they 
                                                
190 Holcroft, Hugh Trevor, 44. 
191 Bandura, “The Psychology of Chance Encounters and Life Paths,” 748. 
192 Holcroft, Hugh Trevor, 8 
193 Ibid., 36. 
194 Ibid., 42. 
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should protect. … [Yet I]  received no answer to any of them! Amazed at this, I 
went to the houses of the great people I had addressed; but my face was unknown! 
Not one of them was at home! I could gain no admission!195  
 
Wilmot’s experience obviously is meant to highlight the difficulties of the writer’s 
profession, but if we read it only through this lens, we miss a small but important point: 
Hugh also starts out as an aspiring writer. But in contrast to Wilmot, Hugh is open and 
willing to learn and make appropriate behavioral changes: 
The lesson [from Turl’s critique of my writing] however did me infinite service. 
The film was in part removed from my eyes, in my own despite. … The result 
was, I immediately went to work; and, disgusted with my first performance, 
began another. … I now arranged my thoughts, omitted my quotations, discarded 
many of my metaphors, shortened my periods, simplified my style, reduced the 
letter to one fourth of its former length, and finished the whole by one o’clock.196  
 
Where Wilmot is determined to persist in producing creative products no one cares 
about—for example, to a theater manager who wants him to produce “comedy or opera,” 
he insists each of these genres “was an ill proof of public taste”197—Hugh is quick to 
jump into the business of writing the polemical letters his patron, the Earl demands. 
When there is an ideological shift in the Earl’s political affiliations, Hugh becomes more, 
not less, determined to use his writing for good. Significantly in contrast to Wilmot, he 
works on improving his writing. He seeks out Turl for his sharp editorial eye for spotting 
rhetorical infelicities; he is willing to set aside his ego in the face of Turl’s often caustic 
mentoring style. Whereas Wilmot views patronage negatively and with tragic 
consequences—“I saw dancing-masters, buffoons, gamblers, beings of every species that 
could mislead the head and corrupt the heart, come and go without ceremony; but to a 
                                                
195 Ibid., 233-35. 
196 Ibid., 123. 
197 Ibid., 239. 
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poet all entrance was denied”198—Hugh is a sardonic and amused observer of the culture 
of nepotism: “[Enoch’s] endeavors were very assiduous indeed, and to me very 
ridiculous; but his lordship [the Earl of Idford] seemed to receive his cringing and abject 
flattery as a thing rather of course, and expected, than displeasing or contemptible.”199 
But perhaps most importantly, where Wilmot continues in persisting in a profession that 
rejects him, Hugh follows his ambition where it leads him. 
Hugh’s ambition would merit an essay entirely of its own. Upon his decision to 
go to London for the first time, even under the discouraging conditions of academic 
rustication, he says, “Possessed, as I was well persuaded of no common portion of merit, 
it was a cheering thought that I was now going to bring it immediately to market; at least 
into view.”200 He studies ambition in others: “[N]o man pursued his own interest, as far 
as [Enoch] understood it, with greater avidity. Circumstances were unfavorable, or he 
would certainly have been a bishop himself.”201 His buoyant philosophy of life is straight 
from the mouths of Benjamin Franklin and Samuel Smiles: “People of a sanguine temper 
are subject to temporary doubt and gloom; but the sky soon clears, and though one bright 
star may shoot and fall, hope soon creates a whole constellation.”202 But perhaps he can 
persist on diverse career paths because he is helped along the way by a network of 
friends.  
As a picaresque hero, Hugh has an eclectic, ragtag collection of social 
associations. Some are materially influential—such as the Earl of Idford and Mr. 
                                                
198 Ibid., 235. 
199 Ibid., 110. 
200 Ibid., 98. 
201 Ibid., 136. 
202 Ibid., 178. 
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Evelyn—and others more philosophically, like Turl, the part-time engraver and full-time 
sage. He has female friendships—Lydia Wilmot and Mary come to mind—and his 
association with Olivia is romantic but also financial: she sends him five hundred pounds 
when he is in debtor’s prison. His network of acquaintances crosses career-lines in 
friends such as the imaginatively named Glibly, Mr. Hilary, Rudge, Stradling, and 
Trottman. Maurer notes that “Hugh’s attachments to men … animate his soul: in a 
pronounced parallel to his own, more conventional, rescues of Olivia, he is himself 
rescued—physically, intellectually, morally, and financially—by other men.”203 Hugh’s 
capacity for extroversion has a consequence greater than what Maurer calls ‘rescue’: luck 
is often attracted to extroverts. We enter a world of (lucky) probabilities when we know a 
lot of people from different walks of life—a phenomenon sociologist Mark Granovetter 
calls ‘the strength of weak ties.’  
In a celebrated essay, Granovetter discusses the importance of social 
‘embeddedness’ and the ‘strength of weak ties’: namely, that a network of diverse social 
relationships, even when these contacts are casual and not intimate, has a greater impact 
on economic life as compared to stronger associations: “Such linkage generates 
paradoxes: weak ties … are here seen as indispensable to individuals’ opportunities and 
to their integration into communities; strong ties, breeding local cohesion, lead to overall 
fragmentation.”204 And, in a rhetorical move anticipating the counterintuitive nature of 
his findings, Granovetter adds: “Paradoxes are a welcome antidote to theories which 
                                                
203 Maurer, “Politics of Masculinity,” 95. 
204 Mark S. Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” American Journal of Sociology 
78.6 (May 1973): 1378. 
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explain everything all too neatly.”205 Pace Granovetter, we might observe that while not 
all of Hugh’s social associations are characterized by emotional intensity (although most 
are), they all offer something reciprocal in terms of emotional, financial, or social capital. 
Indeed Hugh’s friends lead him to lucky circumstances again and again. We might say, 
then, that in contrast to Wilmot who seems to have few acquaintances, but all of them 
intensely meaningful and characterized by mutual confidence, Hugh is the luckier based 
on the “strength of weak ties.”206   
 
2. Luck is a Chain of Opportunities 
Hugh Trevor’s narrative stuns a first-time reader with its sheer volume of 
coincidence and serendipity, often stretching the limits of credulity. Hugh rescues a 
stranger from an overturned carriage—and meets his estranged grandfather. He rescues 
Olivia Mowbray from dangerous situations, not once but thrice.207 Belmont/Wakefield 
enters and leaves the narrative at will, before he is revealed to be Hugh’s stepfather. A 
long-lost uncle who left the story in the first volume returns in the seventh, endowing 
                                                
205 Ibid. 
206 Granovetter qualifies the ‘strength’ of a social association in this manner: “Most 
intuitive notions of the ‘strength’ of an interpersonal tie should be satisfied by the 
following definition: the strength of a tie is a (probably linear) combination of the amount 
of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal 
services which characterize the tie.” Ibid., 1361. 
207 Markley tells us that “[a]n annoyed reviewer in the Monthly Review singled out this 
aspect of the novel for criticism, asking ‘was it not possible for the author to afford 
Trevor other occasions of displaying his zeal in the service of his mistress, than by 
employing him three times, in the course of the novel, in rescuing her from personal 
danger?’” Review of The Adventures of Hugh Trevor by Thomas Holcroft, Monthly 
Review ns 23 (July 1797), 283. Quotation from Markley, Conversion and Reform in the 
British Novel, 193. 
 71 
Hugh with a large fortune. At the end, it is difficult to tell if the narrative would hold 
together without these impossible coincidences.  
To investigate further the idea of luck being linked with personal agency, albeit of 
a determined and optimistic sort, we might turn to one of the key scenes in the novel. 
Here, Hugh ends up gambling compulsively in the gambling den where he has gone in 
search of Belmont: 
So fixed was my cupidity on its object that I began with the caution of a black-
leg; made a bet, and the moment the odds turned in my favor secured myself by 
taking them; hedged again, as the advantage changed; and thus made myself a 
certain winner. I exulted in my own clearness of perception! and wondered that so 
palpable a method of winning should escape even an idiot!208 
 
Much like a possessed gambler who throws the dice repeatedly hoping for a more 
opportune result each time, Hugh is behaviorally inclined to chase wins and redeem 
losses. If one profession will not prove successful, he will try another; if one patron will 
turn against him, there are other patrons to be found. He is intuitively following what 
statisticians and probability theorists call the Law of Large Numbers.  
The Law of Large Numbers, or LLN, is a statistical theorem attributed to 
seventeenth-century Swiss mathematician Jacob Bernoulli. Simply put, LLN states that 
the accuracy of a sample mean increases as the sample size increases. The sample mean 
and the population mean approach each other invariably, which is bad news for card 
players, gamblers, poker players—essentially anyone playing a game of chance. Thus, for 
example, in an experiment that involves throwing a six-sided dice several times, the 
result of a random throw will approach the average of six sides (1+2+3+4+5+6/6 = 3.5), 
as the number of throws (N) increases (N??). LLN reveals something important about 
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luck: that it is a chain of opportunities. Over the long run, LLN ensures it is impossible to 
get lucky (because the outcome will inevitably draw closer and closer to the population 
mean). However, luck will come to the person who stays in the game long enough.  
With this in mind, let us re-read Hugh’s professional choices. He begins as a 
political writer; when this does not work out, he tries his hand at law, and finally, contests 
an election. Aside from the first profession, he lacks experience or education for any of 
these other choices. Despite this, like an inveterate gambler, Hugh stays in the ‘game’ 
(“What was there indeed that I persuaded myself I could not do?”); he believes he can 
prime himself for luck (“I was persuaded I could … make a fortune by gambling!”); he is 
aware of the correlation between luck and flexibility, both behavioral and cognitive (“I 
did not call it by the odious term gambling: it was calculation, foresight, acuteness of 
discernment”).  
Could it be that, after all, the secret to luck is actually quite simple? Make a lot of 
potentially lucky choices a lot of times, thereby setting LLN in motion. Each choice 
increases the odds of getting lucky; given a significant number of attempts, one is bound 
to get lucky at one time or another. Holcroft alludes directly, if unknowingly, to LLN in 
Hugh’s admission he had “on former occasions remarked that players but rarely win 
game and game alternately … that success has a tide, with a kind of periodic ebb and 
flow.”209 So while a lucky run cannot be maintained over the long haul—the LLN 
ensures that—if one does not play, one cannot win.   
 What is the connection between LLN, uncertainty, and luck? Games of luck share 
a common characteristic: an uncertain outcome. Behavioral economists and psychologists 
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aver uncertainty is best ‘managed’ by a mind that processes information in non-unitary 
ways—that is, the absence of black-or-white thinking. Daniel Kahneman and Amos 
Tversky point out the paradox of ‘mental framing’210 a cognitive phenomenon wherein 
the way in which we ‘frame’ a problem influences the decisions we take about this 
problem: 
The prevalence of framing effects and violations of invariance further complicates 
the relation between decision values and experience values. The framing of 
outcomes often induces decision values that have no counterpart in actual 
experience. For example, the framing of outcomes of therapies for lung cancer in 
terms of mortality or survival is unlikely to affect experience, although it can have 
a pronounced influence on choice. In other cases, however, the framing of 
decisions affects not only decision but experience as well. For example, the 
framing of an expenditure as an uncompensated loss or as the price of insurance 
can probably influence the experience of that outcome.211  
 
Following Kahneman and Tversky, we might argue luck is a ‘choice’ made within a 
‘mental frame’: when we interpret a situation in one way, the outcome changes to 
disaster, something we attribute to Bad Luck or Saturnine malevolence. The same 
problem framed differently might prompt us towards decisions that invite Good Luck, the 
heavens opening up their bounty, and so on. Every culture, each civilization in human 
history has anthropomorphized luck in some way, perhaps in a way to make uncertainty 
more manageable.212 
So if being lucky depends on how we ‘frame’ a problem, we may now understand 
why Hugh and Wilmot’s experiences start at roughly the same point (as professional 
                                                
210 For more on this, see Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Variants of 
Uncertainty,” Cognition 11 (1982): 143–157. 
211 Kahneman and Tversky, “Choices, Values and Frames,” American Psychologist 39.4 
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writers), but diverge into entirely different trajectories. Where Wilmot sees success as 
elusive, something to be wrested from an uncaring world, —“I was educated in the belief 
that the world is blind to merit, continually suffers superior virtue to linger in indigence 
and neglect”213—Hugh sees every choice within a frame of positive expectation. For 
instance, about his decision to practice law, he cogitates:   
I persuaded myself that, with respect to law, Turl’s reasoning was much too 
severe and absolute. It was true I could not but own law was much too severe and 
absolute. It was true I could not but own that law was inclined to debase and 
corrupt the morals of its practitioners; but surely there were exceptions, and if I 
pursued the law why should I not be one of them. If therefore the happiness at 
which I aimed were attainable by this means, I asserted to myself that I had heard 
no reasons which ought to deter me from practicing the law.214  
 
Let us follow, for a moment, Hugh’s reasoning. This cognitive process mimics a lawyer’s 
defense—“It was true [that] … but surely …”—but Hugh is his own client (“I persuaded 
myself”). I mentioned earlier that luck is attracted to a certain kind of cognitive and 
behavioral elasticity. Hugh is willing to reject choices that are inflexible (he says, for 
instance, “Turl’s reasoning was much too severe and absolute”) and to pursue what he 
wants from life (“the happiness which I aimed”). Also present is the incontrovertible 
optimism that is common to lucky people: “[S]urely there were exceptions … why should 
I not be one of them.” He knows the logical objections to a legal career—“that law was 
inclined to debase and corrupt”—but will ‘see’ this career only in a context (or mental 
frame) of his choosing—“I asserted to myself that I had heard no reasons which ought to 
deter me from practicing the law.”   
 
 
                                                
213 Holcroft, Hugh Trevor, 231 
214 Ibid., 257. 
 75 
3. Luck in the 1790s: Or, did we just see a Black Swan? 
The Cygnus atratus, or the Black Swan, lives in Australia and Tasmania. For 
thousands of years, it was believed not to exist simply because no one had seen it. Yet.  
Today, a Black Swan means an event with high unpredictability and high 
impact.215 No one believes there is any likelihood of its occurrence; yet once it transpires, 
it changes everything in the future, negatively or positively.216 Because a Black Swan is 
always associated with a crisis point that reconfigures and overhauls the system,217 it 
works very well as a metaphor for the five transformative forces in late eighteenth-
century English society. 
A stupendous thirteen financial crises218 occurred between 1701 and 1797, five of 
them between 1770 and 1797 alone.219 Revolutionary events in France precipitated 
                                                
215 The term is attributed to Nassim Nicholas Taleb who writes on the paradox of 
improbable events in the financial world. He notes: “Our emotional apparatus is designed 
for linear causality … [even when] reality rarely gives us the privilege of a satisfying, 
linear, positive progression.” Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly 
Improbable (New York: Random House, 2007), 88.  
216 Taleb observes, “One of the attributes of a Black Swan is an asymmetry in 
consequences—either positive or negative.” Ibid., 94. 
217 This ‘system’ can be cultural and social, and not just financial.  
218 The term financial ‘crisis’ (along with ‘mania’ and ‘panic’), alludes to a situation in 
the financial markets wherein investors try to move their investments from one type of 
financial asset to another, and frequently from one geographical market to another, en 
masse. This leads to a free fall in the prices of these assets and consequently, institutional 
and personal bankruptcies. For more on this, see Charles Kindleberger and Robert Z. 
Aliber, Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises (Hoboken, NJ: 
Wiley, 2005), 7-32. 
219 The classic text on financial instability in eighteenth-century England is T. S. Ashton, 
Economic Fluctuations in England, 1700-1800 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959). While 
financial crises remain phenomena rooted in both financial reality as well as investor 
perception, Ashton attempts a combination of a quantitative and a qualitative analysis. By 
charting movements in prices of Bank of England shares, East India Company stock and 
South Sea company shares, and changes in Bank of England bullion holdings, Ashton 
concludes that the crisis years were 1701, 1710, 1715, 1720, 1726, 1745, 1761, 1763, 
1772, 1778, 1788, 1793, and 1797. 
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apprehension about the scope of the state and led ultimately to the evolution of “a social 
vocabulary with political consequences.”220 Protracted wars with the American colonies 
and with France reinforced a sense of unease about the randomness of the future. Early 
industrialization jumpstarted large-scale urban migration: a demographic and cultural 
movement from the country to the city with concomitant challenges in navigating a new 
social ecology. And finally, Britain’s colonial empire expanded overseas: the world was 
suddenly much bigger and even more unknowable for late-eighteenth-century men and 
women.  
Taken together, the impact of these events lingered in the collective consciousness 
and the zeitgeist of the 1790s. Systemic turbulence is always mirrored in human 
behavior; we do not live our lives in siloes, hermetically sealed from the world around us. 
Behavioral economists have long affirmed that we tend to dismiss outliers—seemingly 
impossible events—and are blind to probability (‘this could never happen to me’) in our 
assumption of risky economic choices.221 We believe the past will reliably predict the 
future, and are hence unprepared, even shocked, when hit by extreme events. Taleb 
describes this behavioral trait as “a problem with the way we construct samples and 
gather evidence in every domain. We shall call this distortion a bias, i.e., the difference 
between what you see and what is there.”222 Human beings are intuitive statisticians: we 
                                                
220 T.C.W. Blanning observes: “It was after 1789 that words such as ‘bourgeois’ and 
‘aristocrat’ took on their modern meanings. The linguistic ammunition for the great 
debates of the nineteenth century was manufactured by the French Revolutionaries—and 
their opponents.” Blanning, “Conclusion: The French Revolution and Beyond,” in The 
Eighteenth Century: Europe, 1688-1815, ed. T.C.W. Blanning (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 249. 
221 For more on how we evaluate risk, see Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An 
Analysis of Decision under Risk, ” Econometrica, 47, no. 2 (March 1979): 263-92.  
222 Taleb, Black Swan, 102. 
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share the tendency to collect a small sample, gather evidence, and then draw conclusions 
that apply to an entire domain of life—a cause-and-effect thinking along the lines of ‘if 
this, then that’. But in the transitional world of the 1790s, there was no longer any way to 
view, or predict, events through the prism of past experience. The lens had changed. The 
past no longer matched up to the present.  
This brings me back to the Black Swan: taken together, did the five phenomena I 
mention above constitute the Black Swan event of the 1790s? If so, is the resulting 
cultural dissonance—a Black Swan always leaves dissonance in its wake—correlated 
with luck? Or, if we ask this question differently, do some people become luckier than 
others during historical moments of volatility? 
To answer this question, let us shift our attention to the ending of Hugh Trevor. In 
its slapdash attempt to tie up loose ends, this ending is ultimately disappointing. Deane 
laments that “[i]n bringing back [Hugh’s uncle] Mr. Elford and setting Hugh comfortably 
into the society he had been castigating for six volumes, [Holcroft] reduced the 
conclusion to near-farce.”223 Markley observes that although “such [a happy] ending was 
typical for the picaresque mode Holcroft was employing, this conclusion obliterates the 
gravity of the social critique he had developed throughout the work by contradicting the 
fundamental Godwinian tenet that human affairs are ruled by necessity rather than by 
mere chance.”224 
Four Black Swan events occur making this a challenging conclusion for a study of 
luck. Hugh’s morally ambiguous friend Belmont turns out to be the avaricious Wakefield, 
                                                
223 Deane, “Introduction,” xiii.  
224 Markley, 16. 
 78 
Hugh’s former stepfather. Secondly, he is an unusually repentant villain who is 
unrealistically eager to make amends: 
The door opened, and he appeared. “Belmont!” cried I, with surprise. “Why did 
you announce yourself by the name of Wakefield?” 
 He stretched out his hand to me, and turned his face aside: then recovering 
himself replied “The farce is over. … I have done you various wrongs. My name 
is Wakefield.”225  
 
A few pages later, the stranger Hugh has rescued from near death turns out to be the very 
uncle who made a “strange departure”226 in the first volume: 
At length [Hugh] exclaimed—‘What I have heard, sir, has excited very strange 
ideas. They seem almost impossible: and yet I am persuaded they are true. Pardon 
a question which I cannot refrain to ask. Surely I cannot be mistaken! Your name 
is Elford?’ 
… ‘Speak! Go on! What am I?’ 
‘My uncle!’227 
 
And in a final stroke of good fortune, this uncle bequeaths Hugh with a considerable 
inheritance: 
My difficulties now disappeared. I was the acknowledged heir of a man of great 
wealth: therefore, I myself am become a great man. … I have not yet forgotten 
that … the wealth entrusted to my distribution is the property of those whom most 
it can benefit … Neither have I yet shut my doors on one of my former friends. 
But I am comparatively young in prosperity. How long I shall be able to persevere 
in this eccentric conduct time must tell.228  
 
This is a problematic ending, not least because Hugh makes seemingly out-of-character 
observations: “I was the acknowledged heir of a man of great wealth: therefore, I myself 
am become a great man”; and “the wealth entrusted to my distribution is the property of 
those whom most it can benefit” followed immediately by “[h]ow long I shall be able to 
persevere in this eccentric conduct time must tell.” Because the ending features 
                                                
225 Holcroft, Hugh Trevor, 488-89. 
226 Ibid., 33. 
227 Ibid., 494. 
228 Ibid. 
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contradictions so heavily, including one-too-many life-altering, Black Swan events, it is 
worth asking whether Holcroft is making a point here: we can never prepare for luck, but 
we can keep trying to become luckier.  
Today, this advice makes complete sense: it is the subtext of every book in the 
‘Personal Finance’ and ‘Self-Help’ sections of a Barnes & Noble. But is Holcroft giving 
us the same message, albeit veiled in an overtly political novel? Have we been missing 
the forest for the trees, hearing Holcroft’s roar but not his whisper?  
Lennard Davis believes that “all novels are inherently ideological and … have 
embedded in their structure political statements about the world and our organization of 
our perceptions about that world.”229 Ultimately, a novel featuring a protagonist who 
demonstrates ambition, energy and optimism, but attracts good luck at the very end of the 
narrative, carries a few implicit messages. Firstly, personal agency will eventually be 
rewarded. Secondly, for lasting reform in society, an extraordinary type of individual is 
needed, with specific personal characteristics.230 And finally, a society faced with 
irrational occurrences appearing ‘out of the blue’—the Black Swan events of the 1790s—
need not be brought to its knees by the randomness of it all if only men and women will 
                                                
229 Lennard J. Davis, Resisting Novels: Ideology and Fiction (London: Methuen, 1987), 
224. I want to affirm here that this is not Davis’s central argument in Resisting Novels; 
rather it is the claim that, as a genre, the novel is reactionary, “by and large preserv[ing] 
the status quo and defend[ing] against radical aspirations.” But, as I see it, Davis 
complicates his own thesis by statements such as the one I cite in the essay. 
230 Hugh clearly embodies these characteristics; consider, for example, his observation 
that “[t]he earl and the prelate had both been unprincipled; but the failure was in them, 
not in me. … I need but mount the rostrum, I need but put pen to paper, and my 
adversaries would be brought to shame, and mankind taught to do me justice. 
Incontrovertible facts were in my favor; and to foster doubts and fears would be 
cowardice, self-desertion, and folly!” Holcroft, Hugh Trevor, 178. 
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work with, not against, uncertainty. Perhaps this is as close as we come to a ‘secret 
formula’ on luck for the ages.  
Holcroft’s self-proclaimed231 political agenda conceals, like a fortune cookie, an 
endorsement for personal agency at times of systemic rupture. And were we living during 
the 1790s, this rupture was not to be scoffed at. Men and women of the late eighteenth 
century would have seen their lives restructured by the caprice of history. The French 
Revolution, the Anglo-American and Napoleonic Wars, the constant cessation and 
rekindling of Anglo-French conflict, domestic sedition and treason trials, a growing anti-
slavery movement, the industrial revolution and rural displacement, a series of financial 
crises in the stock markets, all taken together would have caused something of an 
avalanche of turbulence.  
Today with the fatigue and the hindsight of history, we see such events in neat 
linearity. But say you were Holcroft’s contemporary reader. You would see, hurtling 
towards you, a furious snowball of danger, risk and uncertainty. You might ask yourself: 
is this a Black Swan I see?  
Mathematician Joseph Mazur notes that “luck rarely comes without risking the 
possibility of loss, injury, trouble, vulnerability, ruin, or damage in a universe of 
opposing chances.” Whether knowingly or unknowingly, Holcroft shows us how to play 
at the game of luck in this ‘universe of opposing chances’ that may well describe society 
                                                
231 For example, in a letter dated February 1790, Holcroft writes: 
The great object I have in view, is not the obtaining of riches, but the power of 
employing my time according to the bent of my genius, in the performance of 
some works which shall remain when I am no more—works that will promote the 
general good. This is a purpose I have so strongly at heart, that I would with 
pleasure sacrifice ease, peace, health, and life for its accomplishment. 
See Verhoeven, “General Introduction,” xxi. 
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in the 1790s. A world of probabilities, and of possibility, lies ahead for Hugh, as it did for 
Holcroft’s readers. 
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Chapter 4 
Negotiating Money in The Wanderer 
 
Frances Burney’s The Wanderer; or, Female Difficulties (1814) is a novel about 
negotiation. In the world of this novel, everyone negotiates. Juliet Granville, the heroine, 
negotiates economic and, ultimately, personal space for herself in a society which 
considers her an arriviste. In the aristocratic circles of Brighton and Lewes, the women 
bargain to pay with little or nothing for services they consume. Juliet’s French husband, 
the commissary, negotiates the Bishop’s life in exchange for Juliet’s inheritance. 
Negotiation is a complex mix of psychology, strategy, and timing, and Burney’s decision 
to veil her heroine’s past for the greater length of the novel adds a layer of mystery and 
uncertainty to each negotiation.   
In the past two decades, scholars have attempted to resuscitate The Wanderer 
from the cruelty of history—specifically, the hostility of its initial reception (this is 
something I discuss at length below). Claudia Johnson calls the novel “essential reading 
for feminist literary historians as well as for anyone interested in the culture of revolution 
and reaction.”232. Emily Anderson examines Burney’s playwriting techniques as 
transposed into the novel, studying the performance of insensibility by Elinor Joddrell.233 
Helen Thompson argues the novel “elaborates a feminized anteriority of practice 
unacknowledged by Bourdieu; … in its insistence upon [Juliet’s] suspension of interior 
                                                
232 Claudia Johnson, Equivocal Beings: Politics, Gender, and Sentimentality in the 1790s, 
Wollstonecraft, Radcliffe, Burney, Austen (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 
167. 
233 Emily Hodgson Anderson, “Staged Insensibility in Burney’s Cecilia, Camilla, and 
The Wanderer: How a Playwright Writes Novels,” Eighteenth-Century Fiction 17 (2005): 
645-46. 
 83 
and exterior in gesture, The Wanderer cannot be contained in a metaphysics of something 
and nothing.”234 Barbara Zonitch argues that “by attempting to climb the social ladder by 
her own talents, and thus achieve a respected and perhaps protective identity, Juliet 
challenges the notion of elevated birth as the only conduit of honor and integrity.”235 
While each interpretation speaks for the variety of readings, particularly feminist, that the 
novel makes possible, the novel’s core theme of financial negotiation has been largely 
unexplored. Reading The Wanderer through the lens of negotiation is not only relevant 
but also imperative to our understanding of what the text means. Juliet/Ellis negotiates 
consistently and deliberately with the reader as she does with the other characters—for 
respect, for security, but mostly, for money.236 My argument is based on the hypothesis 
that Burney intends for her heroine to demonstrate the influence of human behavior on 
financial decisions, particularly when such behavior converges with social ascriptions 
such as status, reputation, and name. Hence, I suggest that The Wanderer is a study of 
negotiation in complex social contexts; negotiation, in my reading, is often messy, 
emotional, and mired in imperfect perceptions of ourselves and of others. 
                                                
234 Helen Thompson, “How ‘The Wanderer’ Works: Reading Burney and Bourdieu,” 
ELH 68.4 (2001): 967. 
235 Barbara Zonitch, Familiar Violence: Gender and Social Upheaval in the Novels of 
Frances Burney (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1997), 115. 
236 An associated claim may be that Burney negotiates with the reader too, particularly in 
her prefatory address “To Doctor Burney” in which she attempts to appropriate respect 
for the genre of the novel: “Divest, for a moment, the title of Novel from its stationary 
standard of insignificance … ! It is, or it ought to be, a picture of supposed, but natural 
and probable human existence. It holds, therefore, in its hands our best affections; it 
exercises our imaginations; it points out the path of honor; and gives to juvenile credulity 
knowledge of the world, without ruin, or repentance; and the lessons of experience, 
without its tears.” Frances Burney, The Wanderer; or, Female Difficulties, ed. Margaret 
Anne Doody, Robert L. Mack, and Peter Sabor (Oxford, Eng.: Oxford University Press, 
1991), 7. Subsequent references are to this edition. 
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Approaching The Wanderer as a narrative on financial negotiation, I ask two 
questions: how do human beings negotiate money in society? And how are such 
negotiations complicated when one has little or nothing to offer in the bargaining 
game?237 I suggest that negotiating money successfully is a function of three variables: 
what one knows, or the strategic use of information; when one knows, or a tactical 
application of timing; and who one knows, or one’s social connections. I use the term, 
negotiation, in its broadest sense, as an act of strategic thinking that expresses itself in 
economic behavior. I examine the theoretical choices underlying this framework in a 
section below.  
While I examine many characters in the novel, I focus on Juliet and her 
negotiation strategies. I assert that successful negotiation, in any area of life but 
especially one’s financial life, requires not only personal agency but also an 
understanding of human behavior, especially of the mental models that underlie 
negotiation. In The Wanderer, Juliet’s strategy for negotiating money is a game of 
planned decision-making; the outcomes for her depend on the actions of others. 
Ultimately, the novel posits that negotiating money successfully incorporates thinking, 
often imperfectly, about the thinking of others who are our co-participants in social life.  
This chapter is divided into five sections: the first explains the theoretical context 
of the essay; the second section, “What one knows,” examines the significance of 
information in the novel; the third section, “When one knows,” discusses the importance 
                                                
237 I use the terms “negotiation,” “bargaining,” and “game” to imply situations with one 
or more participants (or “players,” as they are called in classical game theory) wherein 
the strategy of one affects the strategy of all. Hence Juliet, as a player in the “game” of 
this novel, must adapt to and adjust her strategy and her thinking, to the choices of others. 
“Negotiating money” is thus an act of strategic thinking. 
 85 
of timing. In the fourth section, “Who one knows,” I analyze the influence of social 
connections. A final section, “Trust and Information,” ties together the various sections 
by showing the impact of trust (or its lack) on the power to negotiate. A definition of the 
term “negotiating money” is important here as is my use of the term “game,” both of 
which I use throughout this chapter. In the section that follows, I examine both terms at 
length. 
Classical economic theory is based on a single unifying claim: that the individual 
makes consistently rational decisions that serve always to maximize the attainment of 
economic resources. This normative perspective—it propounds a “norm” of human 
behavior that exists only in theory—opens up an interesting paradox. Since men and 
women are rarely consistent, either in rationality or in their economic choices, the pursuit 
of money—“negotiating money” is the term I use—becomes, literally, a negotiation of 
the boundaries of human rationality.238 Hence, in my argument, money becomes a trope 
to examine the ways in which human behavior elides with economic reward, and the 
complexities that inhere in this elision. In other words, Juliet’s determined pursuit of 
economic independence reveals a number of psychological insights into how men and 
women—irrational, unpredictable, and emotional—think and feel about money. 
My use of the term “game” is drawn from economics, in particular, the sub-field 
of game theory. Economist Colin Camerer describes a “game” as a scenario consisting of 
strategic interactions in which “a person … must anticipate what others will do and what 
                                                
238 I use this term in a purely economic sense, tracing it to mid twentieth-century 
economist Herbert Simon. He describes “bounded rationality” thus: “The capacity of the 
human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very small compared with 
the size of the problems whose solution is required for objectively rational behavior in the 
real world—or even for a reasonable approximation to such objective rationality.” 
Herbert Simon, Models of Man (New York: Wiley, 1957), 198. 
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others will infer from the person’s own actions. A game is a mathematical x-ray of the 
crucial features of these situations. A game consists of the ‘strategies’ each of several 
‘players’ have, with precise rules for the order in which players choose strategies, the 
information they have when they choose, and how they rate the desirability (or ‘utility’) 
of resulting outcomes.”239 Game theory thus provides a framework for strategic thinking 
about the thinking, and ultimately, the behavior of others.  
The Wanderer narrates the story of a female French refugee who climbs on board 
a boat on which a group of English passengers are escaping from France to England by 
stealth. Among this microcosm of English society, she differentiates herself by her 
anonymity, an indeterminate racial history (although she is later revealed to be white), 
and “manners [that] are an incontrovertible guarantee of quality.”240 Once in England, she 
is determined to acquire economic independence and the modicum of dignity she hopes it 
will bring. For four of five volumes of this expansive work, she is called, first ‘L.S.,’ and 
then ‘Ellis,’ until revealed to be a rich aristocratic lady named Juliet Granville, who has 
been compelled to escape France during the Reign of Terror due to a forced marriage. 
The novel finds resolution in a somewhat awkward ‘happy ending,’ but not before 
Burney examines critical issues related to the complexities that inhere in financial 
uncertainty. 
The Wanderer begins with a negotiation, as Juliet makes her first bargain, 
“imploring, in the French language, pity and admission” into the small boat in which a 
mixed group of English passengers are escaping “the dire reign of the terrific 
                                                
239 Colin F. Camerer, Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 2. 
240 Thompson, “How ‘The Wanderer’ Works,” 971. 
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Robespierre” to sail to England in the dead of the night.241 Her initial promise to “pledge 
myself for the cost and the consequence” carries undertones of the language of insurance 
and underwriting, except that it proves to be an empty promise.242 In this new country, 
there is no insurance for an impoverished émigré who has lost her purse, her identity, and 
even her name. According to Johnson, Juliet “poses fundamental questions about a 
woman’s place in society.”243 For the remainder of the novel, she is in constant 
movement: from house to house, from place to place, from profession to profession, 
always bargaining for economic space in a society that is barely willing to grant her 
physical space.244 Burney’s somewhat conventional ending of love, marriage, and wealth 
restored fails to satisfy the tedium of a novel “full of difficulties created out of nothing,” 
and contemporary reviewers were quick to deride the novel.245   
Published in 1814 at the tail end of the Napoleonic Wars, The Wanderer’s 
preoccupation with Robespierre’s Reign of Terror makes for a work that often appears 
dated, and creates the distinct impression its creator is out of touch with a changed 
political ethos. Burney alludes to as much in her dedication to the novel, saying, “I had 
                                                
241 Burney, Wanderer, 11. 
242 Ibid. 
243 Johnson, Equivocal Beings, 167. 
244 Burney’s life, during the period of the novel’s composition, mirrors the life of her 
heroine: an exiled woman who is constantly on the move. Margaret Doody notes that 
General D’Arblay wanted his family with him in France, so “Frances and her son had to 
pack up and go … in a quick and chaotic removal in April 1802. … The proposed year 
abroad extended to ten years. The exile Burney had tried to avert had come upon her.” 
Margaret Anne Doody, Frances Burney: The Life in the Works (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Rutgers University Press, 1988), 288, 289.  
245 The phrase is William Hazlitt’s, and in his anonymous piece for the Edinburgh 
Review, he reviews Burney’s work after examining that of Cervantes, LeSage, Fielding, 
Sterne, Smollett, and Richardson. He articulates frustration with the meandering plot of 
the novel, saying, “The reader is led every moment to expect a denouement, and is as 
constantly disappointed on some trifling pretext.” [Hazlitt, William]. Edinburgh Review, 
24 (Feb. 1815), 337. 
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planned and begun it before the end of the last century! but the bitter, and ever to be 
deplored affliction [of the death of her sister, Susan, in January 1800] … cast it from my 
thoughts, and even from my powers, for many years.”246 William Hazlitt, one of her 
gentler critics, acknowledges he is “sorry to be compelled to speak so disadvantageously 
of the work of an excellent and favorite writer; and the more so, as we perceive no decay 
of talent, but a perversion of it.”247 John Croker writing in the Quarterly Review notes 
caustically that The Wanderer “which might be expected to finish and crown her literary 
labors, is not only inferior to its sister-works, but cannot, in our judgment, claim any very 
decided superiority over the thousand-and-one volumes with which the Minerva Press 
inundates the shelves of circulating libraries, and increases, instead of diverting, the ennui 
of the loungers at watering places.”248 All through the nineteenth century and for most of 
the twentieth, the novel never recovered from the opprobrium of this initial attack.  
 
1. Theoretical Framework 
As in previous chapters, my inquiry into “negotiating money” emerges from my 
interest in behavioral economics and its disciplinary constituents. Whereas the preceding 
chapters use conceptual models from research on trust and probability theory, this chapter 
will draw upon research on negotiation. More specifically, it is influenced by two 
disciplines: the first is game theory and the other, negotiation theory. Both are also sub-
fields within the larger discipline of economics. Each provides an independent framework 
for examining strategic decision-making and strategic thinking, behaviors practiced by 
                                                
246 Burney, Wanderer, 4.  
247 Hazlitt, “Review of The Wanderer,” 338. 
248 John Wilson Croker, “Review of The Wanderer, by Frances Burney,” Quarterly 
Review 11.21 (1814): 124. 
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Juliet throughout the novel. According to Ilhan Geçkil and Patrick Anderson: “Behavior 
that involves … interactive decision-making is called strategic, and the set of actions and 
moves by each player with respect to others, given the rules of the game is called 
strategy.”249 An inquiry into economic behavior through the lens of strategic 
interactions—situations in which an individual’s action affects but is also dependent on 
the actions of others—is germane to my reading of The Wanderer, which I appraise as a 
text on decision-making under conditions of lack of information and depleted economic 
power. My larger argument, that The Wanderer is a text on financial negotiation, is based 
on my claim that the English society of The Wanderer is the perfect economic microcosm 
in which to explore game theoretic choices as they apply to money.   
Classical economics is based on a normative model of human behavior, arguing 
that the individual is rational and acts only in a manner that maximizes self-interest; in 
practice, however, human beings often act in ways that are inconsistent with this 
theoretical position. Game theory attempts to forecast, and often to quantify, how 
individuals will act in situations in which they can compete, collaborate or do both, in the 
face of absent or inadequate information. A ‘game’ is a term to describe any strategic 
interaction between one or more parties (or ‘players’ as game theorists call them).  
Although human beings have always used game theoretic principles in evaluating 
strategy in situations of interdependence—politics, war, contractual agreements—since 
the dawn of history, as an academic discipline, game theory’s origins go back to the early 
twentieth century. In 1944, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern published Theory 
of Games and Economic Behavior, wherein they examined ‘zero-sum’ games: strategic 
                                                
249 Ilhan Kubilay Geçkil and Patrick L. Anderson, Applied Game Theory and Strategic 
Behavior (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2010), 10.  
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interactions in which both parties (or ‘players,’ as game theory calls them) competed with 
one another with only one outcome—victory or loss. More realistic to human society, 
however, is an outcome that involves rivalry but also common interests and collaboration. 
Hence, beginning with the 1950s, economists John Nash, Reinhard Selten, and John 
Harsanyi, among others, proposed mathematical frameworks to forecast the outcomes 
(also called ‘payoffs’) and ‘moves’ (or actions) of complex multi-player games. 
Game theory, in keeping with classical economics, does not concede a place to 
emotions—anxiety, loss, love—and yet, human existence is synonymous with these.250 
To explain how thinking and feeling human beings negotiate for economic resources, I 
draw from negotiation theory and research. Howard Raiffa’s classic, The Art and Science 
of Negotiation (1982), posits that effective negotiation is the consequence of a realistic 
understanding of the behavior of the other party. Purely rational strategies of 
negotiation—game theory, for instance, is based on an assumption of complete 
rationality—rarely work since human beings do not simply think their way through 
strategic scenarios. In my essay, I follow the decision perspective of negotiation, based 
on a belief that human behavior, inseparable from its characteristics of bounded 
                                                
250 The field of behavioral economics attempts to reconcile social and cognitive 
psychology with economic behavior; but we can trace this line to Adam Smith. In The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments, for instance, he argues: “[W]e suffer more … when we fall 
from a better to a worse situation, than we ever enjoy when we rise from worse to a 
better.” Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), ed. D.D. Raphael and A.L. 
Macfie (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), 213. Colin Camerer and George Lowenstein 
note: “In the early part of the twentieth century, the writings of economists such as Irving 
Fisher and Vilfredo Pareto still included rich speculations about how people feel and 
think about economic choices. Later, John Maynard Keynes appealed frequently to 
psychological insights, but by the middle of the century discussions of psychology had 
largely disappeared.” Colin F. Camerer and George Loewenstein, “Behavioral 
Economics: Past, Present, Future,” in Advances in Behavioral Economics, ed. Colin F. 
Camerer, George Lowenstein, and Matthew Rabin (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2004), 6. 
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awareness and bounded rationality, informs negotiation decisions. According to Max 
Bazerman and Dolly Chugh: “The decision perspective to negotiation seeks to understand 
how negotiators actually make decisions, with a specific focus on the systematic ways in 
which decision makers deviate from optimality or rationality. Behavioral decision 
researchers assume that people attempt to act rationally, but are bounded in their ability 
to achieve rationality.”251 The term “bounded awareness” alludes to “an individual’s 
failure to ‘see’ and use accessible and perceivable information while ‘seeing’ and using 
other equally accessible and perceivable information.”252 In other words, we are selective, 
and limited, in the manner we use information. “Bounded rationality” implies a similar 
limit to human rationality: the individual negotiates in ways that are often unpredictable, 
inconsistent, or depend on overly simplistic cognitive heuristics, thereby showing a gap 
between normative behavior and actual behavior.  
My use of these two seemingly diverse fields—game theory and negotiation 
theory—has been motivated by the fact that both provide a theoretical framework to 
understanding the same human endeavor: strategic decision-making. The Wanderer is, in 
my reading, a study of precisely such strategic decision-making in action, exacerbated by 
conditions of uncertainty and risk. To evaluate Juliet’s attempts to negotiate greater 
economic resources, we must also appraise the situations she encounters, with their 
sophisticated interplay of presumed rationality with human inconsistency, emotion, and 
preconceptions—all qualities of the human condition.  
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2. What One Knows 
Information, namely, what one knows, constitutes the first component of a 
financial negotiation. In The Wanderer, Juliet negotiates on the basis of her own 
information and that of others about her, the latter giving rise to speculation, rumor and 
hearsay. Needless to say, this fluid quality of information tinges negotiations with both 
uncertainty and risk. Negotiating money is built on two illusions: the illusion of value (of 
the thing that is under negotiation), and the illusion of knowledge, or the belief that each 
party knows (and hence, controls) the decisions of the other. It is the interplay of these 
twin illusions that create bargaining games. Ultimately, each negotiation begins with 
defining the game, structurally and psychologically: how much am I worth and what can 
I do to influence the outcome of this negotiation? 
In the novel, choices involving money are almost always based on mental 
illusion.253 To survive and to matter, Juliet must work within the constraints of others’ 
illusions about her—in Mrs. Maple’s words, she is “an adventurer and an impostor; with 
her blacks, and her whites, and her double face!”254—while attempting to step outside 
such illusions. She is, quite literally, branded an illusion, a “chimera”: “‘Oh, Harleigh! 
Harleigh!’ Elinor cried, ‘to what chimera you have given your heart! to an existence 
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unintelligible, a character unfathomable, a creature of imagination, though visible!’”255 
Her situation can be traced to her own illusory status—“though in [her] native country, 
like a helpless foreigner; unknown, unprotected, and depending solely upon the 
benevolence of [others]”— while she attempts to negotiate her way out of such 
“benevolence.”256  
The elision of money and illusion occurs almost everywhere in the novel; at key 
points, characters always resort to the manipulation of illusion using money. When 
Juliet’s husband seeks to know her whereabouts, he bargains for information with money 
he does not possess: “[A]ll Salisbury was in an uproar; a rich outlandish Mounseer, in a 
post-chaise, having just come to the great inn, with the advertisement in his hand, 
pointing to the reward, and promising, in pretty good English, to double it, if the person 
should be found.”257 Mr. Tedman’s daughter bargains for the illusory exaltation of a 
higher social status, with music-lessons and subscriptions at the book-shop, so “that our 
names, she says, may come out in print, with the rest of the gentry.”258 The men and 
women of The Wanderer seem to be constantly manipulating public perception about 
financial status through their economic choices.  
Sir Jaspar Harrington summarizes this negotiation strategy: “The more I see, the 
less I understand; the more I surmise, the further I seem from the mark.”259 It is apropos, 
then, that money is itself illusion. Mary Poovey calls it “a form of representation” and 
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hence, one that requires “a distinction between fact and fiction.”260 Making such a 
distinction is not easy, Juliet discovers, because English society tends, often, to pay 
through a combination of gift, favors, and credit, instead of money. Margot Finn terms 
this “the workings of a credit economy … in which exchanges effected through 
borrowing and lending, gifting and purchasing on account, were shaped by both dense 
networks of social relations and intrinsically unstable conceptualizations of the individual 
self.”261 Juliet’s intrinsic challenge is to negotiate her way through this credit economy to 
assert financial independence.  
What complicates this challenge is the negotiation strategy Juliet must follow, 
seeking out collaboration in a society where she encounters distrust and self-interest. She 
faces, as is repeatedly demonstrated, ignorance and prejudice, something young Gooch 
expresses in his own distinctive style: 
[F]or as to profit, there be none to come from foreign parts: for [the French] be all 
main poor thereabout; for, they do tell me, that there be not a man among un, as 
sets his eyes, above once in his life, or thereabout, upon a golden guinea! And as 
to roast beef and plum-pudding, I do hear that they do no[t] know the taste of such 
a thing. So that they be but a poor stinted race at best, for they can never come to 
their natural growth.262 
 
The stereotypes articulated here, aside from their unconcealed Francophobia, encapsulate 
the challenge of the balancing act Juliet faces. Her bargaining strategy for economic self-
sufficiency must take into account the generalized, if abstract, idea of French poverty 
counterpoised against her own allure as a Frenchwoman of accomplishment. She can 
bargain successfully only if she is aware that she attracts even while she repels.   
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What one knows or, specifically in my argument, the economic basis of 
information, dictates how one negotiates for money. This is especially true in a society in 
which social markers of class are breaking down, something Mrs. Ireton articulates in her 
mordant comment: “[Y]ou are a lady no doubt! Every body is a lady, now!”263 Zonitch 
argues: “Like the other means of self-protection that Burney has experimented with—i.e., 
manners—economic independence depends on a rationale foreign to aristocratic 
ideology.”264 With her own aristocratic background, Juliet is thus in a situation that is 
alien to her: she has never lacked or sought money. Her negotiation strategy is based on 
the “self-protection” of her manners—their seemingly aristocratic origin becomes an 
invisible boundary protecting her—while she seeks economic independence, a quest that 
is “foreign” to this social class. Clearly, this sets up a paradox: she is both insider and 
outsider. She becomes, in the words of Marilyn Button, “the figure of the exotic foreign 
woman as a vehicle for examining [and throwing into sharp contrast]—often 
polemically—political, social, and aesthetic issues.”265 It is, hence, not surprising, that 
Juliet faces manipulation, persuasion, but most often, outright threats from a society she 
discomfits by her presence. Lord Denmeath cautions: “Suffer me, nevertheless, to 
intimate to you, that you will do well to return, quietly and expeditiously, to the spot 
whence you came. You may else make the voyage less pleasantly.”266 Implicit in each 
verbal threat—and she encounters many—is the anxiety of what she represents in the 
parochial, self-referential English community.  
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3. When One Knows, or The Significance of Timing 
The second component to negotiating money is good timing, and The Wanderer is 
writ large with the importance of time. In a letter to Gabriella, Juliet laments: “How long 
must I thus waste my time and my existence, separated from all that can render them 
valuable [...]?”267 The allusions to ‘value’ and ‘wasting time’ are significant to my 
argument that the novel can be read as an examination of the complex relationship 
between time and economic destiny.268 If negotiation is a complex dance, time influences 
the delicate patterns of this dance in one way or another.  
Time and its correlate, information, are entities endowed with power and mystery. 
Because of the news embargo from France, Juliet and the English characters resort to 
hypothesis, intuition, and instinct in response to temporality.269 Time alone can rectify 
Juliet’s “strange—indefinable situation;”270 until then, others relate to her on the basis of 
speculation or fabricated history—“of [her] being a young lady of a good family, who 
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came over … from France.”271 Timing constructs skewed perceptions of economic 
reality.  
Good timing in The Wanderer is correlated with having more money. Inopportune 
timing makes life difficult; the French Revolution, for instance, obstructs Juliet’s 
timetable for receiving her inheritance:   
All representation proving fruitless, the Bishop was preparing to attend Miss 
Granville to England, when the French Revolution broke out. The general 
confusion stopped his voyage, and next destroyed even the materials of his 
agency. The family-chateau was burnt by the populace; and all the papers of 
Juliet, which had been carefully hoarded up with the records of the house, were 
consumed! The promissory-note alone, accidentally, had been saved; the Bishop 
chancing to have it in his pocket-book, for the purpose of consulting upon it with 
some lawyer.272 
 
To save the Bishop’s life, Juliet makes her first negotiation: forced marriage with “a 
native of France, resident in that country.”273 Later, even after her escape to England, the 
news embargo from France means Juliet does not know whether or not the Bishop is dead 
and whether she is going to be apprehended by her French husband. Time and 
information affect her financial destiny adversely.  
Lacking information on the past she has left behind, Juliet must resort to decision-
making under conditions of extreme uncertainty and considerable risk. As an 
impoverished refugee, she is “wholly without friends, without money, without protection, 
without succor; and [faced with] the horror of a licentious pursuit, and the mischiefs 
menaced by calumniating ill wishers.”274 Decision-making under such conditions 
becomes a process of selection between different prospects, each one a financial gamble 
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in itself. The variety of professions she chooses—music teacher, mantua-maker’s 
assistant, milliner, lady’s companion, shop owner—may each be read as an attempt to 
manipulate and negotiate with time. Each professional option will have two outcomes: it 
will buy her some degree of financial independence, and will permit her to wait for better 
timing.  
Juliet’s negotiation strategy for more money is underwritten by an exquisite 
understanding of timing. It also supports her capacity for prolonged self-concealment. 
But this very quality proves often to be the source of frustration, both for the novel’s 
other characters and for its readers. Elinor taunts her: 
You, Ellis, … always act by rule, who never utter a word of which you have not 
weighed the consequence; never indulge a wish of which you have not canvassed 
the effects; who listen to no generous feeling; who shrink from every liberal 
impulse; who know nothing of nature, and care for nothing but opinion—you, and 
such as you, tame animals of custom, wearing and wearying plodders on of [sic] 
beaten tracks, may conclude me a mere vaporing impostor, and believe it as safe 
to brave as to despise me!275 
 
Several key qualities in Juliet’s negotiation strategy emerge here: mystery, diplomacy, 
and a suitable level of passive resignation. Zonitch is right in calling The Wanderer “one 
of Burney’s most distinctly political novels,” one that “envisions the incipient 
possibilities for women’s freedom in this pivotal historical moment [of the French 
Revolution].”276 In deciding to make a determined effort towards financial independence, 
Juliet makes a strong political statement for a woman’s power to prevail against 
inopportune timing.  
Paradoxically, her reticence, a quality which Elinor describes as “never utter[ing] 
a word of which you have not weighed the consequence,” gives Juliet an advantage when 
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negotiating for money. Her status as a woman of unknown provenance gives her the 
freedom to try out any number of professions, even those at the margins of respectability. 
Put differently, she has no history to live up to. She is, as Sir Jaspar Herrington describes 
her lyrically, “a rose planted in the snow. … The more I see, the less I understand; the 
more I surmise, the further I seem from the mark.”277 While the more masculine qualities 
of aggression and bluster may be construed as valuable in negotiations, Burney posits, 
repeatedly, that sensitivity to timing is more useful. Thus, Elinor, with her forthrightness 
and simmering rage, would probably, in Juliet’s situation, not last a day.    
Throughout The Wanderer, Burney emphasizes the importance of using time 
strategically. Those who do not are destined to suffer from the consequences of poor 
timing, such as Riley’s ill-timed “curiosity” about the French Revolution, as to “whether 
there were any Revolution really going forward amongst them, or not. For I used to think 
they invented tales here in England, basking by their own fire-sides, that had not an atom 
of truth in them.”278 He pays dearly for his “skepticism,” finding himself imprisoned due 
to the influence of “Master Robertspierre, a demon of an attorney.”279 Time and money 
are forever intertwined—a relationship that is often precarious in times of social and 
political insecurity. In her study of speculation in Victorian fiction, Tamara Wagner 
reminds us: “Economic uncertainty, the loss of a stable home or fixed community, and 
the emotional fragility of the socially and geographically mobile protagonist created new 
motif-structures [in] literary representation.”280 The Wanderer, with its “emotionally 
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fragil[e]” and “socially and geographically mobile protagonist” makes the case that the 
time-money correlation can be disregarded only at one’s peril.  
 
4. Who One Knows 
The final component to negotiating money is dependent upon who one knows, or 
the span of one’s social connections. Juliet does not negotiate money within neutral 
scenarios; her earnings are often the result of interdependent decision-making, her 
financial destiny always responds to or assimilates the strategies of others. The Wanderer 
may thus be read as Juliet’s sustained effort to anticipate and overcome resistance to her 
agenda for financial independence.  
From the start, Juliet finds herself positioned between two discrete camps: 
collaborators (Lady Aurora, Sir Jaspar, among others) and hostile opponents (Mrs. Ireton, 
Mrs. Howel, Mrs. Maple, Riley). Thus, she makes her economic choices, not in a 
vacuum, but with the collusion of other parties within the economic system of Brighton 
and Lewes. Hence, the strength of Juliet’s social connections, and her interactions with 
intelligent supporters, improves her power to negotiate. The more widely spread her 
connections, the more she is likely to meet cooperation and overcome conflict. In turn, 
The Wanderer’s characters seem to form a grid of interlocking social connections; 
everyone seems to know everyone else.281 Juliet’s challenge is to situate herself within 
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this grid. For her, negotiating money ultimately involves strategic interactions with 
others.  
Juliet starts these interactions the moment she climbs aboard the “small vessel … 
preparing to glide silently from the coast of France” to England, thereby creating a 
network of alliances and enemies.282 At each point, she will negotiate with one or more of 
them; each relationship brings, in its wake, a series of other causal relationships. In fact, 
Juliet’s financial negotiations begin even before she emigrates. The process begins with 
the Bishop’s imminent sacrifice at the guillotine unless Juliet panders to the French 
commissary’s greed. She resolves this unilateral bargain—it is a one-sided negotiation in 
which she has no choice—by agreeing to exchange her dowry for a travesty of a 
marriage. In turn, this forced negotiation leads to her escape to England, and a life of 
stress and trauma in which she will live “bewildered with varying visions of hope, of 
despair, of bliss, of horror.”283 All her negotiations, thereafter, and nearly all her ‘Female 
Difficulties’ will involve money—the expectation of money, its lack, and its theft.  
Katharina Rennhak claims that Burney’s emigrants “are frequently shown to 
suffer under the anti-French prejudices that hold sway in England and are grateful for 
every encounter with a sympathetic Englishman or woman to whom they then feel closer 
than to the revolutionary monsters who are devastating their own country.”284 Rennhak’s 
observation also captures Juliet’s own experiences, something she describes as “the evils 
of defenseless female youth”: “[E]ven where actual danger is escaped, must slander lie in 
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wait, to misconstrue the most simple actions, by surmising the most culpable designs?”285 
Much of this danger, as Juliet correctly surmises, is psychological, consisting of the 
prejudices and predispositions of others. Her negotiation strategy must take into account 
how people feel towards her. These, in turn, determine how much she will have.  
A successful negotiation is one in which both parties find their needs met; a 
victory on one side is not won in exchange for a loss on the other.286 But Juliet’s 
predicament as an outsider means such cooperation is difficult to come by. Since she 
lacks a traceable history—a network of social connections to which she can be traced—
the men and women she meets are unable to distinguish fact from fiction. For them, she 
constitutes a set of signs—first of race, then of nationality, and finally of gender and 
female accomplishment—making her essentially powerless, a cipher.  
In every negotiation, individuals tend to incorporate learning from and knowledge 
of the past into the way they think and act. But in the novel, Juliet is a woman without a 
past; subsequently, this affects the negotiation strategies of others. An instance of such 
powerlessness can be discovered in Miss Arbe’s harp-recital organized to raise money for 
Juliet/Ellis. In the absence of social connections, Juliet has little opportunity to negotiate 
an economic advantage for herself: 
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Ellis was called upon with the rest [of the performers]; for in the name of Miss 
Ellis, and for the sake and benefit of Miss Ellis, all the orders were given, all the 
measures were taken, and all the money was to be raised; yet in no one point had 
Ellis been consulted […].287 
 
Juliet/Ellis’s powerlessness described here offers a view into the significance of social 
connections when negotiating money. Without these connections, she must learn about 
the power relations by being an observer: watching the behavior of others and inferring 
the, often unspoken, rules of economic exchange.  
 
5. Trust and Information 
The three variables of a successful negotiation—what one knows (information), 
when one knows (timing), and who one knows (social connections)—are all dependent 
on trustworthiness; it is the invisible glue that binds. Trust is the crux of a successful 
negotiation: its presence influences positively how much money one can negotiate. 
Although an abstract concept, trust enhances one’s financial destiny. In The Wanderer, 
many of Juliet’s struggles are an attempt to gain the characters’ trust. “Your situation I 
know not,” Harleigh writes Juliet, “but where information is withheld, conjecture is 
active.”288 And he is right; conjecture, wild and uncontrolled, is Juliet’s strongest obstacle 
to gaining trustworthiness. She is, Burney tells us, “unprotected, unsustained, unknown. 
Her situation was mysterious, and seemed open, at times, to the most alarming 
suspicions.”289 Juliet’s attempt to negotiate some degree of economic independence is 
even more impressive given that these “suspicions” shadow her movement throughout 
the novel. 
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Juliet discovers that in the absence of trust—intangible, yet powerful in 
influencing private and public agreements—people negotiate based on gender or physical 
appearance. To the members of a parochial English society, her entrance into their world 
as a black woman threatens on both counts: femininity and race. Her initial racial 
disguise in “patches, and black skin, and ragged dress” taints, figuratively speaking, her 
perceived trustworthiness for the remainder of the novel.290 A few dates are important 
here. Burney sets The Wanderer in 1793-4, at a time when “[t]he new developments in 
France in late 1792 were frightening to a number of English people, and encouraged 
slave-owners and slave-traders to associate abolition with sinister revolutionary designs 
against property.”291 Blackness, poverty, and mystery converge almost perfectly in the 
figure of Juliet, making her a figure who is forever “conclude[d] as open to 
corruption,”292 “always seeking some subterfuge, always belonging to art.”293 She spends 
a majority of the novel trying to earn, not only a living but also trustworthiness.  
But where many of Juliet’s female creditors refuse to pay their debts, the men, old 
and young, are amenable to negotiating on the basis of her beauty alone. Johnson 
corroborates this line of argument: 
Ellis/Juliet finds her projects menaced by the compromising sexual predations of 
men, even the best of whose offers of money have strings attached …. Thus, all of 
her dazzling advantages … avail her nothing in a world which regards her 
namelessness and lack of relation as grounds for suspicion rather than 
compassion.294  
Accordingly, Juliet discovers Sir Jaspar, with his patronizing and benign flirting, is a 
constant presence in her life; Sir Lyell Sycamore admits he is “ready to be her Alexander 
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when she will,”295 while Young Gooch “coming behind her, said, in a half whisper, ‘If 
you’ll tell me how much it is you owe, Ma’am, I’ll help you out in a trice; for I can have 
what credit I will in my father’s name; and he’ll never know but what ‘twas for some 
frolic of my own.”296 In other words, since nobody has enough information about Juliet to 
trust her on her own merit, they must look at another visible marker of social 
trustworthiness: physical appearance.297 In turn, their responses reveal that trust is a 
behavioral response to the personal qualities and the personal history an individual 
embodies.  
In Juliet’s case, how much people trust her is a response to her social and personal 
history, another intricate concept in itself. Since there is very little information she 
divulges, her trustworthiness is not correlated with fairness, but becomes a response to 
what people believe she represents. Hence, her imagined improprieties are magnified and 
connote her lack of trustworthiness; her attempt to conduct business ethically leaves her 
with only the prospect of uncompensated “solitary toil.”298 
Trust, as I discuss in chapter 1, is also a behavioral response based on reciprocity 
and risk. It is inherently risky because nobody knows how the other party will respond. 
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Juliet discovers she must trust that her female clients will pay her fairly for musical 
lessons, a risky move that proves unreciprocated; the novel’s characters—like Lady 
Aurora, Giles Arbe, and Harleigh—decide to trust her at a personal cost to their 
reputation. The ability to trust depends, therefore, on the willingness to look beyond self-
interest. In The Wanderer, few people show such willingness: after all, the moral 
obligation to help an impoverished émigré is neither risk-free nor lucrative. Trust and 
information are also correlated. Juliet’s trustworthiness is decided by networks of 
personal relationships, social sanctions—or what people collectively decide to grant 
her—and information people have about her. Juliet, of course, complicates her own 
trustworthiness by choosing to control the latter.  
While scholars have commented on Juliet’s wanderings as a reflection of 
“women’s dispossession in English society,” little has been written about the relationship 
between trust, information, and economic destiny.299 In The Wanderer, all three are 
connected: the more Juliet is trusted, the more information she has access to; this means 
she has more ways of earning a living. An instance is Juliet’s attempt to provide music 
and harp lessons. Her students are arranged through an unspoken and complicated 
network of favors attributed to Miss Arbe. The students constitute a consumer class unto 
themselves—minor aristocrats or gentrified ‘new money’—obsessed with obtaining the 
visible signs of social accomplishment, namely music lessons from a Frenchwoman. As 
Miss Arbe tellingly confesses, notoriety can only work in Juliet’s favor: 
“And now, Miss Ellis,” said Miss Arbe, “you will very soon have more scholars 
than you can teach. If once you get a fame and a name, your embarrassments will 
be at an end; for all enquiries about who people are, and what they are, and those 
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sort of niceties, will be over. We all learn of the celebrated, be they what they 
will. Nobody asks how they live, and those sort of things. What signifies? as Miss 
Sycamore says. We don't visit them, to be sure, if there is any thing awkward 
about them. But that's not the least in the way against their making whole oceans 
of riches.”300 
 
Thus, the misinformation about Juliet can help her, paradoxically, to increase her income. 
But she still requires the patronage of insiders—such as Mrs. Arbe, Elinor, Giles Arbe—
who have the access into this clientele. She may have refinement, the cultural taste, and 
the “fame and a name” to sell, but to enter into business with this class of demanding 
consumers, she will require the information of insiders. In turn, these non-paying music 
students exemplify the power of “extended credit relations [that] fundamentally shaped 
social and cultural life.”301 Juliet must negotiate money within this network of credit 
relations if she is to have any earning power at all.  
Juliet finds that her wanderings are really an extended negotiation: of her 
authenticity and ultimately, her value. In the absence of social and familial ties, trust and 
access to information work together to confer legitimacy. In her work on empire in the 
early eighteenth century, Laura Brown reminds us that “the understanding of race in this 
period, despite the increasing visibility of non-European racial groups in England, 
remain[ed] mainly extrinsic, geographically foreign, a category of difference defined as 
an external object.”302 So while Juliet may have regained her ‘whiteness’ on the boat trip 
to England, she is still defined in terms of difference—“an object to excite pity,” as Mrs. 
Maple describes her.303 To overcome such a distinction—one that functions as an 
                                                
300 Burney, Wanderer, 334. 
301 Finn, The Character of Credit, 2. 
302 Laura Brown, Ends of Empire: Women and Ideology in Early Eighteenth-Century 
English Literature (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 136-7. 
303 Burney, Wanderer, 112. 
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impediment to negotiating money—she must earn the trust of those who will pay her. In 
turn, the stories she will tell about herself, primarily the narrative of “being a young lady 
of a good family, who came over … from France” are calculated to precisely such an 
end.304  
 
6. Conclusion 
Long before she is revealed to be an aristocratic heiress, Juliet is described as a 
“young lady … in such prodigious want of cash … that she'd jump at any price [so] she 
could but get paid.”305 In short, this description articulates her need to negotiate money at 
each point in the novel. Her journey begins in uncertainty and ends with the knowledge 
of a certain outcome, and this arc may well describe any successful negotiation. Because 
her real identity is a mystery even to her, her negotiation strategies are characterized by 
an underlying authenticity: she must negotiate because she is truly poor; she must find a 
home because she is actually homeless.  
The Wanderer when read as text on financial negotiation reveals important truths 
about the altered world of the 1790s: this is a society in which power is nearly always 
assigned to the wealthy, occupying an economic space is the only way to gain power, and 
in the process of gaining economic space, the limits of the self expand concomitantly. 
Negotiation is, thus, tantamount to self-expansion: the more one has, the more one can 
become.  
                                                
304 Ibid. 
305 Ibid., 260. 
 109 
As an outsider, Juliet’s survival depends on the behavior and decisions of 
others;306 with little personal power of her own, economic outcomes are decided for her. 
In an early encounter with Mrs. Howel, we learn exactly how she is perceived by “the 
stuffy middle-class” English society that represents, according to Doody, “the stagnation 
of English life”: 
“Innocent?” repeated Mrs. Howel, with an air of inexorable ire; “without a name, 
without a home, without a friend?—Innocent? presenting yourself under false 
appearances under one family, and under false pretences to another? No, I am not 
such a dupe. And if your bold resistance make it necessary, for the safety of my 
young friends, that I should lodge an information against you, you will find, that 
people who enter houses by names not their own, and who have no ostensible 
means of existence, will be considered only as swindlers; and as swindlers will be 
disposed of as they deserve.”307  
 
To play any role in her own destiny, to make the journey from “swindler” to “the self-
dependence at which she so earnestly languished to arrive,” Juliet must learn to study and 
predict how others will act.308 “She is interesting by her solitary situation,” remarks 
Harleigh at the start of the novel, as a camouflaged Juliet embarks by stealth to 
England.309 As a rhetorical strategy, the heroine’s “solitary situation” permits Burney to 
examine the ways in which individuals may survive and create a space for themselves in 
the uncertain world of the 1790s.  
The novel’s many negotiation situations may serve also as an indicator of the 
cultural, political, and social change of the 1790s. A negotiation, in my reading, becomes 
                                                
306 Juliet’s situation, hence, is perfect for a game theoretic examination. Game theory, 
especially in its concept of the ‘Nash equilibrium,’ tries to reconcile the complexity of the 
cognitive choices individuals make in response to the choices of others, apropos of 
economic competition.   
307 Ibid., 133. 
308 Ibid., 225. 
309 Ibid., 17. 
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a metaphor for the slow but inevitable movement towards a transformed society. The 
novel’s subtitle tells us this is a novel about “Female Difficulties,” but Burney appears to 
remind us that economic dependence is the real source of all “Difficulties” for all human 
beings, male or female. The heroine finds herself participating constantly in negotiations 
involving money, and it is through these situations that the character of men and women 
are revealed. Juliet’s female creditors, contemptuously labeled “scholars,” show 
themselves to be “fair young creatures” with “no thought” and “sad little empty heads,—
except for their own pleasures.”310 The one-sided bargains they attempt to strike with 
Juliet—who has little to bargain with except her musical gift—show up for scrutiny the 
financial lives of the rich. The men she encounters will interpret her in two ways only, 
considering her either an easy amorous target or subjecting her—like Lord Denmeath, 
Riley, and the Gooch men—to Francophobic prejudice. In each negotiation, the people 
who negotiate with her reveal how they feel and think about economic choices; it is this 
psychological insight into money that makes the novel an exemplary study of negotiation.   
Reading The Wanderer as a narrative on financial negotiation enables us to 
understand the implications of conducting economic activity during a time of radical 
social and political uncertainty. That Juliet is an outsider and a woman complicates her 
situation; but despite the severity of her predicament, she is representative of every 
emigrant and ‘wanderer’ forced to make her way in a new and strange society. Through 
Juliet’s ‘wanderings’ in economic life, Burney articulates the practical side of trade, 
finance and credit. The novel is thus a study in political economy and free labor markets, 
popular topics in the late eighteenth century, from the perspective of the underprivileged.  
                                                
310 Ibid., 297. 
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Ultimately, The Wanderer is a novel about surmounting “difficulties” by 
negotiating with life itself. We are left with the sense that even without the economic 
plenitude that is opened up to her at the novel’s conclusion, Juliet would still be a 
survivor. This makes her a heroine for post-Revolutionary world, one that is trying to 
overcome “the most violently contested issues of the 1790s.” With her ceaseless attempts 
to work towards economic independence, Juliet proves she has the negotiation skills 
needed to survive in a society that is losing all its old affiliations.  
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Chapter 5 
“Thou Proteus!”: The Performance of Forgery in  
Georgiana Cavendish’s The Sylph 
 
We end this dissertation in 1779 with an epistolary novel that provides the coda to 
this project and perhaps the strongest illustration of what I earlier called “behavioral 
historicism”: a mode of interpretation with a focus on the diachronic aspect of literary 
texts cross-pollinated with the behavioral choices of literary characters. I investigate 
whether forgery is a decision made not only at the coordinates of incomplete, 
contradictory, and ambiguous information but also within certain cultural contexts—in 
this case that of late eighteenth-century London—in which individuals find themselves 
dissembling in their private lives. Finally, I ask if there are new destinations to which we 
arrive at the crossroads of literary interpretation and history.  
In The Sylph, author Georgiana Cavendish, more famously known as the Duchess 
of Devonshire,311 seems inclined to integrate scripture into her argument repeatedly—
specifically, one phrase from the Book of Jeremiah: “The heart of man is full of 
deceit.”312 And lest we forget this is a story of deceit, variations of this phrase are also 
uttered by different characters, many of who become mired in various forms of forgery. 
                                                
311 Lady Georgiana Spencer married the fifth Duke of Devonshire, William Cavendish, in 
1774, making The Sylph a novel written during the very early years of her long and 
unhappy marriage. It is only too easy to read the novel as an exposé of the ennui and the 
disillusionment Cavendish felt as a young bride to the indifferent and adulterous, if 
tremendously powerful, Duke.  
312 The original verse reads: “The heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately 
wicked: who can know it?” (King James Bible, Jer. 17.9). The Sylph’s heroine, Julia 
Stanley often quotes this verse in her letters, and the most recent contemporary source for 
its popularity is likely to have been John Wesley’s “A Sermon on Jeremiah XVIII.9.”  
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Cavendish wrote only two novels in her life: Emma; or, The Unfortunate Attachment 
(1773) and The Sylph (1779). While she went on to live a life as one of late eighteenth-
century London’s most fashionable celebrities, her writing has received little scholarly 
attention. Indeed she is remembered, variously, for her turbulent marriage to the powerful 
fifth Duke of Devonshire, for her support of other writers and artists, for her adulterous 
relationship with future Prime Minister Charles Grey, and for her political campaigning 
on behalf of the Whig party.313 She was also a style maven, credited with single-handedly 
increasing the sales of London newspapers with reports of her eccentric dress and 
hairstyles.314 Under the glare of this notoriety, her literary works have gone virtually 
unremembered.  
This chapter uses forgery as a trope to examine identity in The Sylph.315 It 
incorporates evidence from two famous forgery trials of the 1770s to argue that financial 
forgery, character forgery, and relationship forgery (all present in the novel and 
condemned repeatedly through the use of scriptural rhetoric) are not three discrete 
categories, but constitute a unified performance of personal identity.316 To read The Sylph 
                                                
313 Two excellent biographies of Cavendish are Brian Masters, Georgiana (London: 
Hamish Hamilton, 1981) and Amanda Foreman, Georgiana (New York: Random House, 
2001).  
314 Foreman reports: “Whatever she wore became instantly fashionable. Women’s hair 
was already arranged high above the head, but Georgiana took the fashion a step further 
by creating the three-foot hair tower. … Another of Georgiana’s innovations was the 
drooping ostrich feather … [that] [o]vernight … became the most important accessory in 
a lady’s wardrobe.” Foreman, Georgiana, 36, 37.  
315 Georgiana Cavendish, Duchess of Devonshire, The Sylph: A Novel (1779), ed. 
Jonathan Gross (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007). References are to this 
edition.  
316 I focus on the 1770s and its two most infamous forgery trials: the Perreau Brothers 
and Mrs. Rudd (1775) and Doctor William Dodd (1777). The Newgate Calendar lists an 
increase in forgery cases in the late-eighteenth century: the decade of the 1750s has three 
cases, the 1760s has four, while the 1770s has six.   
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in this way is to explore its depiction of forgery not only as a financial crime but also as 
an examination of authenticity. In Cavendish’s novel, forgery dislocates the very origins 
of being, or the individual’s ability to say: “This is who I am.” The forger connects the 
skeins of each experience to a different identity, saying, thereby: “This is who I could 
be.” Amidst late eighteenth-century society’s climate of social and national redefinition, 
the opportunities to dissemble were plentiful.317 The novel becomes a miniature depiction 
of this society, illustrating how the individual can reinvent herself as pure representation. 
Cavendish appears to argue that individuals can assume different identities without the 
lines between these identities being blurred.318  
 This idea—of the blurry periphery between authentic self and performed 
self—is central to my argument. I claim the novel’s characters negotiate constantly with 
the dependability and, hence, the real value, not only of the men and women they 
encounter, but also within themselves. Forgery thus becomes a useful trope for examining 
identity in The Sylph: like the counterfeit bank drafts that pass reliably for their authentic 
                                                
317 In her introduction to Cecilia (1782), Margaret Anne Doody posits: “Burney caught 
her society slightly off balance, in a historical lurch. There is no reference within the 
novel to the American War of Independence, yet independence is everywhere a theme. … 
old traditions and allegiances are breaking down.” Cavendish’s novel, written in the 
previous decade, captures late eighteenth-century society at nearly the same moment. 
With its overarching thesis of the idea of opportunism through identity transformation, 
The Sylph presents all the paradoxes and dichotomies of this society. Doody, introduction 
to Cecilia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), xxxvi. 
318 Georgiana’s ability to keep secrets ran deep and may well have influenced her 
portrayal of The Sylph’s characters. In 1776, in the early years of her marriage (also the 
time she was writing The Sylph), her gambling debts “amounted to at least £3,000 
($297,000 in today’s money) when her pin money, the allowance granted to her by the 
Duke, came to £4,000 a year. … In July [1776] Georgiana’s creditors threatened to apply 
directly to the Duke, which frightened her into confessing the truth to her parents.” 
Foreman, Georgiana, 41.  
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counterparts, human beings too can perform iterations of identity that are each inherently 
unstable.  
My investigation of forgery builds on the theoretical edifice of behavioral 
economics, which predicates there is a gap between our belief that we will act rationally 
and our actual behavior that can often be unpredictably irrational. As I uncover in the 
chapter below, such a systematic violation of rationality occurs in The Sylph’s three inter-
related categories of forgery—financial forgery, character forgery, and relationship 
forgery—wherein all three categories work in tandem, making forgery an act that 
involves both economic and behavioral decision-making. 
The present use of the term “performance” draws on Annette Kuhn’s definition of 
it as “an activity that connotes pretense, dissimulation, ‘putting on an act,’ assuming a 
role. … Performance, in other words, poses the possibility of a mutable self, of a fluid 
subjectivity.”319 In examining forgery as a performance, I incorporate but also go beyond 
this definition. I describe and study a phenomenon wherein, in the act of forgery, the 
boundaries between the “performed” self and “real” self are blurred to the extent that it is 
impossible to detect a single, unitary identity. 
The current critical conversation on forgery has usually centered on questions of 
identity and authenticity that lie at the heart of the eighteenth century’s tenuous 
relationship with credit. The crime has been connected with the rise of paper credit, or the 
extension of unsecured personal loans based on reputation or perceived financial worth. 
J.G.A. Pocock argues that in the seventeenth century, the removal of the monarchy 
followed by its reinstatement, led to the overhaul of the established framework in every 
                                                
319 Annette Kuhn, “The Body and Cinema: Some Problems for Feminism,” in Feminisms, 
ed. Sandra Kemp and Judith Squires (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 404. 
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area of life; this breakdown of the status quo—in land, in political authority, and in 
monetary valuation—changed how the worth of an individual was perceived, both by 
himself and others.320 Forgery can also be located within the context of the eighteenth 
century’s “financial revolution,”321 an economic development based on public borrowing 
and lending that, in turn, reconfigured the relationship between the citizen and the state 
through monetary policy. Colin Nicholson describes the consequent phenomenon 
wherein “the human personality radically revises its sense of identity and possibility”;322 
later in the chapter, I argue that such revision lies at the heart of forgery. In considering 
forgery useful for understanding the late eighteenth century, I follow Dror Wahrman’s 
argument that there is a “sea change in the last two decades of the eighteenth century” 
apropos of “the meaning, significance, and limits of identity” that distinguishes its 
cultural beliefs from those held in the previous eight decades.323  
Among scholars who argue that in the eighteenth century social and economic 
instability obfuscated the boundaries of individual identity, Tom Jones speaks of “the 
                                                
320 J.G.A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History: Essays on Political Thought and 
History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1985), 106. 
321 See P. G. M. Dickson, The Financial Revolution in England (London: Macmillan, 
1967), especially chapter 2. Also, J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment 
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 1975), particularly chapters XIII (“Neo-Machiavellian Political 
Economy” and XIV (“The Eighteenth-Century Debate”); and Pocock, Virtue, Commerce 
and History. See also Eric Kerridge, Trade and Banking in Early Modern England 
(Manchester: Manchester UP, 1991). 
322 Colin Nicholson, Writing and the Rise of Finance: Capital Satires of the Early 
Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 5. 
323 Dror Wahrman, The Making of the Modern Self: Identity and Culture in Eighteenth-
Century England (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), xiii. Wahrman divides the 
eighteenth century into two distinct “identity regimes”—the first eight decades (he labels 
these as the “ancien régime”) and the final two—observing that “the surprising rapidity 
of the transformation from one identity regime to another” made “turn-of-the-century 
observers [look] back at the eighteenth century with expressions of distance, 
incomprehension and disbelief.” Wahrman, Making of the Modern Self, xiv.   
 117 
shift from fixed value in land to unstable and fluctuating value in paper money, stocks, 
and government bonds,” all representations of borrowing and lending.324 The spread of 
paper credit, originating in the late seventeenth century through the creation of the 
National Debt, created what Margot Finn calls “the inevitable interpenetration of social 
relations and economic exchange.”325 
About forgery, in particular, current scholarship contends that handwriting 
concretizes but also problematizes the character of exchange in a credit-based economy: 
handwriting is a marker of identity yet one that can be manipulated by a forger because 
paper currency can be duplicated at will. Hence Paul Baines denotes forgery as “a theft of 
some internal notion of a private self,”326 while Donna Andrew and Randall McGowen 
focus on the causes célèbres of eighteenth-century England’s forgery trials—that of the 
Perreau Brothers and Margaret Rudd—observing, like Baines, that handwriting and 
credit-based transactions are directly linked with forgery since “the signature on a piece 
of paper was the feeble and exposed link” in the chain of financial transactions that 
connected various social strata.327 Hence Tamara Wagner argues that “paper currencies 
… opened up a range of metaphorical and metonymical constructions for their 
exploration in an emergent narrative discourse of finance.”328 
                                                
324 Tom Jones, “Pope’s Epistle to Bathurst and the Meaning of Finance,” Studies in 
English Literature, 1500-1900, 44.3 (2004): 487.  
325 Finn, The Character of Credit, 64. 
326 Paul Baines, The House of Forgery in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Aldershot, Eng.: 
Ashgate, 1999), 14.  
327 Donna T. Andrew and Randall McGowen, The Perreaus and Mrs. Rudd: Forgery and 
Betrayal in Eighteenth-Century London (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 
23. 
328 Tamara S. Wagner, Financial Speculation in Victorian Fiction: Plotting Money and 
the Novel Genre, 1815-1901 (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 2010), 11.  
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Ultimately, the breakdown of established structures—in land, in political 
authority, and in monetary valuation—changed how the worth of an individual was 
perceived, both by himself and others. Sara Malton notes that forgery “forms part of an 
ongoing response to the movement from an economy based on fixed wealth, on the 
ownership of land, to one centered on intangible capital and an expanding financial 
network of banking, credit, and forms of exchange that forgers could readily exploit.”329 
Cavendish incorporates the significance of this transition, demonstrating through the 
novel that, when nothing around them is certain anymore, men and women incorporate 
forgery into their lives by acting out human relationships and fiscal transactions in 
fraudulent ways. She writes at a time when an increase in high-profile forgery cases made 
eighteenth-century London sensitive to questions of authenticity and financial identity.330 
Consequently, The Sylph expresses her society’s dread as well as fascination with the 
crime. For the novel’s characters, forgery is a threat, an opportunity, and a necessity; it is 
a behavior that may begin in response to a pressing financial need but then goes beyond 
it.    
 
1. Financial Forgery 
 The Sylph tells the story of Julia Grenville. Having been raised in the mountains 
of Wales, she finds herself wooed and married to a dandified London aristocrat, William 
Stanley. Her married life in London is unpleasant and difficult. Stanley is a critical 
                                                
329 Sara Malton, Forgery in Nineteenth-Century Literature and Culture: Fictions of 
Finance from Dickens to Wilde (London: Palgrave, 2009), 2.   
330 For more on eighteenth-century conceptions of identity, see Charles Taylor, Sources 
of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1992) and also Michael Mascuch, Origins of the Individualist Self: Autobiography 
and Self-Identity in England, 1591-1791 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997). 
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husband, his cast-off mistresses are her only friends, her moral compass is skewed 
because of the strange ways of life inside London's haut ton, and her husband’s purported 
friend, Lord Biddulph is plotting to seduce her. She conveys these experiences in a series 
of letters to her sister, Louisa. Amidst this, a mysterious German nobleman, Baron Ton-
hausen, appears in London; Julia finds they share physical attraction and emotional 
compatibility. In the meantime, she begins to receive letters from a mysterious writer, 
who calls himself the “Sylph,” and appoints himself as her moral and spiritual guide. 
Towards the end of the plot, Stanley, about to be arrested for financial forgery, commits 
suicide. Now a widow, Julia lives off the generous financial settlement Stanley's uncle 
has made on her and is wooed by her childhood friend, Harry Woodley. Woodley, who 
has always loved Julia from afar, was unable to marry her owing to his own straitened 
financial circumstances. The novel ends with Julia's discovery that Woodley, the Sylph, 
and Baron Ton-hausen are all the same person. 
Masks and disguises have long been staples of eighteenth-century literature, 
particularly in amatory fiction.331 In The Sylph, however, such formulaic explorations of 
identity are invigorated by all-too-realistic financial concerns. Keeping in step with the 
novel’s major characters (Julia, her husband, and the Sylph), the minor characters forge 
fake identities of their own, mixing hijinks from formulaic romances with financial 
calculation. In a sub-plot involving a large inheritance, for instance, Julia’s mother, Maria 
Maynard, decides to court her future husband by following him to the battlefield as a 
cross-dresser accompanied by her maid, Hannah: “[T]hey agreed to put on men’s clothes; 
and Maria, to ensure her safety, dressed herself like an English officer charged with the 
                                                
331 See, for instance, Eliza Haywood’s Love in Excess; or, The Fatal Enquiry. 
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dispatches to the British army.”332 This dramatic, if fantastical gesture, is one of many in 
the novel that link transformations of identity to underlying financial game plans, making 
it a veritable panorama of financial forgery.   
The Sylph reaches its narrative crescendo when Stanley does the unthinkable: he 
sells his wife to fulfill his gambling debts before he commits suicide. In Julia’s absence, 
he hands her over to Biddulph through a legal document: “I resign right and title to my 
wife, Julia Stanley, to Lord Biddulph, on condition that he pays into my hands the sum of 
fourteen thousand six hundred pounds, which he enters into an engagement to perform. 
Witness my hand, William Stanley.”333 Stanley’s document mimics the counterfeit bank 
drafts and bonds at the heart of the two most notorious forgery trials of the 1770s, and it 
is through them that we can reach a better understanding of the representation of financial 
forgery in The Sylph. Forgery, which has been described as “the emblematic crime of the 
period,” occupied a central part of the public consciousness in the 1770s.334 The decade 
was characterized by two of the century’s greatest forgery trials: the trials of the Perreau 
brothers, Daniel and Robert (1775) and the case of Doctor William Dodd (1777).  The 
Perreau Brothers were indicted and ultimately executed for “falsely making, forging, and 
counterfeiting a Bond in the penal sum of fifteen thousand pounds, condition for the 
payment of seven thousand five hundred pounds, in the name of William Adair,” a 
wealthy army agent, in collusion with Margaret Rudd, Daniel Perreau’s mistress.335 
Doctor William Dodd was "a divine, a popular preacher and an elegant scholar" who was 
                                                
332 Cavendish, Sylph, 51. 
333 Ibid., 168. 
334 Andrew and McGowen, The Perreaus and Mrs. Rudd, 180. 
335 Old Bailey Proceedings Online (www.oldbaileyonline.org, 20 July 2008), May 1775, 
trial of Robert Perreau (t17750531-1).  
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executed for forging a bond for four thousand pounds in the name of his former student, 
the fifth Earl of Chesterfield. According to the Malefactor’s Register:  
Dr. Dodd being in want of cash to pay his Tradesmen’s bills, and having been 
preceptor to the earl of Chesterfield, he pretended that his lordship had an urgent 
occasion to borrow £4,000, but did not choose to be his own agent, and begged 
that the matter might be secretly and expeditiously conducted. The doctor 
employed Mr. Robertson, a broker, to whom he presented a bond, not filled up or 
signed, that he might find a person who would advance the requisite sum to a 
young nobleman who had lately come of age. … When [the attorney] Mr. Manley 
produced the bond in question, lord Chesterfield was surprised, and immediately 
disowned it. 336  
 
Lord Chesterfield was not the only one “surprised.” The seamlessness with which avarice 
and performance merged to create an instance of an identity (albeit fragmented by 
contradictions) made Dodd’s forgery trials a source of fascination for all of British 
society in the 1770s.337  
As a society leader of 1770s London, Cavendish was herself adept at 
manipulating the boundaries between image and authentic identity, something that the 
most successful forgers did so effectively. In The Sylph, she explores a central theme that 
emerges from forgery trials: financial identity, indeed identity itself, is often a composite 
of many signs, and that this composite could be a complete work of fiction. For instance, 
Julia’s father admits he is an aristocrat purely by nomenclature: “I inherited the blood but 
                                                
336 The malefactor's register; or, the Newgate and Tyburn calendar, vol. 5 (London: 
Alexander Hogg, 1779), 207-09. 
337 There is evidence to suggest Cavendish was aware of the trial of Doctor Dodd. In a 
letter of May 1788 she writes her aunt, Mrs. Poyntz, about a social engagement: “You 
will meet many of your friends tomorrow, the Dss of Manchester and her daughter, Ld 
Chesterfield &c.” The Lord Chesterfield mentioned here is Philip Stanhope, the fifth Earl 
of Chesterfield; he is also the very same former student in whose name Doctor Dodd had 
earlier forged a bond for four thousand pounds. See Georgiana, Extracts from the 
Correspondence of Georgiana, Duchess of Devonshire, ed. Earl of Bessborough 
(London: John Murray, 1955), 129. 
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very little more of my ancestors”338; like the forgers at the center of the Perreau and Dodd 
trials, his financial troubles begin with his inability to live within his means: “[A] taste 
for pleasure, and an indulgence of some of the then fashionable follies in which all ages 
and all times are too prevalent, conspired to make my little fortune still more 
contracted.”339 The parallel between this off-the-cuff comment and the case of the forger, 
Doctor Dodd is impossible to ignore. The Newgate Calendar reminds us that Dodd’s 
“expenses outran his income, and for a supply of cash he committed a forgery on his late 
pupil, the Earl of Chesterfield” by composing a personal bond in Chesterfield’s name.340   
In both actual forgery trials and in the novel, handwriting blurs the edges between 
authentic and fictional identity. The contradiction emerges, for instances, in the trials of 
the Perreau brothers, Daniel and Robert, in 1775: “When apprehended, Daniel kept an 
elegant house in Harley Street … wherein Mrs Rudd passed as his wife; and Robert was a 
surgeon of eminence in Golden Square.” Despite this veneer of genteel respectability, 
they were executed for having “forged a bond … to raise money,” in which they copied 
the handwriting and the signature of William Adair. It is not hyperbole that The Newgate 
Calendar describes the bond as “the fatal instrument.”341 Forgery, as Malton reminds us, 
“frequently connotes … an act of writing or (in the case of mass-printing of forged notes) 
a textual artifact.”342 It is through such a textual artifact—the newspaper announcement—
that Julia’s grandfather announces his daughter’s “sham funeral,” adding, bizarrely: “By 
                                                
338 Cavendish, Sylph, 36. 
339 Ibid. 
340 The Complete Newgate Calendar, vol. 4 (London: Navarre, 1926), 114. 
341 Ibid., 105. 
342 Malton, 150. For more on literary forgery and handwriting see Susan Stewart, Crimes 
of Writing: Problems in the Containment of Representation (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 1994).   
 123 
a whimsical and remarkable desire of the deceased, a large quantity of quicklime was put 
into the coffin.”343 Of course, as Julia’s father narrates, “the property of quicklime is to 
destroy the features in a very short space”; this corrosiveness will make it impossible for 
him, the son-in-law, to prove his dead wife’s identity or to recover her large fortune 
without being accused of forgery. The obituary—a textual record—thus acts as a forgery 
and yet attempts to prevent one. 
Handwriting, as Baines describes it, “constituted evidence in both economic and 
criminal transactions, and this reflexivity indicated the paradoxical reinforcement that 
forgery lent to the category of authenticity.”344 In the case of the Perreau Brothers’ trials, 
the writing and the signature of the wealthy William Adair had been appropriated in the 
counterfeit bond at the center of the forgery. Adair’s forged signature, in a sense, was a 
sign that conveyed crime through handwriting; in turn, the reproduction of this sign 
destabilized existing models of personal identity and reputation in eighteenth-century 
London’s commercial society.345 After all, if one’s handwriting could not be trusted, what 
else could be questioned? 
As in the case of the Perreau brothers’ trials, orthographical inconsistencies led to 
Dodd's undoing. The judge in the case comments: “I observed in the condition of the 
bond a very remarkable blot in the letter e in the word seven, before seven hundred 
pounds; it was a blot of a remarkable nature; it did not appear to me to be the effect of 
chance, but the act of a pen, dotted in hair-strokes in a particular manner, as if done by 
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social standing they enjoyed. After their death by hanging, “thousands of people gave 
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design.”346 William Blackstone, in the Commentaries, explicitly links writing and 
forgery, describing the latter as “the fraudulent making or alteration of a writing to the 
prejudice of another man’s right” for which the offender may suffer fine, imprisonment 
or pillory.”347 The Ordinary of Newgate’s Account for the forger, John Ayliffe describes 
handwriting as “the key of all [a person] possesses or enjoys” and asks: “Can this black 
crime be marked out in stronger or more horrid characters than to have been made the 
direful weapon of Robbery and Murder […] ?”348. Nearly all of the eighteenth century’s 
anxieties about forgery come across in this violent account, but perhaps the most 
significant is the connection between writing and purity of identity.  
Accounts on the interior lives of forgers have share a common narrative; they 
attempt to create an emotional bond with readers, members of a newly literate class who 
were encouraged to see in the crime the opportunity to distinguish themselves morally. 
Seen against the backdrop of the eighteenth century’s newly commercialized social 
relations, posthumous accounts of forgers are what Deirdre Lynch terms “artifacts of the 
era’s typographical culture”: “Adapted in function to particular relations of reception, 
those artifacts observe rhetorical protocols and exploit social analyses that were products 
of a culture-market irrevocably altered by the recent boom in the publishing of printed 
texts and images.”349  
The importance of handwriting in forgery trials cannot be overstated. Handwriting 
was linked, very directly, with the financial revolution of the eighteenth century. Clive 
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349 Deirdre Shauna Lynch, The Economy of Character: Novels, Market Culture, and the 
Business of Inner Meaning (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 28. 
 125 
Emsley observes: “Adam Smith, and others, stressed the dangers to economic life if 
frauds attacking the circulation of promissory notes were allowed to increase and go 
unpunished, especially since paper was becoming more and more important in commerce 
and the production of wealth.”350 As financial worth began to be documented and 
transmitted through paper documents, posturing through handwriting, usually that of a 
wealthier individual, became relatively easy. In a financial system that transferred wealth, 
not through specie or land, but through economic agency (paper bonds) conveyed 
through writing, the use of writing for nefarious purposes undermined, and threatened to 
destabilize, the system itself.  
In The Sylph, handwriting transmits not only information, but also identity. In his 
first letter to Julia, the Sylph writes: “I cannot help anticipating the surprise your ladyship 
will be under from receiving a letter from an unknown hand; nor will the signature 
contribute to develop the cloud behind which I choose to conceal myself.”351 
Handwriting conveyed through an “unknown hand” self-consciously and deliberately 
“cloud[s]” the Sylph’s true identity, in the same manner that the forged bank drafts at the 
heart of forgery trials concealed imposture and fraud. Handwriting gestures toward a 
confirmation of identity, even while it shows the unreliability of such confirmation.352  
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Forgery trials reveal that identity is often an amalgamation of perception and 
reputation. In the case of William Dodd, the Newgate Calendar enumerates his many 
social achievements: 
He stood high in estimation as a divine, a popular preacher and an elegant scholar. 
He was the promoter of many public charities, and of some others he may be said 
to have been the institutor. The Magdalen for reclaiming Young Women who had 
swerved from the Path of Virtue, the Society for the Relief of Poor Debtors, and 
that of the Humane Society for the Recovery of Persons apparently Drowned, 
owed their institution to Dr Dodd. He was patronised by the King, and more 
immediately by Lord Chesterfield; and his Church preferments were lucrative. 353  
 
In other words, Dodd’s case demonstrated that social reputation is a fundamentally 
unstable construct based on insubstantiality. Men and women following the case took 
away the message that it was impossible to predict who could be a forger because social 
identity was capable of multiple iterations. Malton terms such iterations as “less a source 
of vast anxiety and more a means of possibility,” but one result of such unpredictability 
was that eighteenth-century society found itself grasping for new tokens of personal 
transparency, stability, and trustworthiness. 
What does this craving for reliability mean within the context of the novel? To the 
comfort of the reader, in fiction, the act of forgery highlights the contradiction between 
appearance and reality, as various glaring inconsistencies often give the forger away. For 
instance, Stanley is a self-indulgent aristocrat—“wedded … to the pleasures of this 
bewitching place,” as Julia describes him—but conceals his gambling addiction and 
debts.354 His inconsistency reveals him to be a forger, in both his personal and financial 
lives. This is in direct contrast to real-life forgery trials, in which inconsistency could in 
fact be evidence of authenticity. Handwriting, for instance, points to the paradox; too 
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close a match between handwriting on a forged and on a real bank draft may indicate 
fraud. Jack Lynch notes:  
The high degree of consistency associated with currency, moreover, cannot be 
expected in every situation and, even when it exists, it is not always evidence of 
authenticity. In handwriting, for instance, perfect consistency between two 
specimens, far from being evidence of authenticity, is evidence of fraud—a fact 
first systematically discussed in the late seventeenth century.355 
 
In other words, consistency may have different implications in the context of forgery: 
there is no tried-and-tested litmus test. And, in any case, Cavendish’s novel appears to 
develop its own argument about consistency: individuals who forge financial documents 
generally have deception written deep into their character; they perform forgery in other 
areas of life also. 
 
2. Character Forgery 
Biddulph, in his attempt to coax Julia into marital infidelity, catalogs her 
husband’s vices: 
Think what a villain your husband is; think into what accumulated distress he has 
plunged you. Behold, in me, one who will extricate you from all your difficulties; 
who will raise you to rank, title, and honor; one whom you may make a convert. 
… No vile passion would have interfered to sever my heart from my beauteous 
wife; in her soft arms I should have found a balm for the disquietudes of the 
world, and learnt to despise all its empty delusive joys in the solid bliss of being 
good and happy!356   
 
This would be a typical seduction scene from much of eighteenth-century fiction except 
for one singular fact: in his assessment of his best friend’s character, Biddulph is correct 
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on every account. Nor is Julia’s husband the only character in the novel engaged in 
continuous deception. Quite simply, no one in The Sylph is who he or she claims to be.  
Had the eighteenth century come to see an authentic self as merely an illusion? 
Terry Castle considers this question as “locate[d] at the heart of eighteenth-century 
culture”; here I invoke her claim that “the true self remained elusive and inaccessible—
illegible—within its fantastical encasements … [resulting in] a material devaluation of 
unitary notions of the self.”357 In Cavendish’s novel, at any rate, what passes for genuine 
character is simply an enactment of authenticity. Julia realizes she has married a man 
who performs such authenticity occasionally, but that nothing in his character suggests a 
continuous sense of self. She observes: “I have studied the temper of Sir William … but 
how can I form a system from one so variable as he is? Would to heaven he was more 
uniform!”358 If nothing in Stanley’s character suggests consistency or continuity, he is, in 
effect, a character-forger: one who posits a different character to different people. 
Broadly speaking, what I here call character forgery still belongs on the 
continuum that comprises ongoing daily performance and reinvention of identity.359 And 
The Sylph does seem to conceive of identity as a social construct rather than an 
embodiment of essential qualities. Some of the novel’s characters confess to such 
inconsistency with candor; Biddulph, for instance, declares to his friend, Colonel 
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Montague, that they are complicit in Stanley’s downfall: “The undone self-destroyed 
wretch is gone to answer for his crimes; and you and I are left to deplore the part we have 
had in corrupting his morals and leading him on, step by step, to destruction.”360 Stanley 
sells his dutiful wife to pay his debts yet claims he fell in love with her on first sight (“I 
was mad for her”). Julia writes that she has been “abandoned and forsaken by [Stanley,] 
him to whom alone I ought to look up for protection,” but she also seeks advice and 
protection from other men: the Baron and the Sylph.361 Is it possible that these characters 
are simply performing a parody of the roles of authentic husband, wife, and friend? But is 
there such a thing as an authentic husband, spouse, or friend? I am inclined to agree with 
famed sociologist Erving Goffman’s view that essentialist relationship constructs do not 
exist at all, that social life is a performance in which “the activity of a given participant 
on a given occasion … serves to influence … the other participants.”362 We might, pace 
Goffman, posit that Stanley, Julia, Biddulph, and the Sylph perform, variously, the roles 
of “audience, observers, or co-participants.”363 
The Sylph may claim that his role in Julia’s life is to play a paternal mentor, but 
like a thespian in a well-scripted performance, he takes on different roles depending on 
the moment. His designs are clearly erotic: “My task shall be … to have myself the 
ineffable delight of partaking [endless joys] with you, where no rival shall interrupt my 
felicity.”364 In a case of an identity split into multiple personalities, he is, as Baron Ton-
Hausen and Harry Woodley, his own “rival”; each of these iterations—of the same 
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man—are competing, independently, for the love of the same woman, Julia. As such, it is 
an odd, if obvious, case of character forgery.  
Cavendish’s novel posits the argument that the idea of an authentic self may be 
one that lends itself to infinite change. The Sylph is replete with instances of cautionary 
advice about duplicity or character forgery. For instance, the Sylph’s very first letter 
cautions Julia against attributing to others symmetry of character. He warns: “And how 
are you to distinguish the insidious betrayer from the open violator? … Ask your own 
heart—the criterion by which I would have you judge … Examine yourself, and I conjure 
you examine your acquaintances; but be cautious whom you trust.”365 The authorial 
warning may be that there is an impostor within us all. 
Julia learns that she is Stanley’s ‘project’: to fit into his role as “a man of fashion,” he 
requires a wife who will complement his performance. When Stanley tells Biddulph that 
“money well applied … silence[s] the world,” he could well be describing his strategy to 
remake his rustic wife.366 Accordingly, Julia finds herself “surrounded with mantua 
makers, milliners, and hairdressers”: being fashionable constitutes its own category of 
character forgery.367 Cavendish, who dictated the sartorial styles in London during the 
last quarter of the eighteenth century as the notorious Duchess of Devonshire, knew much 
about the power of fashion to create (or “forge”) identity.368 Not surprisingly, she makes 
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her heroine undergo a radical process of self-making through a change in apparel. It is 
surely a tongue-in-cheek self-satire that Julia loathes the privileges of being tended to by 
an assortment of French helpers—a milliner, a hairdresser, a dancing-master, and a 
dressmaker—given that her author was famous for her appreciation of all things French. 
Kimberley Chrisman-Campbell notes:  
But the true secret of [Cavendish’s] sartorial success was her privileged access to 
French fashions. A frequent visitor to Paris and an intimate of Marie-Antoinette, she 
was a key link between French and English fashion at a time in history when each 
country depended upon the other for inspiration and innovation. Like Marie-
Antoinette, Georgiana patronized Rose Bertin, the celebrated marchande de modes 
who was nicknamed France's “Minister of Fashion.”369 
 
Cavendish was astutely cognizant of the social approval bestowed upon cultural norms 
derived from France. Like credit, often conferred on those financially undeserving but 
with the appearance of credit-worthiness, fashion of French provenance conferred upon 
the wearer the social cachet that Stanley seeks for Julia.  
Using fashion for personal reinvention is also a function of life in London, a city 
that, in the eighteenth century, developed its own currency of social valuation based on 
appearance.370 The lapse of the Sumptuary Laws in the late sixteenth century divested 
clothing from its former registers of financial wealth. Now the urban middle class, no 
                                                                                                                                            
elegance … but rather proceeds from the dread each feels that the Taste she may 
endeavour to take the lead in may be rejected.’ Georgiana had no such scruples. As a 
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370 The connection between fashion and the city is addressed directly in a letter from 
Spencer to Woodley: “Sir William Stanley is a quite a man of fashion.—Do you know 
enough of the world to understand all that title comprehends? … To what mischiefs is a 
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longer held back from dressing ‘above their station,’ engaged in ostentatious sartorial 
displays with the native confidence of those who had inherited their wealth. The newly 
rich sought to emulate the fashion displays of the aristocracy through their purchasing 
power. Penelope Corfield notes:  
In particular, the growing visibility and confidence of the urban middle class 
bridged the extremes. “The different Stations of Life so run into and mix with 
each other,” complained the Dean of Gloucester in the 1770s, “that it is hard to 
say where one ends and the other begins.” Wealth and poverty had not 
disappeared, but minute gradations of rank and degree were blurring.371  
 
The novel reflects such “blurring”; indeed, none of its characters (except the Baron) is 
defined by aristocratic title or rank.  
Against such a changing rubric of valuation, dress becomes a medium of financial 
and social exchange: a means for gaining legitimacy and acceptance within a more 
rarefied social circle. Julia claims she is “morally convinced my father would have been 
looking for his Julia, had he seen me, and would have spent much time before he 
discovered me in the midst of feathers, flowers, and a thousand gee-gaws beside, too 
many to enumerate.”372 Reduced to a role as fashion plate, she is literally lost. Indeed, 
with “its potential to provide fantasy, escape or self-realization,”373 one might say fashion 
is its own category of forgery: clothing (and the purchasing power it represents) becomes 
a means of parodying financial worth.  
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3. Relationship Forgery  
Relationship charlatanry is all over The Sylph. Indeed, the novel is, first and 
foremost, a treatise on the relationship of marriage and how this is beset by deception on 
both sides. There is little doubt that Cavendish writes many of her own marital 
experiences, especially those of emotional distance and frustrated love, into those of her 
characters’ travails in the wedded state. Stanley and Julia marry in haste and spend the 
rest of the novel repenting at leisure. “Reflection never agreed with me: I hate it 
confoundedly—it brings with it a consumed long string of past transactions that bore me 
to death,” informs Stanley in his very first letter after marriage, declaring himself as the 
very opposite of the introspective Julia.374 Neither do we understand what could persuade 
Julia to marry this man, who appears as callous as she is sensitive. Not surprisingly, 
marital infidelity—perhaps the cruelest form of relationship forgery—delineates this 
marriage from beginning to end.  
Reading their relationship as a forgery finds an echo in a surprising source: 
William Blackstone’s Commentaries. Blackstone describes the “offence of clandestine 
marriages” thus: “To make a false entry in a marriage register; to alter it when made; to 
forge, counterfeit, such entry, or a marriage license; to cause or procure, or act or assist in 
such forgery … all these offences, knowingly and willfully committed, subject the party 
to the guilt of felony, without benefit of clergy.”375 While Stanley may not have made “a 
false entry in a marriage register,” it is safe to say that a man who subjects his wife to 
consistent verbal abuse has relatively little to offer in terms of a marriage based on 
companionship and love. Julia, who has entered the relationship with the flimsiest 
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knowledge of her husband—we never really are told how their courtship or engagement 
progressed—loses her illusions and her affections rapidly.  
 But does relationship forgery have a connection with forgery itself? Does 
money—whether its absence or possession—allow the individual to simulate falsehood in 
relationships?376 Pocock notes that “we should be aware of the possibility that different 
modes of property may be seen as generating or encouraging different modes of 
personality.”377 Indeed, the Henry Woodley who returns to Woodley Vale, propertied and 
wealthy, seems to have the advantage of a new, masculine personality as well, as Julia 
writes: 
He is arrived (Mr. Woodley, I mean); we are all charmed with him. I knew him 
instantly, tho’ the beautiful boy is now flushed with manliness. It is five years 
since we saw him last – he did not meet us without the utmost emotion, which we 
attributed to the recollection that we now owned those lands which ought in right 
to have been his. He has, however, by Mr. Spencer’s account, been very 
successful in life and is master of a plentiful fortune. He seems to merit the favor 
of all the world.378  
 
It would appear that Woodley’s relationship forgery, or, the ability to manufacture false 
relationships through different identities, rests firmly on his financial value. Put simply, 
the richer he is, the more he can simulate, substitute, and clone.  
 But if Woodley is the overt relationship-forger, there are few within London’s 
haut ton who would escape this description. Woodley’s friend, Spencer alludes to “the 
disorder of this great town” with “its extravagances and follies” and adds: “I tremble for 
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your Julia.—Her beauty … will induce some of those wretches, who are ever upon the 
watch to ensnare the innocent, to practise their diabolical artifices to poison her mind.”379 
Here, in portraying Julia’s condition as a woman out of her depth in an aristocratic 
marriage, Cavendish is drawing upon her own experience. Like her heroine, Julia, 
“Georgiana had little acquaintance with her husband or with his world; training was all 
she could rely upon to take her through the first few months.”380 Cavendish depended 
upon her mother’s training and guidance to help navigate through the haut ton. Foreman 
notes:  
Whenever they were apart, Lady Spencer criticized Georgiana’s behavior in long 
letters filled with “hints to form your own conduct … when you are so near 
entering into a world abounding with dissipation, vice and folly.” In one [letter], 
she included a list of rules governing a married woman’s behavior on Sundays.381 
 
Here, the etiquette-heavy nature of the Cavendish’s marriage and that of her heroine’s 
reveals a great deal about the gender inequalities and isolation faced by women within the 
aristocracy. Julia, despite her social rank, has little access to money and almost no control 
over what little she possesses, given that Stanley has funneled it into his gambling 
addiction. Condemned to a marriage that only gestures at authenticity, she too becomes a 
relationship-forger: nurturing an extra-marital romance, complaining about her fiscally 
irresponsible husband to everyone who will listen, while maintaining a surface-level 
adherence to the role of a dutiful wife.  
Cavendish puts forward the argument that human relationships, even our most 
intimate ones, are formed out of a fundamental dissembling. Given the ubiquity of 
imposture, how can we protect ourselves from becoming “a prey [to those] well versed in 
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the science of deceit”?382 The author’s claim may be that, in times of uncertainty, we all 
need a Sylph. In fact, the novel’s eponymous character may be read as expressing her 
own incipient need for such a guide, mentor, and watchful spirit in the early years of her 
marriage.383 
In the end, the novel does not answer with any degree of assurance the central 
question in relationship forgery: are we all swindlers in our relationships? Yet hope 
exists, provided, paradoxically, by the novel’s ‘villains’: Stanley, in the act of selling his 
wife, expresses genuine contrition and Biddulph, while determined to possess Julia, 
ultimately respects her refusals. Even the worst relationship-forger, it would appear, 
possesses a kernel of authentic feeling.  
 
4. Conclusion 
Cavendish concludes with an argument as old as time: that love alone will defeat 
deceit—that of the heart or of the wallet. All of the novel’s female characters end up 
marrying for love, and this love becomes a catalyst for change. As Julia remarks to her 
sister: “How is the style of your letters altered! Is this change (not improvement) owing 
to your attachment to Mr. Spencer? Can love have wrought this difference?”384 This sense 
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of delight, we may equally read, as undisguised yearning from the writer who, loved 
though she was by nearly every man, was bereft of her husband’s esteem.385  
In other words, forgery in the world of The Sylph wields a threat that goes far 
beyond its financial impact. Set in the society of late-eighteenth-century England, in 
which the measure of an individual’s financial worth changed from inherited income to 
earned income, the novel suggests that the markers of financial valuation and the signs 
that denote the moral worth of an individual can be manipulated and falsified. Pocock 
refers to “the rise of forms of property seeming to rest on fantasy and false 
consciousness”; as a behavioral framework, forgery emerges from the impetus to create 
stories based precisely upon “fantasy and false consciousness.”386 We can re-situate the 
Sylph’s forgery narrative within a theoretical mode I like to call “behavioral historicism,” 
a historicist framework that examines the behavioral processes of literary characters, 
especially as they manifest in economic choices and decision-making. 
This chapter began by arguing that financial forgery, character forgery and 
relationship forgery are all connected and work in tandem. All three are born out of the 
need (or the necessity) to create fact out of fiction, the tangible out of the intangible. 
Cheated upon brazenly and financially exploited by her husband, Julia asks: “What shall I 
                                                
385 Beginning in the 1780s, Georgiana, her husband the Duke of Devonshire, and their 
common friend, Elizabeth ‘Bess’ Foster engaged in one of the eighteenth-century’s 
longest and most scandalous ménage à trois, one that lasted until Georgiana’s death. But 
when The Sylph was written, Georgiana was only a few months into her marriage and had 
already experienced the painful awareness that the Duke cared little for her. Biographer 
Foreman notes: “[T]hree months into her marriage, Georgiana could not help suspect the 
true nature of the Duke’s feelings towards her. He was kind in a distant sort of way, but 
he was naturally reticent and she soon realized they had little in common. Her innocence 
bored him and Georgiana was too acute not to notice his lack of interest in her.” 
Foreman, Georgiana, 29.   
386 Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 464. 
 138 
call him?—the man, my Louisa, who tore me from the fostering bosom of my beloved 
father to abandon me to the miseries and infamy of the world!”387 In her anguish, we may 
read Cavendish’s assertion—and her experience—that in this “world” with its “miseries 
and infamy,” no one can be relied on; intimate relationships are now counterfeit versions 
of the real thing, and it is no longer clear what would constitute the ‘real thing’ instead.  
Cavendish’s treatment of forgery brings out its multi-dimensional nature; in a novel in 
which almost every character is a forger, the performance of such forgery insinuates what 
James Loxley alludes to as “the fundamental performativity … of our lives” and “the 
relation of everyday to theatrical performance.”388 Thus it is hardly surprising that the 
woman who assists Julia with her dress is also “the dresser of the actresses.”389  
As financial volatility became a reality of eighteenth-century urban life, financial 
identity as a function of one’s monetary worth shifted constantly; quite simply, how 
much money one possessed changed from week to week depending on how markets 
performed.390 Malton gestures to this phenomenon when she notes that “the dilution of 
the authentic or pure reveals the tenuous status of conventional notions of ‘originality’ 
and ‘authenticity’ in an expanding system of monetary exchange that uses signs to 
represent value.”391 Woodley’s Sylph symbolizes the need, not vocalized but necessary, 
for an all-seeing guide through an urban landscape peopled by individuals with 
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fluctuating value. Julia describes such a need: “Yes! Thou friendly monitor, I will be 
directed by thee! I shall now act with more confidence, as my Sylph tells me he will 
watch over and apprise me of every danger.”392 The Sylph becomes a constant and 
dependable presence amidst the corruption and unpredictability of late eighteenth-century 
society and Cavendish’s position may be that such a guide is necessary to navigate 
society successfully. 
However, the fact that the Sylph warns Julia against deceit while he practices it 
himself complicates a straightforward reading. Are we to take him as the voice of reason 
and sanity in a chaotic society? Or does he symbolize Julia’s need to sort through the 
chaos inside her mind, one that split into different directions, affiliations, and affections? 
If identity is unstable and ultimately unknowable, then individual thoughts, too, can 
attach to different subjectivities or identities, seamlessly. Not surprisingly, then, the 
central characters—Julia, Stanley, Harry Woodley in his three roles, Biddulph—are all 
“shifting characters … capable of great artifice.”393 Each of these characters is a forger 
who sees the world through a different cognitive lens in the act of performing identity; 
each such identity may be considered a performance of the real thing or, as this chapter 
has argued, the real thing in itself. Thus, as the Sylph sees it, there is no single essential 
self underneath each disguise, but many. Each such iteration of an identity constitutes a 
forgery; but, to the forger, each iteration is not a matter of differentiation, but authentic in 
itself.  
Thus, the use of forgery as a trope to examine authenticity is not so far away from 
the idea of the forged bank draft or the counterfeit coin: both sides of the coin are, in 
                                                
392 Cavendish, Sylph, 88. 
393 Ibid., 192. 
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essence, still the same coin. Cavendish posits this line of argument throughout her novel; 
as I read it, the polyvalence of the term ‘forgery’ may ultimately describe the limits of 
authenticity in late eighteenth-century society. In other words, the epistemology of value 
that the forger plays with—real currency versus fake, real self versus fabricated—is 
inseparable from the ways in which the men and women of The Sylph experiment with 
the boundaries of self. Each character in the novel reshapes identity—either physically or 
behaviorally—thereby making essential value a purely symbolic idea. Julia articulates her 
changed beliefs in a letter: “I believe in this life … we must not search too deeply—to be 
happy, we must take both persons and things as we in general find them, without 
scrutinizing too closely. The researches are not attended with that pleasure we would 
wish to find.” Cavendish leaves her readers not with an answer, but with a question: if we 
can duplicate, rehearse and perform many versions of our identity, who are we really? 
Despite her attempt to create a happy ending in The Sylph, this question of authenticity 
lingers and remains a complex issue for Cavendish to resolve.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Devjani Roy 2013 
 141 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
I wish to conclude by asserting that this dissertation has taken the first steps 
towards a model I call “behavioral historicism” (for a description, see Chapter 1: 
Introduction) that recognizes the importance of behavioral characteristics, gradations, and 
nuances in investigating literary endeavor within its cultural contexts. Behavioral 
research, in particular behavioral economics, with its panoptic view of such 
characteristics provides a robust interdisciplinary paradigm for reading fiction. The 
behavioral-historicist approach to literature does not contradict or replace other 
established literary-critical approaches; as I discuss at length here, it complicates, 
expands, and lends unusual sources of support to our central humanistic inquiry: what 
does it all mean? 
To return to our own home discipline of eighteenth-century literature and culture, 
existing economic scholarship that includes such groundbreaking works as Mary 
Poovey’s Genres of the Credit Economy and James Thompson’s Models of Value 
explains the economic life of the period by staying faithful to the conceptual framework 
supplied by eighteenth-century credit theory. Why then do we need to borrow from 
another discipline when our own discipline has been doing a perfectly good job so far? 
Surely to analyze eighteenth-century literary texts through the insights of a late twentieth-
century social sciences’ field is an anachronistic exercise? One way to answer this 
question is to say that a behavioral approach to fiction complements a literary-critical one 
and, as I explore below, serves as an unexpected entry point for a discussion on questions 
of genre, character development, and narrative. Another possible answer lies in the 
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particular role played by fiction in this period, a role that we can better appreciate today 
since other discourses within popular culture have appropriated it: financial guidance. 
The process of financial institutionalization that began in the 1690s394 came to full boil a 
century later and, along the way, “progressively dismantled and then restructured the 
ways in which individuals saw themselves and their society.”395 So while exogenous (or 
external) factors—examples include the eighteenth-century’s credit economy with its 
high levels of speculative and risky enterprises—explain the workings of the 
macroeconomic system, they fail to explain how endogenous (internally derived) factors 
work. In other words, why do we make the economic choices that we do? Behavioral 
economics and behavioral research opens up new venues for answering this question.  
Here I wish to introduce the implications of behavioral research when intertwined 
with genre conventions. Fictional characters make decisions because their writers make 
them do so, and writers work with or against particular genre expectations. Thus the 
imperatives of genres are at least as important in answering the “why” question of 
economic choices. The behavioral-historicist model I articulate is receptive to the fact 
that, as literary scholars, we are examining specific works of literature—i.e., they are 
subject to specifically “narrative” needs of their respective genres—and also that they 
play a historically specific role of “guiding” their readers at times of financial uncertainty 
(for a extended examination, see Chapter 3, “How to be Lucky,” and Chapter 4, 
“Negotiating Money in The Wanderer”).  
                                                
394 For a discussion on early eighteenth-century financial institutions and markets, see 
Colin Nicholson, Writing and the Rise of Finance: Capital Satires of the Early 
Eighteenth Century. 
395 Nicholson, “‘Illusion on the Town’,” 184. 
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What adds a layer of complexity is that the eighteenth-century already had a 
genre dedicated to offering financial advice, namely the didactic financial narrative, and 
authors also draw upon and integrate features of this genre. To connect this didactic genre 
with the “behavioral historicist” framework, I argue that this genre of the didactic 
financial narrative was already a part of the cultural conversation of late eighteenth-
century England. For instance, in an open letter to the House of Peers in 1795, titled 
“John Bull Starving to Pay the Debts of the Royal Prodigal,” the writer, an anonymously 
titled “Hanoverian,” negotiates and speaks on behalf of the British public itself. 
“Hanoverian” protests against “the injustice of loading frugal men with the debts of a 
spendthrift; of punishing millions for the fault of one” and warns the peerage of the 
impending danger of public unrest.396 The Reverend John Trusler’s pamphlet “The Way 
to be Rich and Respectable” promotes its self-declared aim in its sub-title: that of 
“showing that a Gentleman with Economy, residing in the Country, may, with a few 
Acres of Land, live as well, and make an Appearance in Life, equal to those who spend 
double the Sum without those Advantages.”397 William Green, in Plans of Economy 
(1800), includes rich speculations on how different social classes think about economic 
choices. The genre of the didactic financial narrative urges readers to choose their 
economic behavior wisely in their personal, social, and political lives.  
The authors I study don’t invent this genre, but they draw freely upon it and 
incorporate its many generic conventions. Today, we recognize the features of this genre 
instantly: advice that combines personal stories that transmit financial wisdom in the 
                                                
396 ‘Hanoverian,’ “John Bull Starving to Pay the Debts of the Royal Prodigal: A Letter to  
the House of Peers” ([London]: Citizen R. Lee, 1795), 23. 
397 John Trusler, The Way to be Rich and Respectable. Addressed to Men of Small 
Fortune. 7th ed. (London: Louis Legoux, 1796), 9.  
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form of columns titled, say, “How to manage money in troubling times,” “Saving for a 
rainy day: How to invest wisely and rise above the madness,” “Advice for working 
women: How to change professions, win friends, and influence potential investors.” My 
larger hypothesis is that that other literary texts from the late eighteenth century would 
yield equally to such postulation: we would find financial instruction disguised within 
plots and subplots. The genre of the didactic financial narrative fulfilled a specific 
cultural role: at moments of transition or instability (such as characterized the financially 
and politically turbulent society of late eighteenth-century England), we turn to other 
voices of wisdom to guide our behavioral choices.  
The complexity in this is that the intermingling of these two genres and the roles 
they perform—i.e., a fictional narrative that is also a guide—are sometimes compatible 
and sometimes at odds, and so we have all kinds of interesting tensions in the case of 
each text, resulting now from incompatibility, and now from a particularly tempting 
compatibility. Below, I examine specific payoffs and tensions for literary scholarship. 
Thus, while behavioral research can explain why people make decisions in real life, it 
cannot explain, alone, why characters make decisions in fiction. Instead, the model I 
posit in this dissertation is that of behavioral research that incorporates historical forces 
and cultural artifacts but is also intertwined with the conventions of interpretation that are 
relevant for our work as literary scholars. This dissertation builds towards such a model 
through specific case studies. 
Consider, for instance, the case studies I offer in Chapter 4 (“Negotiating Money 
in The Wanderer”) wherein I discuss Burney’s critique of reckless instant gratification, 
her emphasis on the relationship between emotions and spending, or the case studies I 
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propose in Chapter 3 (“How to be Lucky”) with its portrayal of financial risk and return. 
These and related issues such as emotional biases in decision-making, human motivation, 
and irrational thinking, are also concerns for behavioral economists. So without 
allegations of pilfering or discipline-envy, I can borrow quite safely a vocabulary that 
allows me to articulate what I would otherwise be unable to. I am going to go a step 
further and make another claim, perhaps a controversial one: as long as literary scholars 
continue to study fictional characters and narratives, we are examining exactly the same 
thing as economists: human behavior. Let me make clear what I am not saying here. I am 
not attributing to authors the knowledge of economic theory, but I am crediting them with 
an intuitive sense of the relationship between human behavior and money.  
For the purposes of this dissertation, I am especially interested in the economic 
and political issues that defined late eighteenth-century English society—overseas wars, 
bad harvests, social unrest, financial turbulence in the stock markets—and these were 
unpredictable to the population at large. Thus I am theorizing that authors use such 
unpredictability to construct and depict models of economic behavior that are appropriate 
for their time. In a world in which wealth is the only unchanged point of reference, 
authors incorporate the awareness that money is the only thing that can be managed 
because other assurances like birth, nationality, and class are now gone. Thus, the literary 
texts I have drawn upon for this dissertation all incorporate prescriptions, in some form or 
another, on understanding human motivations in guiding economic decisions. In fact, I 
am going to hypothesize that the use of uncertainty to construct new models about the 
strategic handling of money is something we encounter, again and again, in many late 
eighteenth-century texts. 
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The design for the sequence of chapters was inspired by my interest in the four 
key behavioral “contexts” that fictional characters, and by extension, human beings face 
in social life. Each chapter in the dissertation has argued that the behavioral choices of 
fictional characters corresponds to the decisions of real people because authors are 
writing either from real-life experience or creatively imagined experience about men and 
women they know within the context of social life. While I am not comparing characters 
in a book to people in real life, I am saying authors write about economic choices from 
observing social life and social situations—which have real people in them. The 
dissertation’s chapters are ordered in this manner: Chapter 2 is a study of trust; Chapter 3 
examines what it takes to be lucky; Chapter 4 analyzes how men and women negotiate; 
and Chapter 5 investigates how we rehearse and perform identity within social life.  
 This particular sequence of chapters follows deliberation and design. Trust, the 
subject of the first chapter, is one of the principal behavioral choices fictional characters 
make in social life; authors build on the idea that relying on other people’s words, 
holding others to what they promise they will do, saves us time and money, both 
economic resources. By adding behavioral research on trust to a literary-critical reading, 
we are able to highlight the volatile, unpredictable nature of the social games that 
fictional characters play, and the ways in which these games affect the fictional narrative.  
 Let us consider one specific example that occurs in The Wanderer; in my reading, I 
use the behavioral game theory’s framework of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (for more, see 
Chapter 4) for illuminating the central problem in Juliet’s negotiations: the problem of 
trust. The literature on trust is vast and has been studied at length by behavioral 
economists (for an extended discussion, see Chapter 2). While there is no covering the 
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literature in its entirety in this chapter, I hope to make some relevant connections to The 
Wanderer. The Prisoner’s Dilemma’s hypothetical prisoners, A and B, reach their 
decisions on whether to ‘defect’ (or turn informant) or deny (thereby unknowingly 
cooperating), independent of one another. Cooperating turns out to be the ultimately 
better strategy, but is based entirely on blind trust. I am going to make a cognitive leap 
here, and apply this idea to money. Trustworthiness (‘cooperation’ in the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma) and creditworthiness (‘payoff’ in the Prisoner’s Dilemma) are synonymous 
abstractions. The act of conferring financial backing (or credit) signals trust; lack of trust 
might indicate one has a reputation unworthy of credit. Such a deeply embedded 
connection between trust and reputation, something that behavioral economists are very 
interested in, is something Burney is very aware of, at an intuitive level. Consider for 
example, this scene in which Juliet is trying unsuccessfully to recoup money from her 
debtors: 
Mrs. Ireton, again beckoning to Ellis, said, “Pray, Mrs. Thing-a-mi, have you 
done me so much honor as to make out your bill?” And, ostentatiously, she 
produced her purse. “What is the amount, Ma’am, of my debt?” 
Juliet paused a moment, and then answered, “’Tis an amount, Madam, 
much too difficult and complicate for me, just now, to calculate!” 
Mr. Giles, alertly rising, cried, “Let me help you, then, my pretty lady, to 
cast it up. What have you given her upon account, Mrs. Ireton?” 
“I am not her book-keeper, Sir!” returned Mrs. Ireton, extremely nettled. 
“I don’t pretend the honor of acting as her steward! But I trust she will be good 
enough to take what is her due. ’Tis very much beneath her, I own; extremely 
beneath her, I confess; yet, I hope, this once, she will let herself down so far.” 
And, ten guineas, which she had held in her hand, were augmented to twenty, 
which she paradingly flung upon the table.  
Mrs. Maple and Miss Bydel poured forth the warmest exclamations of 
admiration at this magnificence; but Juliet, quietly saying, “Let me hope, Madam, 
that my successor may merit your generosity,” again curtsied, and was going: 
when Mr. Giles, eagerly picking up the money, and following her with it, spread 
upon his open hand, said, “What do you go without your cash for, my pretty lady? 
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Why don’t you take your guineas?” … “Are they not your own? What have you 
been singing for, and playing, and reading, and walking? And humoring the little 
naughty boy? And coddling the cross little dog? Take your guineas, I say! Would 
you be so proud as to leave the obligation all on the side of Mrs. Ireton?”398  
 
There is a curious circuitous logic at work in Juliet’s inability to receive payment from 
her debtors: they will not pay her because they do not trust her. Mrs. Ireton’s caustic term 
for Juliet, “Mrs. Thing-a-mi,” and Juliet’s nervous response, (“’Tis an amount … much 
too difficult and complicate[d] for me … to calculate”), show the connection between 
reputation, trust, and power: she lacks the social power to earn such trust organically, and 
this in turn affects her economic behavior—she is willing to leave the room without her 
money, a desperate measure to escape the “extremely nettled” Mrs. Ireton and her equally 
censorious associates, the applauding Mrs. Maple and Miss Bydel, even if it will leave 
her impoverished. It is less the matter of pride that Mr. Giles thinks it is (“Would you be 
so proud as to leave the obligation all on the side of Mrs. Ireton?”) than a realization that 
she is not trusted.  
To use behavioral economic terminology, we might say trust is “social capital.” 
Economists Leonardo Beccheti and Giacomo Degli Antoni term “social capital” as a 
complex, if abstract, concept that includes at least five dimensions: trust, trustworthiness, 
willingness to pay for public goods, civic sense, and trust in institutions. My point here is 
that Juliet needs to earn trustworthiness before she earns a livelihood; where the first is 
social capital, the second is financial capital. To return to our the specific payoff from 
using the framework of behavioral game theory, in particular the Prisoner’s Dilemma, it 
allows us to integrate an additional—and very compatible—perspective into a literary-
                                                
398 Burney, Wanderer, 610. 
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critical reading of trust in The Wanderer: namely, that trust is intangible, powerful in 
influencing public and private contracts, yet ultimately fickle.  
The subject of the second chapter, luck, is connected to trust as a kindred 
behavioral choice and a comparably important element of social life. In works of fiction, 
choosing what turn out to be lucky pursuits (as Holcroft’s hero decides to do) helps a 
fictional character plan for conditions in which trust may be unreliable, a state of the 
world in which every possible future contingency may not be identifiable. If we study 
luck from a purely narrative angle, luck as portrayed in fiction has interesting tensions 
with fiction’s laws of verisimilitude. If the plot is too improbable, there is an insufficient 
narrative ‘payoff.’ If it is too believable, we don’t get our desired ‘happy’ ending. So the 
depiction of luck in fictional narratives allows the author to create exciting stories in 
which lucky incidents can create a suitably exhilarating narrative arc. However, such an 
author also faces the challenge of maintaining a very fine balance between a credible, 
lifelike narrative and an exciting, but improbable, storyline. We see this tension in the 
conclusion of Hugh Trevor in which a series of improbable events makes the hero a very 
lucky man: 
I know not if it will give [the reader] pleasure to be told that, could I have 
delighted in revenge [on Hugh’s enemy, the politically corrupt Earl of Idford], I 
might have satiated myself with that unworthy and destructive passion. … Must I 
repeat more names? … That [by unexpectedly inheriting my uncle’s large 
fortune] I have amply provided for the generous-minded Clarke? … That Mary 
and her son are equally objects of my attention? And that I do not mean to boast 
of these things as acts of munificence: but as the performance of duties?399 
 
In strictly narrative terms, Hugh Trevor’s conclusion proves the challenge that I describe 
above: that authors find themselves walking a tightrope between serendipity and 
                                                
399 Holcroft, Hugh Trevor, 496. 
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credibility when they depict luck in fiction. When we add a behavioral reading to this 
claim, note the payoff it provides: a framework like the ‘Black Swan’ I use in Chapter 3 
(a behavioral term used to describe life-altering events in financial markets that appear in 
the manner of an unpredictable ‘thunderclap’) permits literary critics another angle from 
which to study agency and causality, something which authors are already doing when 
write about luck. Thus, the behavioral perspective strengthens the interpretation that, say, 
a celebrated Holcroft scholar such as Arnold Markley is already attempting when he says 
that in Hugh Trevor “the balance between the demand for a happy ending and the 
political efficacy of the work [is] easily tipped” and that the ending makes us question 
whether “human affairs … are ruled by mere chance.”400 
Negotiation, the subject of the third chapter, fits into the sequence of trust 
followed by luck. We negotiate our place in the world within the context of how 
trustworthy we are perceived to be; trust is a behavioral response to the personal qualities 
and the personal history we are seen to embody. Similarly, negotiation is connected to 
luck, since both, in my argument, are cognitive-behavioral gestures that demonstrate the 
successful ways in which fictional characters incorporate unpredictability in the form of 
new information and new insights that emerge in the narrative. The subject of negotiation 
also allows us to question the limits of genre. Should genres be treated as rigid categories 
or well-demarcated ‘species’ of literary works, or can we explore the possibility that 
authors frequently negotiate for the intermingling of genres? In chapters 3 and 4, I 
consider the possibility that authors seek to play with the reliance on fixed genre 
categories by negotiating with the boundaries, or ‘laws,’ of these categories. Specifically, 
                                                
400 Markley, Conversion and Reform, 16. 
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I argue that against the financial uncertainty of the late eighteenth century, authors 
negotiate towards the emergence of a new literary category—or genre—that we are today 
intimately familiar with: financial didacticism conveyed through personal narratives 
involving money. 
Hence, the choice of the final chapter (“Performing Forgery in The Sylph”) fits 
into this sequence since it studies such unpredictability and randomness in the broad 
sweep of social life: do fictional characters see the world through a different cognitive 
lens (or, say, multiple lenses) in the act of performing identity? Trust, luck, and 
negotiation all coalesce in this final chapter; the characters in Cavendish’s epistolary 
novel interact with trustworthy and untrustworthy situations, cross and diverge from the 
paths of fortune (or luck), to ultimately negotiate a different subjectivity for each social 
encounter. Instead of fixing upon the genre of the epistolary novel (which would be the 
most immediately obvious genre to which The Sylph adheres), Cavendish also draws 
upon the genre conventions of didactic financial narrative that I describe earlier in this 
chapter. This authorial gesture, of drawing upon features from two genres, lends support 
to my view of reading literature behaviorally—namely that it allows authors to engage, in 
a capacious manner, with the repertoire of ‘behavioral’ codes associated with different 
genres. 
One specific payoff in using behavioral research is that it yields the vocabulary 
for interpreting Cavendish’s particular interest in the psychological insights of her 
characters within the context of specific social occasions, especially since behavioral 
researchers are particularly interested in things we don’t say to each other. For literary 
scholars, such unspoken behavioral impulses underpin our own process of interpretation: 
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as participants in literary criticism, we agree or disagree about characters’ behavior and 
its significance to the narrative. Thus, the Sylph’s words of wisdom to Julia, “Ask your 
own heart—the criterion by which I would have you judge. … Examine yourself, and I 
conjure you examine your acquaintance,” may well be addressed to literary scholars 
too.401  
Another payoff of the behavioral perspective is that it gives us definite 
frameworks that permit us to investigate how the novel’s characters are emotional, 
irrational, and unpredictable in thinking not only about each other but also when thinking 
about money, a concern central to the plot of The Sylph (and to that of all the texts I 
investigate in this dissertation). This is something Cavendish does particular well in her 
depiction of conspicuous consumption (a habit that, as I discuss at length in Chapter 5, 
was strongly ingrained in the author herself). Let us consider this scene in which Julia 
writes to her sister Louisa about the excesses of dress and jewelry, particularly important 
when we later find out these have been purchased by her husband’s income from 
gambling and forgery:  
I must tell you what my dress was … . Indeed it was very beautiful, and so it 
ought, for it came to a most enormous sum. My jewels are magnifique, and in 
immense quantities. Do you know I could not find out half their purposes, or what 
I should do with them; for such things I never saw. … [Our father would have] 
discovered me in the midst of feathers, flowers, and a thousand gew-gaws beside, 
too many to numerate. … When I recovered the power of utterance, I told [the 
French hairdresser] … he should have informed me … before he ran me to so 
much expense. … My manner made [my husband Stanley] ashamed; [he] added, 
“My dear creature, I want you to be admired by the whole world; and, in 
compliance with the taste of the world, we must submit to some things which, 
from their novelty, we may think absurd; but use will reconcile them to you.”402 
 
                                                
401 Cavendish, Sylph, 87. 
402 Cavendish, Sylph, 31-34. 
 153 
Why, we might ask, is Stanley so keen to drive himself into debt to make sure his wife is 
“admired”?  
Applying the behavioral-historicist framework to literary interpretation, we can 
examine this scene—and Stanley’s motivations—through the ‘window’ of intertemporal 
choice.403 Intertemporal choice can be reduced to this question: how do we mentally 
‘weigh’ the future against the present? For Stanley, the appearance of affluence clearly 
matters a great deal even when it conceals a threadbare existence. The phenomenon of 
credit culture is well researched within eighteenth-century scholarship.404 However, in 
our work of literary interpretation, we are helped along the way, by new, connected 
strategies. Thus, the conceptual framework of intertemporal choice studies why people 
buy things they do not need—or why Julia needs “jewels [that] are magnifique,” a 
financial profligacy fueled by Stanley’s gambling and spending habits. Cavendish is also 
depicting, at work, a ‘mental accounting’ process through which characters choose 
between immediate and delayed gratification. The term “mental accounting” was 
introduced in behavioral economist Richard Thaler’s landmark article, “Mental 
Accounting and Consumer Choice.” In this, he draws parallels between the accounting 
process used by firms and the mental accounting process used by individuals, defining 
mental accounting as the set of cognitive operations we use to code, categorize, and 
evaluate our financial choices. Thus, Stanley’s ‘mental balance sheet’ declares that his 
wife “will be an eternal disgrace to [him]” if she does not “submit to some things” in 
                                                
403 Behavioral economists George Loewenstein and Drazen Prelec have written 
prolifically on our mental accounting of buying and selling. See, in particular, 
Loewenstein’s Choice over Time. 
404 For an extended discussion, see works by Mary Poovey, Catherine Ingrassia, and 
Margot Finn. 
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terms of extravagant purchases that, while “absurd,” are made “in compliance with the 
taste of the world.”405 The cognitive complexity of such mundane decisions is interesting 
but also furthers our understanding of eighteenth-century financial life: intertemporal 
choice, or our preferences within the context of time, communicates much about what 
men and women value at a certain point in history. In other words, it allows us to read 
literature behaviorally. 
Each chapter offers multiple case studies, through a combination of close-reading 
and expansive literary analysis, situated within the specific context of behavioral 
research. For each case study, I note that these conceptual models offer payoffs and 
thought-provoking tensions (more on this below) that allow certain literary interpretations 
to become possible. (To mention just three examples, the behavioral concepts of 
discounted utility, intertemporal choice, and mental accounting applied in chapters 2 and 
4 help us understand why fictional characters make choices involving conspicuous 
spending or excessive financial sacrifice, and the ‘cognitive price’ exacted by such 
spending.) More interestingly for literary scholarship, behavioral research meshes with 
and complicates various fictional genres and their conventions. I explain this above in the 
description of Cavendish’s use of multiple genre conventions in The Sylph and also at 
length below in the analysis of Holcroft’s use of the picaresque.  
Consider, for example, four representative tensions that can also be interpreted as 
literary payoffs. The first involves my behavioral reading of Cowley’s Stratagem 
(Chapter 2). Misty Anderson discusses Letitia’s ‘stratagem’ within the context of 
“craft[ing] a positive … identity for herself as a British woman with both English sense 
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and foreign allure. Letitia has inherited her father’s prescience in trade, and she uses it to 
bolster her … value.”406 Anderson’s observation here falls under the larger question of 
the payoffs of studying negotiation behaviorally: or, to put it differently, what is Letitia 
ultimately trying to negotiate through her ‘stratagem’? Behavioral game theory and 
negotiation research offer insights into the ways in which fictional characters involve the 
thinking of others into their own thinking in weighing economic outcomes, such as 
Letitia does in this play. We can extend this hypothesis, this metaphor involving 
‘thinking’ and ‘weighing outcomes’ to our study of genre in works of fiction: authors 
incorporate thinking about the features of entirely different genres to conceptualize a 
fictional work that is completely organic while drawing from multiple genre conventions. 
Thus, Stratagem falls under the genre of drama but also involves the complementary 
genre conventions of the didactic financial narrative, the latter already familiar within 
eighteenth-century cultural life. 
Consider the tensions in the third chapter (“How to be Lucky”), in which we enter 
the world of the picaresque novel: “a world of sharp-witted servants and dull masters, of 
confidence tricks, of hunger and the constant threat of poverty, of the road and the 
unforeseen adventure, of upward and downward mobility,” all characteristics of the 
picaresque genre.407 While the picaresque is one way to classify Hugh Trevor in terms of 
genre, such a taxonomy is in tension with what literary critics such as Arnold Markley 
see as a fundamental divergence in the way Holcroft interprets the picaresque. In 
Markley’s reading Holcroft is playing at the boundaries of the picaresque, whereby the 
                                                
406 Misty G. Anderson, Female Playwrights and Eighteenth-Century Comedy: 
Negotiating Marriage on the London Stage (Houndsmill, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 
157. 
407 John Frow, Genre (London: Routledge, 2006), 86. 
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importance the author assigns to “mere chance” (or luck, in my reading) that rules 
“human affairs” is seen to “obliterate the gravity of the social critique” that commonly 
delineates this genre.408 What is interesting about combining Markley’s perspective, i.e., 
that of a literary scholar, with a reading that integrates behavioral research on luck, is that 
it gives us the vocabulary (were a literary critic so inclined) to embed an additional layer 
of complexity into our study of plot as agency; or, to put it differently, to Patricia Meyer 
Spacks’ observation that “[a]ll plots in their nature raise questions about agency and 
causality: what, or who, makes things happen?”409 Behavioral research on social network 
theory, some of which I also apply in this chapter, similarly gives us the lexicon to 
‘measure’ and reflect upon the relationships between Hugh Trevor and his network of 
associations—who lead him to surprisingly lucky outcomes in the form of an unforeseen 
inheritance and a privileged social position, thereby subverting the genre expectations of 
the picaresque, as literary scholars have noted—in an economic light, both quantitatively 
and qualitatively. 
Another interesting convergence (or tension, depending on where we stand in the 
interdisciplinary continuum) between literary analyses and behavioral interpretations is 
the idea of negotiation. The literary works I examine in this dissertation are all drawn 
from the late eighteenth-century, consonant with my belief that the period’s literature 
“announce[s] change and embod[ies] ways that fiction can constitute an agent of change 
in modes of understanding the world.”410 Such re-definition can also be termed as 
‘negotiation,’ something I study under the umbrella of behavioral game theory and 
                                                
408 Markley, Conversion and Reform, 16. 
409 Patricia Meyer Spacks, “Energies of Mind: Plot's Possibilities in the 1790s,” 
Eighteenth-Century Fiction 1, no. 1 (1988): 39. 
410 Ibid., 39. 
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negotiation theory. Even if readers do not think about late eighteenth-century texts in this 
fashion (“is this a story about negotiation?”), authors such as Burney (see chapter 4), with 
her decision to cast her heroine as Everywoman who seeks to carve out a well-
demarcated economic and social space for herself, is vocalizing an issue that is very 
much on the minds of authors of the 1790s and, it appears, also on that of the literary 
scholars who are writing about them.411  
And finally, consider the interpretive model of behavioral historicism as applied 
to the final chapter of this dissertation, “Performing Forgery in The Sylph.” Specifically, I 
argued that the ways in which the fictional characters in this epistolary novel code and 
decode behavioral choices is imbricated within, perhaps even inseparable from, the 
historical forces of late eighteenth century London. This historicist interpretation finds 
echoes in literary critics who note that in the late eighteenth century, “a time of intense 
class consciousness, when appearing wealthy was almost as good as possessing wealth, 
England was likely to [both] produce such characters as [infamous forgers] Perreau and 
Rudd and novels such as The Sylph.”412 Tracing such a frame of reference through the 
economics of information (for instance, the dissertation’s application of concepts such as 
asymmetric information, moral hazard, adverse selection, and signaling) provides us with 
an interpretive ‘strategy’ with a somewhat unusual payoff; it cross-pollinates effectively 
with plot situations that involve fictional characters engaged in exchanging information 
with a desire to control how they present this information, a narrative tension that also 
                                                
411 For more, see Gary Kelly, The English Jacobin Novel: 1780-1805 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1976) and Mona Scheuermann, Social Protest in the Eighteenth-Century English 
Novel (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1985). 
412 Jonathan Gross, introduction to The Sylph, by Georgiana, Duchess of Devonshire. 
(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2007), li. 
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interests literary scholars. One specific payoff is that we can use frameworks such as 
intertemporal choice (see the extended analysis above) to examine Cavendish’s caution 
about falsehood and the contradictions between financial appearance and reality; as Julia 
confesses poignantly about her spendthrift husband: “Could two men be more opposite 
than what Sir William appeared at Woodley Vale and what he now is? – For too surely 
that was appearance – this reality.”413 
I am going to make three immediate observations about the specific texts I chose 
for this project and then shift my focus to a wider angle, and see what these observations 
tell us about fiction between 1770 and 1820. Firstly, human beings have always preferred 
instant gratification to future gratification. We ‘discount’ the future to pay for the present, 
a phenomenon behavioral economists study under the umbrella of ‘intertemporal choice.’ 
Secondly, people are not rational all of the time (as many mainstream economists 
insist)414 and our choices about money often reflect irrational behavior. Such irrationality 
gets even worse during unpredictable historical moments. And finally, our relationship 
with money is based on appearance and perception far more than we would admit easily; 
we incorporate information about intangibles (trustworthiness, social connections, 
propitious timing) when we buy (or sell). But lest we are moving too fast into the 
territory of economic theory, let me say that I am more excited about what these 
observations tell us about the territory of fiction itself.  
                                                
413 Cavendish, Sylph, 109. 
414 Mainstream economists draw from some central tenets of neoclassical economics, in 
particular, rational choice theory and the theory of the rational actor, both of which claim 
that clear-headed rationality, or wanting more rather than less of something, underlies our 
economic decisions; in doing so, human beings are ‘rational actors’ who choose (or ‘act’) 
objectively. See, for example, the work of economists Gary Becker and Kenneth Arrow. 
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In particular, I am interested in the behavioral approach to fiction and its 
implications for our study of narrative. As it turns out, there is an intriguing parallel we 
can draw to the behavioral concept of “mental framing,”415 a cognitive phenomenon 
wherein the way we “frame” a situation that has many options and probable outcomes 
influences the decisions we take. I would also like to draw a connection here between this 
line of argument and David Herman’s description of the “spatiotemporal configuration of 
narrative worlds.”416 We might ask here: how does framing influence the “vantage point 
on situations, objects, and events in the narrated world [that] shapes the presentation of 
that world at a given moment” [in the narrative]?417 As I discussed in chapter 2 (“Trust 
and Reciprocity”), we might read Letitia’s entire ‘stratagem’ as an attempt to change the 
“vantage point … in the narrated world” through which Doricourt sees her. Similarly, the 
heuristics (or mental ‘rules-of-thumb’) and cognitive biases that behavioral economists 
study (for more on this, see “Introduction”) also creates differences in perspective 
through which situations and events are presented to the reader, with immediate 
implications for the study of narrative. Thus, chapter 3 (“How to be Lucky”) proposes 
that we read Hugh Trevor’s picaresque exploits as an attempt to ‘see’ each situation he 
encounters through the ‘perspective’ of different ‘interpretive frames,’ something that 
also complicates our expectations of the genre of the picaresque hero’s narrative, as I 
discuss elsewhere. This genre expectation involves the reader participating in the world 
                                                
415 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology 
of Choice,” Science 211, no. 4481 (1981): 453. 
416 David Herman, “Narrative Worlds: Space, Setting, Perspective,” in Narrative Theory: 
Core Concepts and Critical Debates, eds. David Herman, James Phelan, Peter J. 
Rabinowitz, Brian Richardson, and Robin Warhol, 98 (Columbus, OH: Ohio State 
University Press, 2012). 
417 Ibid., 98. 
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of the hero, sharing his perspective into society’s corruption and ills from the position of 
an underprivileged outsider. Hugh Trevor confounds these genre expectations, changes 
the ‘frame’ through which we read about his experiences. 
Behavioral-literary research on gender, i.e., studying fictional characters based on 
gender, could be another interesting payoff. Many of the female characters in the 
previous chapters suggest that the late eighteenth century England had started “to accept 
that gender categories could ultimately prove inadequate; and therefore that individuals 
or actions were not necessarily always defined or fixed by the boundaries that these 
categories delineated.”418 Studying gender through the interplay of the historical and the 
behavioral might lead us to pull the cultural rug from our own gendered assumptions. 
What were the determinants of an eighteenth-century woman’s economic destiny? What 
were the cultural practices enmeshed within economic practices that influenced whether 
or not women could negotiate self-sufficiency for themselves? Let us consider one 
specific example from The Wanderer. Here Juliet and fellow French émigré, Gabriella, 
have become shopkeepers in London and are managing, nervously and inefficiently, a 
haberdasher’s store: 
Again a new scene of life opened up to Juliet. The petty frauds, the 
overreaching tricks, the plausible address, of the crafty shop-keeper in retail, she 
had already witnessed; but the difficulties of honest trade she had neither seen nor 
imagined. The utter inexperience of Gabriella, joined to the delicacy of her 
probity, made her not more frequently the dupe of the artifices of those with 
whom she had to deal, than the victim of her own scruples. New to the mighty 
difference between buying and selling; to the necessity of having at hand more 
stores than may probably be wanted, for avoiding the risk of losing customers 
from having fewer; and to the usage of rating at an imaginary value whatever is in 
vogue, in order to repair the losses incurred from the failure of obtaining the 
intrinsic worth of what is old-fashioned or faulty;—new to all this, the wary shop-
                                                
418 Wahrman, The Making of the Modern Self, 21. 
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keeper’s code, she was perpetually mistaken, or duped, through ignorance of 
ignorance, which leads to hazards, unsuspected to be hazards. 
Repairs for the little shop were continually wanted, yet always unforeseen; 
taxes were claimed when she was least prepared to discharge them; and stores of 
merchandize accidentally injured, were obliged to be sold under prime cost, if not 
to be utterly thrown away. 
Unpracticed in every species of business, she had no criterion whence to 
calculate its chances, or be aware of its changes, either from varying seasons or 
varying modes; and to all her other intricacies, there was added a perpetual horror 
of bankruptcy, from the difficulty of accelerating payment for what she sold, or of 
procrastinating it for what she bought.419  
 
One specific payoff of investigating the underlying behavioral dynamics of Juliet’s life as 
a shopkeeper is that it allows us to study if, and how, women negotiated in eighteenth-
century economic life, one of the themes of The Wanderer, and whether this has 
implications for eighteenth-century gender studies.420 As literary scholars, we can 
integrate an examination of eighteenth-century gender with a framework that interests 
behavioral scholars: what is the interplay of mental models—our self- perception in an 
ongoing interchange with the perceptions of others—that impacts women’s self-
sufficiency in the eighteenth century. Thus while Juliet has prepared herself mentally by 
personally experiencing the “the petty frauds, the over-reaching tricks ... of the crafty 
shop-keeper in retail,” she has not assimilated into this mental model her own 
“inexperience” and “delicacy,” which end up making her “frequently the dupe of the 
artifices of those with whom she had to deal.” The specific payoff for gender scholars, 
and the strategic complexity we can add to a literary interpretation, is that eighteenth-
century women, when negotiating with others, found that their mental models and their 
roles in the negotiation are not fixed but changed constantly especially in response to 
                                                
419 Burney, Wanderer, 622-23. 
420 See also Felicity Nussbaum, The Autobiographical Subject: Gender and Ideology in 
Eighteenth-Century England and Paula Backscheider, Revising Women: Eighteenth-
Century “Women's Fiction” and Social Engagement. 
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unforeseen events. Thus, one payoff of studying gender through the lens of behavioral 
historicism would be some new directions for literary scholarship for the study of gender 
identity and subjectivity, especially when a woman’s economic destiny depending on her 
malleability in economic exchange. Juliet initially lacks such mutability because she is 
“unpracticed in every species of business”; she has, in her own words, “no criterion” by 
which to “calculate” the variability of chance. This means she is financially independent 
in name only, consumed mentally by the “perpetual horror of bankruptcy.” Thus, to add 
to our interest in gender we can integrate the behavioral perspectives on negotiation: how 
did eighteenth-century woman here manage information (“the difficulties ... she had 
neither seen nor imagined”), mental perceptions (“perpetually mistaken, or duped, 
through ignorance of ignorance”), and uncertainty (“repairs were ... always unforeseen,” 
“stores of merchandise accidentally injured.”) in her quest for economic self-sufficiency. 
And was such self-sufficiency even possible? In ending, the main payoff of studying 
fiction behaviorally and historically may be found in Alan Richardson’s use of the French 
term bricolage, or something new and vital constructed from a diversity of material, not 
an invitation to interdisciplinary anarchy but a unifying intellectual gesture. I see a 
mutually accessible colloquy (accessibility is the fundamental term) that, in Richardson’s 
words, “bring[s] additional objects of inquiry, different questions, and a certain healthy 
skepticism (our well-known “hermeneutics of suspicion”) into the conversation.” 
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